Taufiq Rahim
Senior Fellow, Future Security
Future Security Program Fellow Taufiq Rahim examines the current state of the war with Iran.
At 1:15 am on February 28, 2026, Israel and the United States an aerial assault on Iran. In the immediate attack, Iran鈥檚 Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed. The subsequent war engulfed more than a dozen countries in the region directly, with Iran and its proxies successfully launching Shahed-drone attacks as far afield as .
A ceasefire reached on April 8 has held at least in terms of halting the kinds of strikes that defined the early phase of the war, but the situation remains tense. Despite ongoing negotiations, mainly facilitated by Pakistan, a clear resolution appears out of reach. The ongoing threats to the Strait of Hormuz waterway by Iran and the blockade by the United States on Iranian-bound vessels could result in renewed escalation at any moment.
This post provides a window into what is important to pay attention to as the multi-dimensional crisis continues, by answering ten key questions about the conflict.
Both the United States and Iran continue to hold objectives that are far apart, following the initial hostilities.
While the war did degrade Iranian capabilities, one of the United States鈥 foremost , it did not do so to such an extent that Iran is willing to accede to the White House鈥檚 demands thus far. Several reports have demonstrated that Iranian weapons stockpiles are back at .
Yet, while Iran鈥檚 regime has not only survived but seemingly maintained many of its capabilities, it has not been able to force the removal of the U.S. naval blockade and a cessation of all hostilities, including a formal end to the war, which it had as a prerequisite for resuming negotiations.
The United States is seeking progress in any deal across three principal :
Iran is seeking progress on three principal areas:
The management of the Strait of Hormuz is a new but unsurprising issue that has emerged in this conflict, and any resolution would involve broader stakeholders in the Gulf, Europe, and Asia.
After the ceasefire on April 8, the U.S. facilitated between Lebanon and Israel in Washington, D.C., to address the disarmament of Hezbollah, with the first formal meeting on April 14, 2026. This led to a limited Israel-Lebanon ceasefire, agreed to on April 16. The negotiations are an attempt to reduce Iranian leverage and to exclude that file from the bilateral U.S.-Iran negotiations, something the Iranians have objected to.
Israel continues to see Iran as the 鈥渉ead of the snake鈥 of its principal adversaries, notably Hezbollah and Hamas, and holds the Islamic regime responsible for the events of October 7, 2023. Without , Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sees the war as incomplete.
In the early days of the war, the White House focused on preventing the threat of Iranian development of a breakout nuclear capability as its primary reason for the attack. However, in his initial speech, President Trump highlighted a wide-ranging set of reasons, including past actions by Iran and current threats to American bases. While he that the war would seek to ensure Iran 鈥渃an never have a nuclear weapon鈥, the president also the United States to annihilating Iran鈥檚 navy, ballistic missile capacity, and proxy forces.
The attack was also opportunistic in light of the in January that had the Iranian regime on the back foot. Subsequent have that arms were also sent via Kurdish groups to support an armed insurrection. The war鈥檚 initiation may also have been motivated by created an opening to eliminate Iran鈥檚 Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a targeted strike.
The White House believed before the war that negotiations were at a dead end. Others in the room contested this, including the Omani foreign minister, in an interview on where he stated: 鈥淭he single most important achievement, I believe, is the agreement that Iran will never, ever have nuclear material that will create a bomb.鈥
Many Iranians point to the CIA-backed coup in 1953 that led to the overthrow of the country鈥檚 nationalist prime minister as a seminal event. More broadly, Western countries, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, have been in shaping Iran for over a century, beginning with the British backing a 1921 military coup that brought the first Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty to power.
The current rivalry between the United States and Iran dates back 47 years to the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and is deeply shaped by the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, and resultant hostage crisis, which lasted for 444 days. As early as 1980, Donald Trump, then a real estate developer, was referencing Iran in .
In the 1980s, the Iran-Iraq war precipitated of the GCC, and the subsequent tanker war throughout the decade led to the development of a close security relationship between the United States and the Gulf monarchies. In the four decades since, both the United States and Iran have engaged in direct, often clandestine negotiations across presidential administrations. While many partial deals were struck, including the JCPOA under President Barack Obama that curtailed Iran鈥檚 nuclear enrichment and lifted many sanctions, the two countries failed to reach a grand bargain.
Under the first Trump administration, the United States from the JCPOA, and the Biden administration was unable to reach a new deal. In 2025, Special Envoy for Peace Missions Steve Witkoff led negotiations on behalf of the president with Iran. Those were interrupted by Israel during Operation Rising Lion and then by the American-led Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025, during which the United States hit three nuclear facilities in Iran.
