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In January 2018, the Pentagon released a new , which declared that the primary challenge to U.S. security was no longer terrorism but “long-term strategic competition.” The National Defense Strategy also stated that the United States must “compete, deter, and win” against five top challenges: China and Russia, the “revisionist” power players; North Korea and Iran, the rogue regimes; and terrorism, the “plus one.” The strategy also somewhat cryptically talked about “the competitive space” in global affairs.

On September 20, 2018, Sharon Burke, Director of ������Ƶ’s Phase Zero Project, convened a panel to discuss great power competition with China and specifically “the competitive space.” The panel discussion brought together high-level subject matter experts, including Nancy Sung, Senior Science Advisor, National Science Foundation; David Rank, Senior Advisor to the Cohen Group and former Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Beijing; Andrew Gulley, Mineral Economist at the United States Geological Survey; and Leon Clarke, Senior Scientist at the Joint Global Change Research Institute, which is involved in a research initiative with the Phase Zero Project.

David Rank, the former Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy Beijing, started the discussion by stressing that the competitive space and contest between the U.S. and China should not be singularly focused on military means.

…the competitive space and contest between the U.S. and China should not be singularly focused on military means.

Rank lamented the Trump administration's withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the erosion of U.S. leadership in the region. He emphasized that trade has always been advantageous for the U.S. and a key tenet of U.S. power. Rank cited Atul Gawande, a surgeon and journalist [and Board Member for ������Ƶ], who has written about the importance of incrementalism and prevention rather than just heroic interventions. The same approach can apply to U.S. national security, Rank noted. Burke posed the question, “If all we are doing is building a war machine are we inevitably going to war?” Rank acknowledged that this is a major worry and emphasized that what is really an effective intervention is not lethality but rather diplomacy, culture, trade and investment when it comes to “preventative care” in the competitive space.

Dr. Nancy Sung, who formerly headed the Beijing office for the National Science Foundation, said that the NSF works in the “pre-competitive space,” focused on “blue sky discoveries.” Sung stated that the U.S. and China are “each other’s most important collaborators” and have been since the Science and Technology Agreement was signed in 1979. For the scientific community, contribution to the competitive space is measured “not in lethality but in the number of publications, in the pebbles we throw on the mountain of knowledge,” and now China has “surpassed all but the U.S.” Another metric to examine the scientific competitive space is to measure the level of Chinese investment in research and development, which has . Sung emphasized that although the U.S.- China relationship has been asymmetric, she “wouldn’t want to see us sell when the market is low, pull out at the point right when we may begin to benefit in these basic science fields,” especially when it comes to future access to world class facilities, experts, and unique research sites. Sung noted the need for future scientific collaboration that is mutually beneficial, and gave the example of working with Chinese scientists to understand the mechanisms of disease transmission in order to mitigate and prepare for future pandemics. Trusting relationships need to be in place for such research to pay off.

Trusting relationships need to be in place for such research to pay off.

When it comes to artificial intelligence, however, Sung emphasized that the NSF is not seeking to collaborate with China unless there is a clear benefit for the United States.

Dr. Leon Clarke, Senior Scientist at the Joint Global Change Research Institute, spoke to how climate change will affect the competitive space within the context of the energy-water-land-food nexus in China. China is a “voracious consumer of energy,” according to Clarke, and is taking actions domestically and internationally to address their energy and broader resource needs. China is investing at home in photovoltaic cells, wind energy, and hydroelectric, as well as internationally in petroleum and natural gas. In terms of water, arable land, and food, China has a history of droughts in the north. To ensure food security, as well as meet the preferences of China’s growing middle class consumers, China is increasingly importing fruits and vegetables, soy feed for animals, and purchasing land abroad. “In terms of climate change,” Clarke noted, “much of China’s population, urban centers and economic activities are in coastal regions particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise.”

“In terms of climate change,” Clarke noted, “much of China’s population, urban centers and economic activities are in coastal regions particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise.”

Clarke emphasized that the effects of climate change on China’s security are not limited to domestic agricultural output but “what is really going to matter is how trade patterns [will be] affected.” Therefore, to mitigate the risks of climate change, China’s top-down climate policy is making targeted investments in energy and food security both domestically and internationally.

Dr. Andrew Gulley, Mineral Economist at the United States Geological Survey, delineated the new competitive space for strategic nonfuel minerals that are critical for advanced and emerging technologies. “Whether it is niobium in jet engines, indium in flat panel displays, or gallium in smart phones, obscure elements empower smarter, smaller, and faster technologies, and nations seek stable supplies of these nonfuel minerals for their industries.” No nation has domestic reserves of all of these mineral resources, so Gulley’s research has looked at net-import reliance around the world for 42 of the most important minerals. According to Gulley, a country is considered “highly import-reliant upon a particular mineral when its net import reliance is 50% or greater.” Gulley found that China has a comparative advantage over the United States in 13 out of the 42 minerals studied and of these 13 minerals China is the leading source of U.S. imports for 9 minerals. This includes Rare Earth Elements (REEs), which are integral inputs for modern technologies ranging from everyday electronics to clean-energy and high-tech military technology. Gulley focused in particular on the “most contentious 11 minerals, for which China and the United States are both highly import-reliant upon concentrated production sources.” These minerals include niobium, chromium, rhenium, zirconium, manganese, titanium, platinum group metals, lithium and tantalum, which are critical to a variety of aerospace, defensive, energy, and high tech applications. There are just five countries that produce these minerals: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, Chile, and Brazil. When it comes to minerals, those five countries are clearly the competitive space.

There are just five countries that produce these minerals: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, Chile, and Brazil. When it comes to minerals, those five countries are clearly the competitive space.

Gulley concluded that the U.S. has many foreign critical mineral supply risks and although China has weaknesses as well, China’s strategic planning over the past decade has addressed these risks through domestic capacity building and foreign direct investment.

This panel discussion provided insight into China’s current relative strengths and long-term geostrategic initiatives for achieving superiority within the competitive space. This panel and keynote address by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Security Affairs Randall Shriver introduced Phase Zero Project’s research collaboration with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s Joint Global Change Research Institute to examine how natural resources and climate change will influence China’s future strategic priorities. The Phase Zero Project utilizes big data and a range of analytical tools to assess how natural resources shape the competitive space. Other research initiatives in the Phase Zero portfolio include developing an early warning system for water related conflict with the World Resources Institute, examining how climate change will increase frequency and severity of humanitarian and disaster relief operations in the Indo-Pacific in partnership with the Indo-Pacific Command’s Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and the Pacific Disaster Center, and building an anticipatory model of war rhetoric with our partners at Arizona State University and Indiana University.