Anne Hyslop
Policy Analyst, Education Policy Program
Ever since the first waivers were submitted , there has been an inherent dilemma in the Obama administration鈥檚 No Child Left Behind (NCLB) : the tension between comprehension and precision in states鈥 accountability systems.
On one hand, NCLB set a goal so high 鈥 100 percent proficiency by 2014 鈥 that it became meaningless. And its blunt measure of school quality (student proficiency only) and prescriptive, top-down improvement activities (based on the number of years a school failed to meet Adequate Yearly Progress, regardless of why the school missed those targets) exposed the limitations of federal policy to identify and improve low-performing schools.
Yet despite its rudimentary measures, at least NCLB required states to create transparent accountability systems, full of black-and-white rules everyone understood: all students and student subgroups worked toward the same 100 percent goal, at the same pace, and all schools were subject to the same labels and interventions based on their success.
But if school accountability under NCLB was black-and-white, then school accountability under waivers is shades of grey. And just like , the public is struggling to understand the waiver phenomenon.
With flexibility, states could address their grievances with NCLB by developing school accountability systems that 1) measure quality more accurately based on proficiency, growth, and postsecondary readiness, 2) better identify low-performers through letter grades or other ratings, and 3) tailor specific interventions to schools鈥 needs.
However, this precision comes at a cost. As accountability systems become more nuanced, they become infinitely more complicated. The waiver applications are hundreds of pages, and many of the new models states use, like individual student growth, are so that it takes an advanced statistics background to explain them fully.
Today鈥檚 accountability systems also include more information. Many states created that do not always overlap in predictable patterns, . For example, a school in Ohio could simultaneously miss performance targets for Hispanic and low-income students, earn a 鈥淐鈥 grade, and receive a 鈥渇ocus鈥 label for low graduation rates. States will also all the school data required by NCLB, even if they no longer apply to its accountability system.
Summarizing the implications of each strand in this web to families, elected officials, and reporters could be a frustrating task for state education agencies. Which is more important, the federal 鈥渇ocus鈥 label or the state鈥檚 鈥淐鈥 grade? Why wasn鈥檛 the school graded lower if several subgroups performed below expectations? Are the improvements needed for the school to earn a 鈥淏鈥 next year the same as the improvements needed to exit 鈥渇ocus鈥 status?
This level of nuance cannot be explained in a media soundbite. And that鈥檚 one reason why in , , and , public reactions to the state鈥檚 waiver-approved are threatening the legitimacy of the new system. It鈥檚 largely a problem of perception, not policy. Given a decade of setting equal targets for all students, it to set lower targets for racial minorities and disadvantaged students, even if these groups are expected to make greater annual progress. As Education Week鈥檚 rightly notes, states would be wise to highlight achievement gap closure rates, alongside the proficiency rates, to help explain the logic of the new goals.
It might seem trivial, but these details matter. And unfortunately, the details often in public discussions of waivers, exacerbating the confusion. A generation of parents, policymakers, and journalists has been trained to expect annual school ratings and use them to make decisions about school quality. Given these expectations, state education agencies need to be much more aggressive in sharing and selling their new accountability plans to legislators, the media, and the public. States鈥 next generation accountability systems may be more accurate and effective, but no one will care if they can鈥檛 understand the system in the first place.