Chayenne Polim茅dio
Fellow, Political Reform Program
Last Friday was a memorable day for Brazilian democracy.
Luiz In谩cio 鈥溾 da Silva, former president, was taken in by the Brazilian federal police for three hours of questioning as part of the Lava Jato investigation. (Opera莽茫o Lava Jato) has been in the works since March 2014 and is the biggest corruption and money laundering investigation Brazil has ever seen. After a series of smaller investigations into criminal organizations run by black-market money dealers, the Brazilian Government Agency for Law Enforcement and Prosecution of Crimes (Minist茅rio P煤blico Federal) found proof of a massive corruption scheme that involved the Brazilian national oil company Petrobras. The scheme, which lasted more than ten years, implicated contractors, Petrobras employees, financial operations, and politicians from pretty much every party in the country. And : the corrupt dealings add up to more than $20 billion worth of government contracts across several sectors.
Not surprisingly, this investigation has had a serious and lasting impact on the Brazilian economy: shares of Petrobras fell precipitously and Moody鈥檚 Investors Services the company to Ba3 from Ba2 (translation: not good); as a result of a sweep of layoffs in the auto, oil and construction sectors has also spread to other businesses that relied on those industries. And as the bad news made its way around the world, were filed in the U.S. by shareholders who claimed losses due to mismanagement.
But that鈥檚 not what makes the day a decisive one for democracy.
What happened to Lula is important for two reasons. Firstly, it was a symbolic showing that powerful political elites cannot escape justice, even the most seemingly untouchable ones. But secondly, and most importantly, it is becoming increasingly clear that populism-branded politics has had its time of glory in Brazil.
Say the word populism today in Latin America and the names of Venezuela鈥檚 Hugo Ch谩vez, Bolivia鈥檚 Evo Morales and Ecuador鈥檚 Rafael Correa, and Brazil鈥檚 Lula and Dilma are likely to pop up. These leaders are what political scientists call 鈥攖heir brand of governing rests on the claim that they govern in the name of the 鈥減eople,鈥 albeit a single and homogeneous people. This, of course, is an oversimplification of what populism has looked like in Latin America over the years. But suffice it to say that Latin America has been a point of reference for the rest of the world for what populist leaders look like, what sort of policies they are likely to adopt, and what effects those policies have on the countries鈥 economies. Before you had Le Pen and Orban and Sanders and Trump, we had and .
Populism鈥檚 success in Latin America has hinged on leaders鈥 ability to mobilize those who were previously politically unorganized by responding to the social demands of the poor. This focus on radical anti-poverty programs and their success in helping millions of people rise out of poverty has led to of people who now define themselves as 鈥渕iddle class,鈥 with Brazil鈥檚 growth of over 40 percent the region鈥檚 highest.
This does not mean that the ascent was so easy for Lula. It took him three attempts to finally make it the presidency in Brazil. At political rallies, Lula鈥檚 bushy beard and Che Guevara t-shirts didn鈥檛 help him win people鈥檚 approval. Some wondered if his longtime friendship with Fidel Castro was a sign that he was too much of a socialist, and thus unfit for the presidency.
But things changed.
When unequal income distribution and widespread poverty peaked, when total public debt rose from , and when the stark contrast between the rich and the poor could no longer be ignored, Brazilians thought it was time to give Lula a chance. Lula became president in 2003.
Lula鈥檚 governing agenda was heavily focused on social programs. Bolsa Fam铆lia (Family Allowance), a poverty-fighting effort was by far Lula鈥檚 : If a family could prove that it lived in extreme poverty or moderate poverty (earning less than 100 reais per person), it was eligible for payments (direct cash transfers). This was pretty revolutionary, and it , challenging the idea that cash transfers would make people dependent on welfare. Millions of Brazilians rose out of poverty. People were buying more refrigerators, televisions, microwaves鈥 some for the very first time.
The problem? Populist policies tend to have negative consequences, too.
The : Populism leads to institutional underdevelopment. Populism expands a leader鈥檚 power to dangerous levels, rendering spending discretionary. Countries that go through periods of populism have weakened civic institutions. And while populism might be successful in addressing the needs of those who have been marginalized or particularly hurt by economic downturns, its solutions tend to be temporary and, consequently, they do not lead to a real transformation of social structures.
The picture of the Brazilian economy today is a result of the lack of regard to factors such as , coupled with widespread political corruption. Lula鈥檚 foundation for an excessive interventionist model, with high regulation of the economy and expansion of the state, and current president Dilma Rousseff鈥檚 following through of the model, wasn鈥檛 going to last forever. Add to that the undermining of some of the basic premises of what it means for a country to be a democracy (accountability, rule of law, separation of powers and judicial independence), and you have Brazil鈥檚 current , which is only aggravated by corruption scandal after corruption scandal.
This has made Brazilians reassess the state of their democracy. They . They for a laser-focused investigation into Petrobras and any and every politician that might have been involved in the money-laundering scheme. 鈥淕ood enough鈥 was replaced by 鈥渨e deserve better.鈥
Populism is an aging phenomenon in Brazil. There is a deep political divide between those who were for populist policies and those who are now being confronted with the reality that the leadership style they supported has been accused of corruption, and those who no longer see populism as a viable option. The multiclass support that Lula, Dilma, and their Workers鈥 Party had initially enjoyed is gone.
And this is fine. Actually, it is better than fine. This is good news.
That鈥檚 because change is on its way. The ability to be politically discerning is a sign鈥攕urely, it is a sign鈥攐f a more mature civic society. As Brazilians have (finally!) grown increasingly suspicious of politics and skeptical of righteous promises of salvation, and as politics takes the center spot in the media, important conversations have started about what Brazilians expect their representatives to be like. The current chaos is also forcing people to ask, What model of government truly represents what Brazil and its people stand for? It is clear that what Lula and Dilma have offered is no longer enough or attractive. But what is?
They don鈥檛 know yet. And that鈥檚 fine. Learning what works鈥攖ruly and sustainably works鈥攆or Brazil is going to be a long and painful process. But so, too, will it be a necessary and important one.
In addition, significant improvements in accountability are already taking place. Lula鈥檚 coercive questioning is an example of that. If six months ago you asked any Brazilian whether or not he or she thought that there was any chance Lula would even be included in Operation Car Wash鈥檚 investigations, you鈥檇 get a resounding 鈥渘o.鈥 Whether Lula is guilty or innocent remains to be seen. But what is truly transformative is that a member of the political elite could not evade justice.
Dilma, too, is for her role as Petrobras鈥 Chairwoman and for alleged . As are a growing list of other politicians, government contractors, and government agencies.
So yes, things are bad. Some might even argue that they are going to get worse. But, as many chanted on the streets of Brazil, 鈥溾. Now, we wait for more memorable days for democracy.