Table of Contents
- Executive Summary
- Introduction
- Age Assurance and Age Verification
- Pursuing Kids Safety through Online Age Verification Legislation
- Challenges with Age Verification
- Social Media Platforms and Age-Appropriate Practices
- The Path Forward: Minimizing Potential Ramifications of Online Age Verification
- Appendix
Challenges with Age Verification
As governments around the world explore better ways to ensure children can safely and securely access online spaces, age verification requirements continue to pose a number of challenges to users and online operators. Such challenges include: technical immaturity; first amendment implications鈥攔estricting access and excluding eligible users; data privacy and security risks; determining scope of responsibility and level of implementation; cost of compliance and impact on competition; and ease of circumvention.
Technical Immaturity
As of this report鈥檚 publication, strict age verification鈥攃onfirming a user鈥檚 age without requiring additional personal identifiable information (PII)鈥攊s not technically feasible in a manner that respects users鈥 rights, privacy, and security. In 2022, the French Commission on Information Technology and Liberties (CNIL) investigated six common solutions for online age assurance, including payment card validation, facial analysis, offline verification, identity documentation, government-provided tools, and inferential verification.1 CNIL鈥檚 report examined whether these solutions provided 鈥渟ufficiently reliable verification, complete coverage of the population, and respect for the protection of individuals鈥 data and privacy and their security鈥 and found that 鈥渢here is currently no solution that satisfactorily meets these three requirements.鈥
Australia鈥檚 eSafety Commission released an in-depth roadmap for age verification, which also found that 鈥渆ach type of age verification or age assurance technology comes with its own privacy, security, effectiveness, and implementation issues.鈥2 The Australian government noted that age assurance technologies are too immature to work effectively while balancing user privacy and security, ultimately suggesting alternative methods of improving children鈥檚 safety online, such as industry codes, increased platform transparency, and greater parental support.3
Facial Age Estimation
Facial age estimation, or using artificial intelligence (AI) to analyze the geometry of a user鈥檚 face in a still or live photo to estimate their age, is gaining popularity as an age-gating and verification method. In 2022, Meta began testing new age verification methods on their services, including facial age estimation, and found that 81 percent of people chose this method when presented with a menu of options.4 The euCONSENT project also found facial age estimation to be the most popular age verification method offered鈥攃hosen by 68 percent of all participants.5 In 2023, , the , and submitted an application to approve facial age estimation as an Federal Trade Commission (FTC)-approved method for obtaining parental consent under its Children鈥檚 Online Privacy Protection Rule.6 Proponents of this method stated it offers an easy and less-intrusive way to verify a user鈥檚 age without asking for formal identification.7 Meanwhile, opponents of the method raised concerns regarding privacy and accuracy for determining specific ages rather than age ranges鈥攁s well as determining the ages of people of color and transgender, nonbinary, and disabled people, who may be disproportionately subject to false negatives or positives.8 In March 2024, the FTC denied the application without prejudice in a 4鈥0 vote.9 In September 2023, the same technology was submitted to the National Institute of Technology for evaluation, which is forthcoming.10
It should be emphasized there are no available technologies that verify age in a private and secure manner, much less any that could do so at the scale required by large social media platforms.
First Amendment Implications鈥擱estricting Access and Excluding Eligible Users
Current practices of age verification often require disclosing government-issued ID, and users who are hesitant to disclose or those without such ID face restricted access to content, anonymity, and privacy. Given current technological limitations, age verification mandates require online operators to verify the age of every user (often through the use of government-issued identification). If an online operator believes they are unable to undertake this task with certainty, it may feel obligated to censor or restrict content available for all users to avoid legal action and liability.11 As a result, many age verification laws aimed at protecting children inadvertently limit access to content and infringe on all users鈥 First Amendment rights.
