Chayenne Polim茅dio
Fellow, Political Reform Program
The most important battle in Brazil today isn鈥檛 about how who plays the game best, but instead over what the rules of the game should be.
The first half of 2019 for Jair Bolsonaro鈥擝razil鈥檚 President, or the 鈥淭rump of the Tropics鈥 as some like to call him鈥攈as been rough. His administration, mired in and , has been unable to match up to the anti-establishment, tough-on-corruption signature image that the candidate offered on the campaign trail last year, which ultimately landed him in the Executive Office. On Twitter, Bolsonaro offers observers a window into the man himself; watching how he carries himself (Remember that golden shower ?) and how he and those in his circle interact with the media, supporters, and critics has given observers pause.
But Bolsonaro, much like President Trump, is not the problem. Bolsonaro is the result of a deeper and more widespread phenomenon that assails Brazilian democracy: polarization. The left-right divide鈥攁 healthy feature of a pluralist political system鈥攊s so toxic now that divergence of opinion has surpassed the realm of policymaking. And that鈥檚 where the real danger lies.
A Fragile Democracy as a Result of a Divided Country
As one of the world鈥檚 largest democracies, Brazil鈥檚 current political state serves as a good thermometer for the state of democracy more broadly. Unsurprisingly, much like the U.S. and some European countries, the South American giant is facing a political and societal crisis that has divided the country.
At the mercy of these divisions are the country鈥檚 political institutions whose resilience keeps being put to the test. Today, Brazil has no shared vision for how justice is to be delivered, how laws are to be designed and enacted, or how government and private interests are to be held accountable.s. The ideological gulf鈥攕purred by the political crises of recent years鈥攃ontinues to come further apart and challenge the concept of a shared understanding of the rule of law. On one side are conservative Brazilians who support Bolsonaro and approve of Lula鈥檚 conviction; on the other are progressive Brazilians who see Bolsonaro as an authoritarian leader, Moro as a corrupt and biased judge, and Lula as a victim of political expediency.
The World Justice Project鈥檚 measures how the rule of law is experienced and perceived by the general public in 126 countries and jurisdictions worldwide. It measures countries鈥 rule of law performance across eight factors: constraints on government powers; absence of corruption; open government; fundamental rights; order and security; regulatory enforcement; civil justice; and criminal justice. Ranking , Brazil declined three positions for overall rule of law performance since it was last measured in 2017-2018.
Some of the more of this rule of law downturn include widespread corruption in all levels of government and a broken criminal justice system that fails to establish order and security. But beyond that, the left-right divide hinders compromise and has made it virtually impossible to come to a shared vision for the rule of law, one that supersedes partisan ideology and has put the idea of Brazil as a consolidated democracy into question.
It All Started in 2014鈥
When former federal judge S茅rgio Moro and federal prosecutor Deltan Dallagnol uncovered a massive kickbacks scheme that involved contractors, politicians, and the country鈥檚 state-owned oil company, Petrobras, Brazilians and the world were shocked. Corruption was more entrenched and systemic than anyone thought was possible, as politicians from Brazil to Mexico found themselves ensnared in graft scandals worth billions of dollars. No one was immune to Moro and Dallagnol鈥檚 pursuit to leave every stone unturned in their anti-corruption probe鈥攏ot even Brazil鈥檚 most beloved and charismatic former president, Luiz In谩cio Lula da Silva.
Moro and Dallagnol rose to hero status for millions of Brazilians who were eager to rid the country of corruption and who saw the country鈥檚 judiciary as the only untainted political institution in their country. Lula was found guilty of crimes of corruption and sentenced to 12 years in prison, which prevented him from running for office in last year鈥檚 election. Bolsonaro, who won by a landslide, appointed Moro to become Minister of Justice and Public Security.
But the ghosts of corruption continue to haunt Brazil.
Last month, showed that now-Justice Minister S茅rgio Moro counseled prosecutor Deltan Dallagnol for more than two years during the investigation. The discovery of the back-and-forth between the two men鈥攁bout whether or not they had enough evidence to convict Lula of corruption鈥攃ouldn鈥檛 have come at a worse time for President Bolsonaro, who was already facing . For many critics of his administration and for Lula supporters, the recent revelations became further evidence of a biased judiciary that failed to uphold its most sacred principle during one of Brazil鈥檚 most decisive moments in history. It confirmed what many saw as a plot to undermine Lula鈥檚 candidacy, destroy his legacy, and have his successor Dilma Rousseff removed from office. saw the actions of the judge and prosecutor as a serious violation of judicial ethics and independence.
Still, for another , there was nothing unethical about Moro and Dallagnol鈥檚 actions. Late last month, to show support for Justice Moro and affirm their trust in both the country鈥檚 judicial system and the legality of Lula鈥檚 trial. For others, to successfully tackle the systemic corruption that assailed the country since its origins, Brazil鈥檚 judiciary 鈥攁nd the gains in the fight against corruption had to compensate for any excesses committed by the prosecution.
Moro, Dallagnol, and Bolsonaro doubled down on their beliefs in the legitimacy of Lula鈥檚 trial. Lula supporters are now further convinced that the country鈥檚 political right orchestrated an unjust trial to put the former President behind bars.
The Gap Between the Right and Left Continues to Widen
The 鈥渓eaked conversations鈥 episode became the epitome for polarization in Brazil and further cemented the right and left in their respective camps. And the split is not only seen the halls of Congress or the courtroom. shows that three out of ten Brazilians believe it鈥檚 not worth talking to someone with a different political vision, putting Brazil at a higher 鈥渞adicalism index鈥 than countries like Turkey, Hungary, Russia, and the United States.
Comparable to the chilling effect that the election of Trump had on personal relationships throughout the United States, the 鈥淓ra of Bolsonaro鈥 has meant that, for some Brazilians, talking politics is out of the question. Guilherme Louren莽o, an English teacher in Brazil, told me he was 鈥渢he only one in my family who's been against Bolsonaro and Moro right out of the gate.鈥 And although he hasn鈥檛 stopped talking to his family, healthy political discourse has stopped:鈥淚 most certainly refrain from talking politics, now more than ever,'' he said. According to the survey above, only 25 percent of Brazilians think it鈥檚 important for them to listen to people who are different from themselves, especially if there鈥檚 disagreement.
This polarization also manifests itself online. , a found that Brazilian Facebook users with political interests could be categorized into six "user communities" based on the types of pages they visited: (1) conservative politicians and parties; (2) politicians and leftist parties; (3) hardcore anticrime groups; (4) anti-corruption campaigns; (5) progressive social movements; and (6) human rights and environmentalism. And 鈥淸t]hough there was a clear difference between the online behavior of people who followed left-wing and right-wing politicians in Brazil in 2013, the distance between leftist and rightist social movements was not so vast,'' wrote the authors of the study. It wasn鈥檛 uncommon, for example, for socially progressive users to be interested in anti-corruption conversations or for some anti-corruption groups to be sympathetic to environmental causes.
That鈥檚 no longer the case. Fast forward to 2016, and the researchers saw 鈥渦sers who once comprised six visibly distinct communities of interest separate into just two groups with very little overlap: progressives and conservatives.鈥 The Brazilian right and the left have become more homogeneous, rigid, and siloed.
With only one eighth of Bolsonaro鈥檚 presidency behind us, the severity of Brazil鈥檚 right and left polarization is unsustainable and unconducive to efficient and responsive governing. If they don鈥檛 find a way to see eye to eye on the rules of the game, conservatives and progressives are likely to continue drifting further apart. The consequences of that will be much more severe than any disagreement over who is or isn鈥檛 corrupt.