Alexei Alexandrov
Policy Researcher, Nonprofits and Government
This article is part of The Rooftop, a blog and multimedia series from 国产视频鈥檚 Future of Land and Housing program. Featuring insights from experts across diverse fields, the series is a home for bold ideas to improve housing in the United States and globally.
There is broad agreement that the cost of housing is one of the most urgent policy challenges in the U.S. However, housing markets differ significantly across the country and therefore the solutions that work in one housing market may not work in others.
In this article, I propose an organizing principle by which to determine which solutions are most effective in which market:
This article outlines the rationale behind this organizing principle, and uses it to assess five popular housing affordability solutions.
The price of a home comprises the price of the land and the price of the physical structure. In a few (mostly-Coastal large) Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), the biggest price challenge is that land is expensive. Meanwhile, in most of the country, where land is relatively less expensive, it is escalating construction costs that result in expensive to build physical structures.
The price of the physical structure comprises the price of a new structure less the wear and tear (depreciation). Since buildings depreciate slowly, a well-kept older home won鈥檛 be dramatically cheaper than a new one in the same location, and the cost of building a new home acts as a market ceiling when land is cheap.
Consider a median-sized U.S. house (about 1,800 square feet), not including the lot (land), with construction costs of $350,000. Consider places where land is relatively cheap, say, a lot costing $30,000. This results in a home (including the land and physical structure) of $380,000. In such markets, fitting two housing units on the lot instead of one (an enormous increase in density) leads to relatively low savings. The land, now $15,000 per unit, takes the home price from $380,000 to $365,000. By contrast, cutting construction costs by even 10 percent would decrease the house cost significantly more, to $345,000.
Contrast to places where land is expensive. Let鈥檚 say a lot costs $600,000, bringing the combined price of the same house in the previous example and land to about $950,000. In markets where land is expensive, splitting the cost of land by doubling the density reduces the cost by $300,000, while similar-sized construction cost improvements are considerably less valuable to the overall cost of the home.
These scenarios illustrate the need to consider housing proposals in a more disciplined and nuanced way. In places where land is expensive, we should look to bring down the cost of housing by building more units per acre. In most of the country, where land is inexpensive, we should bring down the cost of housing by lowering construction costs.
, across the U.S., the average derived price of land under a house increased from about $84,000 in 2014 to about $109,000 in 2024鈥a $25,000 increase. This suggests that most of the country is closer to the $30,000 lot, as opposed to the $600,000 lot.
In the Table below, I use data from to highlight metro areas in the U.S. where land is expensive. These are metro areas where the median price of a home less the imputed cost of new housing construction (not including land) is greater than $150,000.
These organizing principles should be used in assessing federal, state and local housing proposals to determine how much a proposal to lower house prices might help. In this section, I provide a high-level overview of five often-discussed proposals.
Cutting zoning and local regulations (often referred to as 鈥減ro-growth鈥 or YIMBY proposals)鈥攇reat for expensive cities, but might not move the needle in most of the country.
Reducing various zoning requirements is a crucial tool against the not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) status quo; this includes minimum lot requirements, maximum lot density requirements, maximum building height, offsets between the building and the road, floor area ratio (FAR) requirements, parking lot requirements, environmental review requirements, and the required number of staircases in a multifamily building should have. Proposals floating around include both sticks to offer to municipalities and states.
Analyzing the data on across the U.S. shows that even expensive cities (as defined in the table above) are not nearly dense enough, and that NIMBY resistance to densification imposes enormous costs. For example, Ventura and Snohomish Counties鈥suburbs of expensive Los Angeles and Seattle鈥are at about 0.25 housing units per acre, which is one-third of the density of even the U.S. overall larger-county average, or 0.75 housing units per acre. There is plenty of room to densify鈥Manhattan and Brooklyn lead the way with over 20 housing units per acre. However, easing zoning regulations and making multi-story, multi-family housing easier to build will make less difference where cheap land comprises only a small fraction of the home鈥檚 cost.
Accordingly, to bring costs down, federal carrots to reduce many of the local regulatory and zoning barriers should be offered only to cities where land is expensive, primarily large, coastal cities. That might not be feasible especially in the current political climate, suggesting that federal sticks might be more pragmatic.
Allowing Manufactured Housing (MH) and Accessory Dwelling Units (ADUs) by right could dramatically lower prices in much of the country, but the impact might be muted in expensive cities.
