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Problem
#1: CISA authorizes excessive information sharing, including unnecessary sharing
of personal information.

First, the definition of the term “cybersecurity threat” is
very broad, allowing companies to share a wide variety of information with the
government if there is the mere possibility that there may be “an unauthorized
effort to adversely impact” an information system, or information stored on or
transiting that system. Before sharing their users’ information with the
government, a company should at least be required to make a determination that
the purported cyber threat is likely to cause harm. (Sec. 2(6))

Additionally, CISA authorizes companies to share an
excessive amount of their users’ information with the government and with one
another. It defines what can be shared,
“cyber threat indicators,” to include “information that is necessary to
describe or identify” any “attribute of a cybersecurity threat” so long as its
disclosure is not otherwise legally prohibited.
Something that “describe[s]” an “attribute” of a “threat” could be
interpreted so broadly as to include personally identifiable information (PII) or
the content of private online communications, that is not actually needed to
detect or protect against that threat. (Sec. 2(7))

Further, CISA fails to protect users’ PII. CISA merely
requires that companies remove personal information if the company “knows” that
it is not “directly related” to the threat. This weak protection could result
in companies unnecessarily sharing the PII of victims, and even their contacts,
with the Department of Homeland Security and other companies. Additionally, the
“knowledge” requirement allows companies to default to leaving PII in the
indicators they share, since they may not know with absolute certainty that the
PII they have identified is not directly related to the threat. Instead, CISA should require companies to
remove PII from indicators unless it is necessary to identify or mitigate a
threat. The bill should also require that government entities review indicators
for improperly shared PII, and remove it before using or disseminating the
indicators. (Sec. 4(d)(2))

Solution
#1: CISA should only authorize a company to share information, including PII,
if it is necessary to identify, block or mitigate the impact of a cyber-attack
or vulnerability that the company has determined to be likely to cause harm.
Additionally, government entities receiving that information should be required
to review it for improperly shared PII and remove that PII before disseminating
the information further.

Problem
2: CISA Requires DHS to automatically and indiscriminately disseminate to the
NSA all indicators it receives.

While CISA only authorizes companies to share threat
indicators with DHS, it also requires that DHS immediately disseminate every
threat indicator it receives, including all of the personal information that
comes with them, to a myriad of government agencies ranging from the NSA to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to the Department of Commerce. Management
of and response to domestic cybersecurity threats should be controlled by a
civilian agency. Requiring a civilian agency like DHS to automatically and
indiscriminately disseminate that information to military intelligence agencies
like the NSA undermines civilian control. The NSA should only have access to
information concerning significant cyber threats, such as threats that could result in a significant loss of life or
physical destruction of critical infrastructure; state sponsored espionage,
including economic espionage; or the activities of foreign criminal
organizations. (Sec. 4(b)(2))

Solution
#2: CISA-derived information should only be disseminated to the NSA to address
a discrete set of significant threats to national security.

Problem
#3: Law enforcement agencies are authorized to use CISA-derived information to investigate
a wide array of garden-variety crimes.

If excessive sharing of Americans’ personal information is
not enough to establish that CISA is as much a surveillance bill as it is a
cybersecurity bill, the breadth of investigations and prosecutions that law
enforcement can use the information for leaves no room for doubt. It is
reasonable to authorize federal and state law enforcement to use CISA-derived cyber
threat indicators to investigate and prosecute a clearly defined set of
computer crimes. However, CISA authorizes this and much, much more.

CISA allows any entity within the federal government,
including intelligence agencies and law enforcement to use the information it
receives from companies for investigations and prosecutions into terrorism,
which as we’ve seen over the last year and a half of NSA leaks, is interpreted
by the Intelligence Community to constitute a
of . It also authorizes entities like law enforcement agencies to
use that information in regard to any crimes that could result in imminent
death or serious bodily harm, meaning this “cybersecurity” bill would also
facilitate investigations into garden-variety violent crimes that have nothing
to do with cyber threats. If that weren’t
worrisome enough, the bill would also let law enforcement and other government
agencies use information it receives to investigate, without a requirement for
imminence or any connection to computer crime, even more crimes like carjacking,
robbery, possession or use of firearms, ID fraud, and espionage. And that’s
just a few of the crimes on the very long list of crimes for which CISA-derived
information can be used.

While some of these are terrible crimes, and law enforcement
should take reasonable steps to investigate them, they should not do so with
information that was shared under the guise of enhancing cybersecurity. This authorization would not just seriously
undermine Americans’ Fourth Amendment rights, which would otherwise require the
government to obtain a warrant based on probable cause to access much of that
same information, it would create an expansive new means of general-purpose
government surveillance. (Sec. 5(d)(5))

Solution
#3: Law enforcement entities like the FBI should only be able to use
CISA-derived information to investigate or prosecute a clearly defined set of
computer crimes. Any authorization for use in investigating violent crimes
should be limited to cases where violence is imminent.

