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Words matter. They’re the keys that allow us not only to communicate something, but to communicate that something with granular precision.

But what happens when a word’s definition doesn’t fully encapsulate what we’re actually talking about? More worryingly, what happens when this gap—between denotation and connotation—can have real-world consequences?

J.M. Berger, a fellow at the Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications Project, spoke at a recent ������Ƶ event about this very topic, which is also the subject of his new book, . According to Berger, the (circular) dictionary definition of extremism—“the quality or state of being extreme”—fumbles in its attempt to “cover the scope of the problem at hand.” He explains that the current definition, in addition to being wildly relative, is too focused on violence, in effect “excluding a broad swathe of obviously extremist activity such as segregation, laws against interracial marriage, and employment bans.” He argues that it’s time to move our woefully incomplete understanding of extremism beyond prevailing tautologies.

But how?

“No two hurricanes are alike, but we can recognize them when they form, follow them through stages, and estimate their future behavior—imperfectly. But we can’t understand hurricanes if we don’t understand wind and water.” This is Berger’s approach to extremism. He suggests that “extremism emerges from social ecosystems in a manner analogous to weather.”

At least in part, Berger grounds his understanding of extremism in three specific ways in which we view identity: in-group, the group a person belongs to; out-group, those excluded from an in-group; and extremist ideology, largely beliefs that prescribe who’s part of the in- and out-groups, and how the relationship between these two camps ought to function.

Some people, Berger explained, believe that extremism is based on the belief that the out-group creates a crisis that affects the in-group, such that the in-group feels compelled to “solve” that crisis by taking aggressive action against the out-group (recall the triumphalism that permeated Nazi Germany). But Berger complicated that thinking somewhat, saying that it’s perhaps more accurate to distinguish between two kinds of in-groups: the eligible in-group, and the extremist in-group. The former is the identity an extremist group appeals to, whereas the latter is an actual extremist movement or organization. For instance, Berger said, “for ISIS, an eligible in-group would be Sunni Muslims, because that’s who they want to join them.”

But identity alone doesn’t make an extremist ideology. In addition, there’s the particular role of a crisis. Berger mapped out several common crisis narratives surrounding extremism: impurity, conspiracy, dystopia, existential threat, and apocalypse. He also explained that once an extremist group has come to define itself according to, and been motivated by, one of these crisis narratives, they then have to decide on a perceived solution to squelch that particular crisis.

Importantly, these solutions might not sound like the kind you’re used to, and they’re not always commensurate with the crisis at hand. Rather, Berger said, they’re often specific hostile acts the in-group believes will address their broader, arguably existential struggle. These solutions range in scope and severity, from harassment, discrimination, and segregation to hate crimes, terrorism, oppression, insurgency, and, in the worst cases, even genocide.

Indeed, as Mary Beth Altier, a clinical assistant professor at New York University, added, the value of Berger’s forward-thinking approach to extremism is that it provides us with a new way to conceptualize—and, ultimately, address—this sort of behavior on a much fuller spectrum.

It proffers “a way to circumvent those types of problems”—that is, the limitations of our typical understanding of extremism—“by offering an overarching definition of extremism and radicalization that fits groups from the KKK to the IRA,” Altier said, adding that “the emphasis of CVE [countering violent extremism] and PVE [preventing violent extremism] should be on mitigating hostile activity, rather than on attacking the legitimacy of extremist groups,” since the latter mainly drives home the notion that “extreme measures are required to protect the group,” and radicalization is often only part of the puzzle of why people ultimately carry out extremist violence.

Berger put it succinctly: “We often don’t talk about extremist movements that are in a pre-violent phase until, suddenly, one day, they’re violent. And then we’ve got a big problem.”