Previous Congressional attempts to protect minors from harmful material online through content restrictions and required age verification failed to pass constitutional muster. Supreme Court rulings found the Communications Decency Act and Child Online Protection Act unconstitutional for being overly broad, restricting freedom of expression, and limiting access to protected speech.12 Through these cases, the Court also acknowledged that age verification mandates would impose significant costs on commercial entities and limit access of adults without acceptable identification. Current limitations on commercially effective and available tools may also impact the Court鈥檚 willingness to accept any new online age verification requirements aimed at protecting children鈥檚 safety online.13 It is also important to note, that while the Supreme Court has established the government鈥檚 ability to regulate material deemed harmful to minors, particularly obscene material, children are not completely exempt from First Amendment rights to protected speech.14
In addition, those that lack any acceptable form of identity to prove their age may be excluded from accessing content protected by the First Amendment under traditional methods of age verification simply because they do not have access to a government-issued ID or credit card. Youth between the ages of 14 to 16 years old often do not hold any official form of government identification, and those under the age of 18 are unable to hold credit cards. Millions of adults who are 18 years of age and older do not hold a valid government-issued photo identification.15 Additionally, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation鈥檚 2021 National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households found that 28.5 percent of households did not have a credit card and 4.5 percent were unbanked.16 Age verification requirements also leave no space for users who do not wish to identify themselves online, threatening individuals鈥 right to anonymous speech, which has long been upheld by the Supreme Court.17
Data Privacy and Security Risks
Most age verification methods are at odds with data minimization, posing significant risks to user data privacy and security. Recent age verification laws require that online operators cannot knowingly retain users鈥 personal information, but the act of verifying user ages itself can put personal and sensitive data at risk. For instance, operators verifying users鈥 ages through government-issued ID or credit card information put data at risk if secure processes are not in place for use, collection, processing, storage, or deletion of PII. This, in turn, increases the risk that such sensitive data could be merged, stolen, sold, or turned over as part of legal proceedings.18
At the same time, operators who choose to verify ages through estimation or inference models may increase surveillance and monitoring of users鈥 online activity, such as their content, engagement, social networks, geographic location, screen time, linked accounts, and browsing history. Subjecting users to such intrusive practices may result in a chilling effect that suppresses online speech and enables the potential collection, use, or sale of user activity data.
Determining Scope of Responsibility and Level of Implementation
The point of verification鈥攚hether that be via an online operator or platform, app-store, device, operating system, or internet service provider (ISP)鈥攚ill significantly impact the cost, scope, efficacy, and risks of age verification mandates. Currently, most age verification legislation targets online operators and platforms鈥攚ith the exceptions of Idaho and Tennessee, which target devices.19 While NetChoice, a coalition of trade associations, eCommerce businesses, and online consumers, has challenged attempts to implement age verification requirements, Meta and Pornhub have recently come out in support of different approaches to online age verification. Meta鈥檚 Global Head of Safety argued that app stores should play a larger role in age verification, while Pornhub representatives supported device-level age verification.20
Selecting the technological intervention point at which age verification is required has implications for the degree of invasiveness of the policy. For example, implementation via online platforms could create an onerous verification system for users that puts their data at greater risk. Implementation at the app-store level leaves large gaps in coverage because it would not encompass non-application points of access like websites. At the device level, age verification could have implications for users鈥 non-online activities and fail to account for multiple users. Similarly, requiring ISPs to verify age does not account for multiple users and necessitates invasive data monitoring and collection practices. More research is needed to fully explore the consequences of mandating age verification at any level of application.
Cost of Compliance and Impact on Competition
Age verification mandates would impose costly barriers to entry for start-ups and smaller operators. Such costs could unintentionally bias the market toward larger, more established companies that are better positioned to implement age verification and undertake the associated costs. Companies unable to effectively meet requirements may be forced to pull their services from jurisdictions with age verification legislation.
Most age verification laws, both passed and pending, require companies to institute any 鈥渃ommercially reasonable鈥 age verification techniques鈥攜et strict age verification or age verification through the use of government-issued identification can be costly. In a POLITICO article, Mike Stabile, the director of public affairs for the Free Speech Coalition, states that age verification costs operators 鈥渁round 65 cents per verification,鈥 which can be exorbitant for many companies processing hundreds of thousands of users, potentially each time they begin a new session.21 A February 2024 report by Engine, a start-up trade association, details how the direct and indirect costs of age verification requirements will make it more difficult for start-ups and smaller companies to compete.22 The report identifies costs such as age assurance product creation and integration, additional staff, data testing and training, cybersecurity, and the potential cost of data breaches.
Ease of Circumvention
Age verification legislation and technologies are not foolproof鈥攏or will they completely stop underage users from intentionally or unintentionally accessing age-inappropriate content. Despite the efforts of legislators and online operators, users can still use tools like virtual private networks (VPNs) to bypass age verification.23 In China, where age verification is required to enforce online gaming limits, users evade restrictions through a variety of methods.24 Tech giant Tencent found that users can evade age verification by borrowing the device of a parent or adult or by buying, renting, or trading verified adult accounts.25 South Korea, which has similar limits for online gaming, also found children were using their parents鈥 identification to bypass age restrictions.26
Further, as the technology develops, it鈥檚 uncertain how users will be able to use generative AI to circumvent age verification methods. For example, users could use realistic filters that can alter the age a person is perceived as in images and videos, or they could generate an image of an accepted identification document. Relatedly, the Supreme Court has also considered users鈥 ability to evade age verification tools as part of the rationale for finding mandates unconstitutional.27
Citations
- 鈥淥nline age verification: balancing privacy and the protection of minors,鈥 Commission Nationale de l鈥橧nformatique et des Libert茅s, September 22, 2022, .
- Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, and the Arts, 鈥淕overnment response to the Roadmap for Age Verification,鈥 Australian Government, August 2023, .
- Josh Taylor, 鈥淎ustralia will not force adult websites to bring in age verification due to privacy and security concerns,鈥 The Guardian, August 30, 2023, .
- Erica Finkle, 鈥淏ringing Age Verification to Facebook Dating,鈥 Facebook, December 5, 2022, .
- Ian Corby, 鈥淎 summary of the achievements and lessons learned of the euCONSENT project and what comes next,鈥 euCONSENT, December 7, 2022, .
- See letter from Entertainment Software Rating Board, Yoti, and SuperAwesome to Federal Trade Commission: 鈥淩E: Application for Approval of a Verifiable Parental Consent Method Pursuant to the Children鈥檚 Online Privacy Protection Rule 16 C.F.R. 搂312.12(a),鈥 Federal Trade Commission, June 2, 2023, .
- Facial Age Estimation: White Paper (London: Yoti, 2023), .
- See, for example, 鈥淐omment from Center for Democracy & Technology,鈥 Request for Comment Project No. P235402, Federal Trade Commission, August 21, 2023, .
- 鈥淔TC Denies Application for New Parental Consent Mechanism Under COPPA,鈥 Federal Trade Commission, March 29, 2024, .
- Facial Age Estimation: White Paper (London: Yoti, 2023), .
- Ayesha Rascoe and Saige Miller, 鈥淎 New Utah Law Led Pornhub to Ban Access to Its Site for Everyone in the State,鈥 NPR, May 7, 2023, .
- 鈥淩eno v. ACLU 鈥 Challenge to Censorship Provisions in the Communications Decency Act,鈥 American Civil Liberties Union, June 20, 2017, ; 鈥淎shcroft v. ACLU,鈥 American Civil Liberties Union, June 29, 2004, .
- Eric N. Holmes, Online Age Verification (Part III): Current Context (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2023), .
- Stephanie Kunze, 鈥淕insberg v. New York (1968),鈥 Free Speech Center at Middle Tennessee State University, April 5, 2024, ; Noah Feldman, 鈥淪orry, Senators, But Kids Have Free Speech Rights Too,鈥 Washington Post, April 27, 2023, .
- Michael J. Hanmer and Samuel B. Novey, Who Lacked Photo ID in 2020?: An Exploration of the American National Election Studies (College Park, MD: Center for Democracy and Civic Engagement, 2023), .
- 2021 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households (Washington, DC: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2021), .
- Shoshana Weissmann, 鈥淎ge-verification methods, in their current forms, threaten our First Amendment right to anonymity,鈥 Real Solutions (blog), R Street, June 1, 2023, .
- Mark Keierleber, 鈥淪urvey Reveals Extent that Cops Surveil Students Online 鈥 in School and at Home,鈥 The 74, August 3, 2022, .
- 鈥淚D SB1253 | 2024 | Regular Session,鈥 February 13, 2024, LegiScan, ; 鈥淭N SB2042 | 2023-2024 | 113th General Assembly,鈥 LegiScan, March 12, 2024, .
- Antigone Davis, 鈥淧arenting in a Digital World Is Hard. Congress Can Make It Easier,鈥 Meta, November 15, 2023, ; Marc Novicoff, 鈥淎 Simple Law Is Doing the Impossible. It鈥檚 Making the Online Porn Industry Retreat,鈥 POLITICO, August 8, 2023, .
- Marc Novicoff, 鈥淎 Simple Law Is Doing the Impossible. It鈥檚 Making the Online Porn Industry Retreat,鈥 POLITICO, August 8, 2023, .
- More than just a number: How determining user age impacts startups (Washington, DC: Engine, February 2024), .
- Shoshana Weissman and Canyon Brimhall, 鈥淎ge-verification laws don鈥檛 exempt VPN traffic. But that traffic can鈥檛 always be detected,鈥 Real Solutions (blog), R Street, August 29, 2023, .
- Rita Liao, 鈥淐hina roundup: Tencent takes on sites trying to circumvent its age limits,鈥 TechCrunch, September 11, 2021, .
- Shan Li, 鈥淕ame Changer: Tencent to Limit Playing Time, Verify IDs of Young Chinese,鈥 Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2018, ; Zhang Yangfei, 鈥淭encent Games sues platforms over adult ID trade,鈥 China Daily, August 9, 2021, .
- Min-Jeong Lee, 鈥淪outh Korea Eases Rules On Kids鈥 Late Night Gaming,鈥 Wall Street Journal, September 2, 2014, .
- 鈥淎shcroft v. ACLU,鈥 American Civil Liberties Union, June 29, 2004, .