OTI Policy Director Kevin Bankston Offers Ten reasons Why Backdoor Mandates Are a Bad IDea
In testimony before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Bankston argues against legislative "fixes" for strong encryption
Tomorrow, OTI Policy Director Kevin Bankston will before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform鈥檚 Subcommittee on Information Technology about encryption and potential U.S. policy responses. In his , Bankston will argue against recent suggestions from high-profile figures like the and the that Congress should legislate to limit the availability of strongly encrypted products and services. Drawing upon lessons from both the past and recent events, he articulates ten reasons why Congress should not require that companies build surveillance 鈥渂ackdoors鈥 into their systems to preserve the government鈥檚 ability to obtain plaintext copies of encrypted data.
1. Surveillance backdoors were already rejected as a policy approach two decades ago, including by Congress.
In the 1990s, American policymakers faced a during a period often referred to as the 鈥淐rypto Wars,鈥 where the Clinton Administration battled against privacy advocates and the technology industry to limit the spread of strong encryption both within the United States and overseas. One conflict was over the U.S. government鈥檚 attempts to promote so-called 鈥渒ey escrow鈥 solutions鈥攕uch as the much-maligned 鈥攊n which the government or a trusted third party would hold master keys that could decode any encrypted communications. The other conflict was over the U.S. government鈥檚 attempts to restrict the proliferation of strong encryption products overseas by treating them as munitions subject to export controls. After a from privacy advocates, industry representatives, and prominent politicians, the Clipper Chip and subsequent commercial key escrow proposals were abandoned, while the Clinton Administration gradually export restrictions on products containing strong encryption.
The victory in the Crypto Wars reflected a growing realization that, as Representative Bob Goodlatte in 1999, 鈥淥nly by allowing the use of strong encryption, not only domestically but internationally as well, can we hope to make the Internet a safe and secure environment.鈥 Indeed, by the time the Crypto Wars ended, a majority of House members had signed onto Goodlatte鈥檚 , which would have reaffirmed Americans鈥 right to distribute and use strong encryption, barred the government from mandating the use of key escrow technologies, and allowed for the export of strong encryption.
2. It would seriously undermine U.S. cybersecurity.
The of high profile data breaches last year demonstrated the acute cybersecurity challenges that we are currently facing in the United States. And since the recent crypto controversy began last September, that has spoken publicly has concluded that it is impossible to devise and implement a that provides government access to data stored on encrypted device or end-to-end encrypted communications without compromising its security against hackers, industrial spies, and other malicious actors. No matter what you , mandating guaranteed government access to encrypted data to a variety of new cyber-threats. Even the chief cybersecurity adviser to the Commerce Department鈥檚 National Institute of Standards and Technologies has that when it comes to designing a secure 鈥榢ey escrow鈥 system where the government has access to a master decryption key that can鈥檛 be subverted by other attackers, 鈥淸t]here鈥檚 no way to do this where you don鈥檛 have unintentional vulnerabilities.鈥
3. It would cost the American economy untold billions of dollars.
The sheer complexity and cost of implementing a key escrow scheme at the scale of the current Internet would cost American technologies billions of dollars 鈥 not to mention the additional billions that would be lost as consumers worldwide lost confidence in the security of American computing products and online services. Requiring that American companies provide the U.S. government with the technical capability to decrypt their users鈥 data would compound the already significant of the Snowden revelations. Backdoor mandates would give foreign users 鈥 including major institutional clients such as foreign corporations and governments 鈥 even more incentive to avoid American products and instead.
4. It would not succeed at keeping bad actors from using unbreakable encryption.
Encryption technology is nearly ubiquitous today, and much of it 鈥 like and 鈥 is free and open source. A government mandate prohibiting U.S. companies from offering products or services with unbreakable encryption is of little use when foreign companies can and will offer more secure products and services, or when an independent coder anywhere on the planet has the resources to create and distribute free encryption tools. As former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff bluntly earlier this year, 鈥淸T]hat genie is not going back in the bottle.鈥
5. Surveillance backdoors are not necessary to keep us safe from criminals 鈥 but strong encryption is key.
So far, the opponents of strong device encryption have to offer any compelling examples where encryption seriously hindered a criminal investigation or prosecution. Indeed, rather than 鈥,鈥 there鈥檚 good reason to believe that thanks to the growing role played by digital technology in nearly all aspects of our lives, law enforcement is in the midst of a 鈥.鈥 Police officers and intelligence agents can access more data about what we say, where we go, what we do, and with whom we associate and communicate than ever before. Intelligence officials have acknowledged that metadata about private communications can tell them 鈥 if not , in some cases 鈥 than the actual contents of those communications. And with the rise of the 鈥,鈥 this golden age promises to get for law enforcement in the next few years.
On the other hand, widespread use of strong encryption , especially when it comes to smartphones. With a growing epidemic of smartphone theft (according to , 3.1 million smartphones were stolen in the U.S. in 2013, nearly double the number stolen in 2012), encryption can help shield the vast amount of personal information stored on those devices and protect against identity theft and other kinds of fraud. That鈥檚 why even the FBI itself with smartphones to turn on their encryption (until they abruptly and deleted that advice from its website last month).
