How China Is on the Verge of Totalitarianism 2.0
鈥淭he capacity to maliciously modify or steal information.鈥
鈥淭he capacity to conduct undetected espionage.鈥
That was FBI Director Chris Wray earlier this year, when he, along with other members of the U.S. intelligence community, that further penetration of the U.S. market by Chinese tech giants Huawei, ZTE, and Hikvision may pose a national security threat. Their fear, more broadly, wasn鈥檛 merely that these entities may be beholden to foreign governments, but also that they may even attempt to siphon away key information for nefarious ends.
Yet the scope of this challenge stretches beyond China鈥檚 potential to abuse technological 鈥渂ackdoors.鈥 More than that, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is exploiting and exporting technological innovations to establish a panoptic form of governance鈥攐ne through which it becomes possible for the state to constantly monitor individuals under the guise of 鈥渟ocial management.鈥 As as result, it鈥檚 important to investigate what this technological turn may mean for people both within China鈥檚 borders and beyond them.
Totalitarianism 2.0
It鈥檚 impossible to understand the CCP鈥檚 current approach to maintaining political power without also understanding its version of social management. As the political scientist Samantha Hoffman , China 鈥渙ptimises interactions vertically (within the Party), horizontally (between agencies), and holistically, between the Party and society鈥 in order 鈥渢o improve governance capacity to shape, manage, and respond to social demands.鈥 Crucially, the demands of society, as determined by the state, .
How does this actually play out? China shores up control largely through its social credit system, which collecting and analyzing meta-data to shape and 鈥渟core鈥 individual citizens鈥 economic and social behavior. The effect fuels both passive participation (state access to ) and active participation (coercing people into allowing the state to ).
Human Rights Watch this system 鈥減redictive policing,鈥 whereby monitoring an individual鈥檚 social interactions, use of social media, and physical movement enables the state to make real-time assessments of their perceived 鈥渢hreat鈥 to it at any time. This may seem like a dystopian vision of digitally-powered totalitarianism in a science-fiction movie (think of 2002鈥檚 Minority Report). But it鈥檚 increasingly becoming a lived reality鈥攁nd nowhere is this reality more apparent than in China鈥檚 far-western province of Xinjiang.
Xinjiang: A 21st Century Police State
Xinjiang鈥檚 geopolitical position on the eastern edge of the Islamic and Turkic-speaking worlds, as well as the ethno-cultural distinctiveness of groups there like the Uighur, has long been treated by the Chinese authorities as a threat. In turn, since 1949, the CCP has pursued a muscular strategy of tight political, social, and cultural control over the region, as a means of integrating Xinjiang and its people. Understandably, this has periodically triggered violent opposition from the Uighur population, which chafes at demographic dilution, political marginalization, and continued state interference in its religious practices.
But while Beijing鈥檚 approach to combating Uighur opposition in Xinjiang has always rested on the repressive capabilities of its security forces, its obsession with 鈥渟tability鈥 has, in recent years, seen the regional government鈥檚 spending on public security . This money has largely gone toward making a pervasive, hi-tech 鈥渟ecurity state.鈥 China has achieved this via actions like a 鈥淪kynet鈥 electronic surveillance system in major urban areas, GPS trackers in motor vehicles, and facial recognition scanners at checkpoints and apps that wipe smartphones of so-called 鈥渟ubversive鈥 material.
Though these actions are in line with the CCP鈥檚 move toward tech-driven social management, it鈥檚 obvious that, in Xinjiang, this system is defined almost solely by racist conceptions of threat鈥攐nes according to which the Uighur population is a 鈥.鈥 From government officials Uighur 鈥渆xtremism and terrorism鈥 as a 鈥渢umour鈥 to religious observance with drug addiction, the CCP鈥檚 discourse frames key elements of Uighur identity as pathologies to be 鈥渃ured.鈥 Reporting by and shows that the CCP鈥檚 idea of 鈥渃uring鈥 supposed pathologies is a program of mass internment: have been locked away in prison-like 鈥渞e-education鈥 centers using a system of predictive policing.
