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China has the second largest economy in the world, supporting a population of around 1.4 billion people. According to the government of China, the country’s economic growth lifts some 14 million people out of poverty every year.¹ It takes considerable natural resources to drive and sustain all of that growth—from energy, to metals and minerals, to food and water—and China depends on extraction and production at home and global trade in goods and services to meet its needs.

The above map ranks nations in order of importance to China’s natural security with a composite score, based on a range of variables, including hydrocarbon and critical mineral reserves, China’s import dependencies, and the relative criticality of certain resources to the country’s economy. On the map, the reddest countries and highest scores are China’s most significant natural security partners; grey means there is no data or no assigned rating. Separately from the map, for purposes of comparison, the Phase Zero team looked at a range of military and soft power indicators, as well. In some cases, China’s military-to-military and soft power ties complement its resource relationships, and in other cases, they reflect a strategic focus on countries in its own region, such as Pakistan or Thailand, regardless of resource wealth. The top focal points for China’s soft power tend to be the world’s largest economies.

The natural security map suggests that two of America’s most important allies and trade partners are also top natural security partners for China: Australia and Canada. Reflecting both its mineral wealth and proximity, Australia is number one in the natural security rankings, with robust bilateral trade in fuel (natural gas and coal) and non-fuel minerals (especially zirconium, lithium, and manganese). China has considerable investments in Australia’s metals sector ($32 billion from 2005 to 2018), as well as energy and agriculture. Australia is fifth in the list of military-to-military ties with China, and fourth as a soft power target. Likewise, Canada’s position as number four in the rankings reflects the country’s mineral and agricultural wealth, with China’s largest investment being in the Canadian energy sector (more than $41 billion from 2005 to 2018).

The United States ranks second in importance for China’s natural security (Phase Zero has a forthcoming report looking at U.S. natural security, as well). Moreover, the United States is third in military-to-military relationships, and first as a soft power target for China. Note that the data are all drawn from 2003-2018, however, and do not reflect new tariffs and other recent bilateral tensions.

Another key observation from the map is that Russia, which the United States identifies as a great power competitor, is also high in China’s natural security rankings. This wide-ranging resource relationship, spanning energy, metals, and agriculture, undergirds a growing strategic partnership between China and Russia. Some of this resource trade and commerce, such as China’s investment in Russia’s energy sector—more than $19 billion from 2005 to 2018—suggests long-term commitments, given the infrastructure involved.

Many resource-rich nations are arguably key battlegrounds for what the U.S. government has termed the “competitive space,” or competition between nations for strategic advantage. This can translate to military alliances (such as NATO), trade and investment agreements (such as the Belt and Road Initiative), or other bilateral or multilateral forms of geopolitical influence.

China and the United States are courting a range of countries within this competitive space, including a number in the Western Hemisphere that are important for China’s natural security. In fact, Brazil is third in importance for China’s overall natural security and in some ways may be more important than Australia or the United States, given the concentration of certain digital age resources in Brazil (e.g. niobium). China also invests in Brazil’s energy, agriculture, and metals sectors, and Brazil is ninth in line for China’s soft power engagement.

Likewise, Chile supplies 22 percent of the lithium China consumes, which is especially significant for the manufacture of batteries, including for electric vehicles, a Chinese priority.² Kazakhstan and Indonesia are important geostrategic locations, as well as resource suppliers, which China recognizes in a number of ways, including through the Belt and Road Initiative. For example, China invested almost $18 billion in Kazakhstan’s energy sector from 2003 to 2018, and gets a significant proportion of its nickel ores, a key industrial and information age material, from Indonesia.