6. It would undermine 鈥 and turn on its head 鈥 the Fourth Amendment right to be secure in our papers and effects.
The Fourth Amendment gives individuals the right to be secure in their papers and effects, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and requiring that any warrant authorizing such a government invasion be issued by a court based on a showing of probable cause. Recent Supreme Court cases like Riley v. California have that the need for vigorous enforcement of that right has become even more acute in the context of powerful digital technologies. The court did not pretend that requiring warrants for searches of cellphones seized incident to arrest did not risk diminishing law enforcement鈥檚 effectiveness 鈥 it simply recognized that allowing warrantless searches posed an even greater risk to our Fourth Amendment rights considering the scope of data available on those phones.
Encryption opponents would push in the other direction and flip our Fourth Amendment rights on their head, casting the Fourth Amendment as a right of the government 鈥 a right to dictate that the contours of the physical and digital worlds be redesigned to facilitate even easier surveillance. But as former computer crime prosecutor Marc Zwillinger recently , 鈥淚 don鈥檛 believe that law enforcement has an absolute right to gain access to every way in which two people may choose to communicate鈥 And I don鈥檛 think our Founding Fathers would think so, either. The fact that the Constitution offers a process for obtaining a search warrant where there is probable cause is not support for the notion that it should be illegal to make an unbreakable lock.鈥 The law has never prohibited the creation of unbreakable locks, nor required us to hand our keys over to the government just in case it might need them for an investigation.
7. It would threaten First Amendment rights here and free expression around the world.
Repeated to export controls on encryption during the Crypto Wars illustrate how any attempt by the government to limit the distribution of encryption software code, which is itself , would raise serious First Amendment concerns. Similarly, a legal regime that forced individuals to hand ove rtheir private encryption keys to the government or to their communications providers for law enforcement purposes would also raise novel issues of compelled speech under the First Amendment. What鈥檚 more, a mandate against unbreakable encryption and in favor of backdoors for government could have even . By contrast, encouraging the availability of strong encryption free of surveillance backdoors can enable free expression both in the United States and around the world, including by stymieing the censorship and surveillance efforts of governments with less respect for human rights than our own.
8. It would encourage countries with poor human rights records to demand backdoor access of their own.
The governments of countries like , , and the have long advocated for various measures that would require companies to implement key escrow systems or other forms of backdoors as a condition of their ability to do business in those countries. The United States government has these proposals in the past. Yet how can we continue to credibly push back against, for example, the Chinese government for proposing an anti-terrorism bill that would require U.S. companies to hand over their encryption keys, if we impose a similar requirement here at home? On what grounds will U.S. companies be able to continue to argue that they cannot implement such requirements and hand over the keys to foreign governments 鈥 even those with a history of human rights abuses 鈥 if they have already had to do so for the U.S. government? A failure by the United States to protect Americans鈥 ability to encrypt their data will undermine the right to encrypt around the world will in turn have a broader impact on human rights, undermining our s
9. An overwhelming majority of the House of Representatives and the President鈥檚 own hand-picked advisors have already rejected the idea.
Last year, an overwhelming and bipartisan majority of the House of Representatives when they approved the Sensenbrenner-Massie-Lofgren amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 4870) by a of 293 to 123. Responding to reports that the NSA had worked to insert surveillance backdoors into a variety of hardware and software products, that would have prohibited the NSA or the CIA from using any funds 鈥渢o mandate or request that a person鈥lter its product or service to permit the electronic surveillance鈥f any user of said product or service for said agencies.鈥 Although it into the final in December, the amendment was still a potent indicator that Congress is skeptical of U.S. government efforts that would weaken the security of American hardware and software products.
The five experts hand-picked by the President to review the NSA鈥檚 surveillance activities in 2013 were equally skeptical of encryption backdoors. The final report of the President鈥檚 Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies , with regard to encryption, the U.S. government should:
鈥(1) fully support and not undermine efforts to create encryption standards;
(2) not in any way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make vulnerable generally available commercial software; and
(3) increase the use of encryption and urge US companies to do so, in order to better protect data in transit, at rest, in the cloud, and in other storage.鈥
10. It would be vigorously opposed by a unified Internet community.
Decades before the that stopped the SOPA and PIPA copyright bills in 2012, the 鈥淐rypto Wars鈥 represented the Internet community鈥檚 first major political engagement 鈥 and it was a rousing success. An unprecedented alliance of Internet users, technologists, academics, the technology industry, and newly-emerging Internet rights advocacy organizations flexed its muscles for the first time and made a huge difference in the political process, through public campaigns, , , and . That Internet community has only grown larger and more vocal in the intervening years, and will certainly make its voice heard if we find ourselves in the midst of a second round of the Crypto Wars.
Fortunately, that conflict can be avoided, especially if we shift toward policies that will promote rather than undermine the widespread use of strong encryption.
Read Bankston鈥檚 here (pdf).
For a shorter brief and printable handout, please see this post.