Problem
#4: CISA authorizes companies to monitor all of their users’ activities and communications.

CISA’s monitoring provision is unnecessary, overbroad, and
would threaten Americans’ privacy and Internet security. The federal protects Internet users’ privacy and
Internet security by only authorizing companies to monitor their users’
activities as necessary to protect their own systems from threats. CISA would undermine those reasonable limitations
by providing a blanket authorization for companies to generally monitor their
networks for any cybersecurity purpose. (Sec. 4(a))

This would significantly increase the scope of how companies
can monitor their customers’ online communications and activities. For example,
an Internet Service Provider (ISP) that is currently authorized by federal law
to monitor traffic on its network in order to identify and counter threats to
its own systems would be authorized under CISA to monitor all traffic looking for any
threat to any system. That would make
everyone a target for monitoring, not just suspicious actors threatening the
ISP’s network. This authorization could also undermine Internet security
because in order to facilitate monitoring, that ISP could attempt to decrypt
encrypted communications, or even block encrypted communications from its
network.

Solution
#4: CISA should not create any new authorization for monitoring, as adequate
authorizations already exist in the law.

Problem
#5: CISA’s liability protections leave customers no recourse if they are
wrongly harmed by information-sharing and monitoring.

CISA absolves companies of any liability associated with
sharing or monitoring of information pursuant to the Act, except for actions
that constitute gross negligence. This provision would preclude causes of
action for violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as well as privacy statutes
such as the Stored Communications Act and Wiretap Act portions of ECPA. (Sec.
6)

Solution
#5: CISA’s liability protections should be narrowed to ensure that there is
reasonable recourse for those harmed in the event that a company unnecessarily
monitors or shares their personal information.

Problem
#6: CISA authorizes companies to deploy dangerous countermeasures and has
concerning language regarding military cyber operations.

Lastly, CISA includes provisions that have nothing to do
with information sharing at all. It
authorizes companies to retaliate against perceived attackers by deploying
countermeasures on their systems, like software that would automatically “hack
back” against attackers or attempt to retrieve or destroy information that was
stolen. While it requires that the countermeasures be deployed only on the
company’s own network, countermeasures may still unintentionally have
extra-network effects, and those extra-network effects could easily include
damage to the computers of innocent people whose systems have also been
compromised by the attackers. CISA’s
only other constraint on countermeasures is a weak requirement that the company
not intend for the countermeasure to have a harmful or destructive effect on
someone else. But if those countermeasures do have such an effect, the company
that deployed them would still have been acting pursuant to CISA’s
authorization. (Sec. 4(c)(1))

Countermeasures are unpredictable and can be difficult to
control, and can also fall into the hands of bad actors, all of which increases
the risk of unintentional harm to innocent bystanders or victims of botnets or
other malicious attacks. And yet if a company deploys a countermeasure on its
network that unintentionally harms or destroys the computer systems of a hospital,
a Fortune 500 business, a power plant, a friendly foreign government or any
other innocent entity, that company would still have been acting within CISA’s
broad authorization. Cybersecurity information sharing legislation should not
include an authorization for the use of such offensive countermeasures, no
matter how narrowly drafted, as any such authorization threatens to undermine
rather than enhance Internet security.

Finally, CISA also includes an odd rule of construction that
states that nothing in the Act should be interpreted to limit the authority of
the Secretary of Defense to “develop, prepare, coordinate, or, when directed by
the President, conduct military cyber operations.” It is unclear why such a
statement concerning the Secretary of Defense’s authority is needed, or what
its intended effect is. What is clear is that the NSA engages in a from purchasing and , to inserting vulnerabilities into
software and ,
to , to deploying
and even cyberweapons like . Some of these activities may be reasonable;
many are certainly not. Regardless, they unquestionably impact the security and
functionality of the Internet and the broader computing environment, and their
efficacy and legality should be the subject of public debate rather than the
subject of vague carve-outs in overbroad cybersecurity information sharing bills.
(Sec. 8(m))

Solution
#6: CISA should not authorize the use of any offensive countermeasures, and it
should not include a Rule of Construction concerning military cyber operations
where the necessity and intent of that rule is unclear.

If CISA is intended to increase cybersecurity and not
surveillance, it should exclude unnecessarily and dangerously broad
authorizations for new monitoring and countermeasures, and it must narrowly
define what information can be shared (including robust requirements to remove
unnecessary personal information), when information can be shared, and how
information can be used. Unless all of
the problems we’ve summarized above are addressed, CISA will do much more to
enhance the government’s cyber-surveillance
than it will do to enhance everyone’s cybersecurity, and should be strongly
opposed.