We keep looking for a breakthrough in lowering housing construction costs, but it鈥檚 been here for decades. Between lower square footage and lower per square feet construction cost, MH is that mythical cheap new entry-level home, . In contrast to most zoning changes, allowing MH by right (allowing it as long as it complies with existing zoning and code regulations that do not discriminate against MH) could be a game-changer in lowering the cost of construction for much of the country.
Converting garages, basements, and sunrooms into ADUs is also considerably cheaper than new construction. However, financing for both MH and ADUs remains a problem (in addition to zoning). MHs are often confined to MH parks (often due to zoning), forcing the residents to rent the land underneath their home. Financing for such home-only loans is even . In addition, the homeowner not owning the land, combined with a very high cost of moving MH from one place to another (they are not particularly mobile after all) also gives the MH park owners (landowners) an .
However, there is only a limited amount of single-family homes that might add an ADU, and this policy change will not make a large difference in densifying the large expensive coastal cities. In Los Angeles, even with the pent-up demand, the fewer than 50,000 ADUs only takes the county鈥檚 density from about 1.415 to about 1.434 housing units per acre.
Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) are an inefficient developer subsidy that is unlikely to help in most of the country, but might (inefficiently) counteract other policy failures in expensive cities.
LIHTC is a Federal program that subsidizes most or all construction cost (but not land) through tax credits that developers resell to investors, and is one of the largest Federal programs supporting affordable housing, . LIHTC requirements often add to the cost of construction via , hiring consultants, and excess time. Because these costs are paid for by taxpayers, and not developers, it incentivizes . In most of the country, LIHTC is an expensive inefficient subsidy for renters鈥while some of the forgone tax dollars lowers rents, it is at the expense of a significant fraction of these tax dollars staying with investors and developers, and paying for cost overruns. Moreover, that LIHTC construction often cannibalizes construction that would have happened even without LIHTC.
It鈥檚 possible that LIHTC results in more units in expensive cities, due to that often accompany LIHTC, and the cost of construction being covered by taxpayers. Developers (and taxpayers) should not disregard that cost more or that larger units are more valuable鈥building in a more expensive way unnecessarily increases home prices. But when most buildings are forced to be less dense than efficient by regulations, the LIHTC inefficiency going the other way might cancel some of these broader issues out. In other words, when zoning constraints force too few units per acre, while occasionally LIHTC results in too many units per acre, then LIHTC might help to bring the average closer to the efficient outcome, but at a great expense to the taxpayers. A much more effective solution is lowering zoning and regulatory barriers for all developers and construction.
Affordability and inclusionary zoning (IZ) requirements are unlikely to be effective anywhere.
Affordability and IZ-style (for example, some fraction of the units in a new building has to be affordable to lower-income renters) do not immediately add to or lower the construction cost, nor do they result in more housing units (unless paired with relaxing zoning). Accordingly, they are not particularly helpful in either kind of housing market, but they are also not dramatically harmful鈥this transfer to lower-income renters is not nearly as inefficient as LIHTC. But since landlords are paying for it (through forgone rent), that might change what kinds of projects for developers, resulting in fewer units built.
Expensive cities should relax zoning restrictions instead for all construction. But even simple sale of perks might be more efficient than IZ鈥for example, the city allowing developers to create fewer parking spots in exchange for cash that the city can use for housing vouchers.
from owning single-family homes does not densify and does not decrease the cost of construction.
Large corporations that buy single family homes to rent out鈥these homes are , and account for a vanishing fraction of the U.S.鈥檚 housing stock. . Further, large (鈥渕ega鈥) investors are 鈥where land is cheap, and forcing investors to finance condo units is likely counterproductive.
A more apt question for policymakers is why aren鈥檛 households who could otherwise afford to buy single-family homes instead renting? There are who should be able to qualify for a mortgage, want to own, but are still renting, raising questions about whether our mortgage standards are too tight or are perceived as being too tight.
Editor鈥s note: The views expressed in the articles on The Rooftop are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policy positions of 国产视频.
Tax Land, Not Buildings, to Spur Development (The Rooftop, 2025): Greg Miller argues for taxing land at a higher rate than buildings, to encourage development and reduce land hoarding.
Build, Baby, Build: Unshackling Homeowners and Developers from Local Red Tape (The Rooftop, 2025): Alexei Alexandrov puts forward a detailed federal plan for incentivizing housing supply while tackling local red tape and other barriers to construction.