Negotiations resumed following the operation and led to the involvement of the president鈥檚 son-in-law, Jared Kushner, in an unofficial capacity, with the last negotiations prior to the war occurring on .
Outside of the principal actors 鈥 Iran, America, and Israel 鈥 the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia) have been the most affected, being hit by over . While their posture remained broadly defensive under a barrage of missiles and drones, they have indicated that further escalation would bring a more direct response.
The estimated impact of the conflict has been . The Gulf States would see any resolution that does not reopen the Strait of Hormuz outside of Iranian control as unacceptable. Recent that the UAE has aligned itself closely with Israel and even undertook airstrikes against Iran in April, signaling a break with other GCC countries.
Other American partners 鈥 , , and 鈥 also faced missile and drone strikes that were largely intercepted. Finally, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq have been between Iran鈥檚 proxies and Western interests. Throughout the region, numerous American bases and installations were hit by Iranian strikes, including notably the .
Oil prices nearly doubled to a of $118/barrel (Brent) and remain high. The physical price of energy has decoupled from the overall market price in some geographies, as evidenced by the price gaps between .
The conflict has also affected broader supply chains, driving up costs as a significant share of global trade passes through the Persian Gulf. Downstream products such as fertilizer, plastics, and other petrochemicals have seen shortages and price spikes. For example, there is a shortage, which also affects the manufacturing of semiconductors and MRI machines. The IMF already due to the war from 3.3% to 3.1%.
Even if the war were to conclude formally tomorrow and the Strait of Hormuz were to open, the repercussions would take some time to clear. Many European carriers, such as Lufthansa, have due to high fuel costs. Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) facilities in Qatar, for example, could take , leading to sustained price increases.
The sharpest turn domestically has been within President 国产视频 own base, which has split along anti-war and pro-war lines. Former Trump allies such as Marjorie Taylor Greene, Tucker Carlson, and Megyn Kelly have and are now being ostracized by the president himself in multiple Truth Social Posts.
Overall, the conflict has been consistently unpopular in polls, with 51% deeming the war 鈥渘ot worthwhile,鈥 according to one . The war has also negatively impacted Americans鈥 views of Israel, especially among Generation Z. Even if the conflict subsides, it will remain a central issue in the midterms, as it continues to affect affordability, particularly via elevated gas prices.
Internet access and news media are still , so information is hard to come by. However, life appears to have largely in cities like Tehran. Meanwhile, street protests have not recurred, as the regime has reconsolidated its law-and-order apparatus.
The military and political leadership, has largely reconstituted itself. Although the Speaker of Parliament, Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, has been put forward as a public face, it is unclear who the exact leader is.
While Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the previous Supreme Leader, was appointed as the new Supreme Leader, his health and overall role is unclear. Regardless, the Iranian regime appears to retain an integrated structure.
One of the most significant outcomes of the conflict is the redefinition of warfare. Drones had not been used in this manner across such a vast geography before. Regional countries are now investing in anti-drone systems, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announcing that Ukraine had reached a 听with Gulf countries. Iran鈥檚 hypersonic missiles also to avoid interception, which will also be studied.
While Gulf states had invested heavily in cyber-defense, some key facilities went offline due to small-scale physical on power stations and data centers. Finally, Iran employed a structure to enable continued decision-making in the face of the decapitation of its leadership. Iran had put this in place following last summer鈥檚 Operation Midnight Hammer. This decentralized decision-making approach will likely be adopted by other American adversaries.
The full resolution of the war will shape the perception of American power for years to come. As it stands, Iran appears to have gained a stronger footing, having proven resilient despite the attacks. This could, of course, change should the war resume.
China and Russia will have taken notice of the targeting of American military installations. At the same time, the Trump administration continues to signal its intent to target adversarial states outside of China and Russia, with perhaps Cuba now next in line. Compared to a decade ago, there are fewer American adversaries for China and Russia to align with and contest the American security architecture globally, especially if the Iranian regime is weakened. However, the war has increasingly raised the question of whether American allies will turn to China and Russia as more reliable future partners.
听Traditional mediators, Oman and Qatar, have taken a backseat as they themselves came under Iranian attack during the conflict. The principal track continues to be led by Pakistan, particularly under the auspices of its Chief of Armed Forces, Asad Munir. An initial round of talks in Islamabad on April 11 involved Vice President JD Vance from the Iranian Speaker of Parliament, Mohammed Ghalibaf. However, direct talks have yet to resume. China has Pakistan鈥檚 efforts but could take on a more direct role. Thus far, the Europeans have been less involved, but a high-level delegation to Tehran in mid-May.
As of the date of this article, the two sides remain at an impasse.