This mass repression of an ethnic minority is, on its own, cause for concern, and certainly outrage. But the problem is even bigger: The Uighurs are, arguably, the canary in the coal mine鈥攖he 鈥渢ools of control that are now being employed by the CCP鈥 in Xinjiang, the historian James Millward has , may be 鈥渆asily applied to other individuals as well.鈥
Taking 鈥楽ocial Management鈥 Global
The implications of China鈥檚 apparent technological takeover are evident in at least two meaningful ways. For one, China is seeking to target ethnic minority diasporas, such as Uighurs and Tibetans, with its system of social management. Beijing, , is 鈥渃reating a global registry of Uighurs who live outside of China, threatening to detain their relatives if they do not provide personal and identifying information to Chinese police.鈥
Potentially more far-reaching, though, is the fact that President Xi Jinping鈥檚 multi-billion dollar isn鈥檛 intended to invest only in physical infrastructures鈥攂ut also in the infrastructure and technology necessary to create a 鈥渄igital Silk Road.鈥 Much of this investment is coming from China鈥檚 , including Alibaba, Huawei, and ZTE. In addition, the manner in which China鈥檚 tech companies seem to be investing so heavily in emerging surveillance technology suggests that its gaze is broad: It wants to address Beijing鈥檚 social management 鈥攂ut also secure customers abroad.
For instance, in 2016, the China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation the Ecuadorian government establish an 鈥渋ntegrated security service system,鈥 which was made up of a 鈥渘ationwide network of 4,300 surveillance cameras, 16 regional response centers, and over 3,000 government employees diligently watching video footage.鈥 More recently, CloudWalk, a Guangzhou-based tech company, finished a deal with to provide a 鈥渕ass facial recognition program鈥 with the alleged purpose of helping the company 鈥渢rain racial biases out of its facial recognition systems鈥 via access to people with ethnic and racial backgrounds more varied than those of people in China. While such companies are undoubtedly more focused on profit, , it鈥檚 also likely that the 鈥減resence of Chinese engineers, managers, and diplomats will reinforce a tendency among developing countries, especially those with authoritarian governments,鈥 to adopt China鈥檚 approach of ensuring that technology serves the interests of a homogeneous state. Indeed, Beijing appears willing to nurture such tendencies, with President Xi himself that China export its model of social stability to the Arab world.
So, what can be done to counter this pernicious development?
In the past, many people viewed the digital revolution as a way to spur a new wave of democratization. But as the scholars Daniel Benaim and Hollie Russon Gilman recently , the CCP鈥檚 use of technological innovation demonstrates that it can just as easily be harnessed to enable 鈥渟tate domination and repression at a staggering scale and algorithmic effectiveness.鈥
In that light, one place the international community鈥檚 response could start is with Xinjiang, since it鈥檚 there that we most clearly see the lived effects of China鈥檚 digitally-enabled totalitarianism: the creation of 鈥.鈥 The chairs of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission鈥擲ens. Marco Rubio and Chris Smith鈥攈ave practical steps toward holding China to account, for instance by calling on the Trump administration to apply sanctions against China. These sanctions would directly target 鈥淐hinese government officials and entities complicit in or directing鈥 the persecution of the Uighur people in Xinjiang through measures like freezing any U.S. assets and denying visas for travel to the United States.
This isn鈥檛 to suggest that sanctions, more broadly, should be used haphazardly, given that it鈥檚 often all too easy for sanctions to harm uninvolved citizens. But the advantage of Global Magnitsky Act sanctions, as Human Rights Watch , is that they allow the U.S. executive branch to target 鈥渁ny individual involved in a human rights violation, from senior officials to low-level officers and even nongovernment associates.鈥 In fact, U.S. Ambassador for Religious Freedom, Sam Brownback, has that the first target of such sanctions, if implemented, would be Xinjiang CCP Chairman Chen Quanguo, who has overseen the development of the 鈥渞e-education鈥 centers. Additional targets could also include companies like Hikvision that have through supplying much of the tech hardware that underpins Xinjiang鈥檚 draconian security state.
Effectively implementing these kinds of measures will, of course, be difficult, given China鈥檚 increasing strategic and economic clout around the globe. Even so, the cost of inaction wouldn鈥檛 only be dire for Uighurs鈥攊t鈥檇 also, potentially, encourage Beijing to intensify its efforts, and export its digitally-enabled totalitarianism around the world.