An Enrollment Management Scandal
The sexual assault catastrophe was not the only scandal at Baylor under Starr鈥檚 watch. A separate scandal, news of which did not break until long after the former independent counsel had left campus, received far less attention than the first but threatened to do great financial harm to vulnerable students and their families. And it too showed how the university had, in its quest for greater status and glory, 鈥渓ost its moral compass.鈥1
In October 2021, The Wall Street Journal revealed that Baylor had been steering low- and lower-middle income families to take out 鈥渘o limit鈥 Parent PLUS loans as part of the university鈥檚 efforts to help pay for the costs associated with its ambitions 鈥渢o transform itself from a regionally known Baptist college into a national brand.鈥2 By pushing low-income parents to take out PLUS loans, Baylor would receive the money up front from the government, without having to worry whether the families would be capable of paying the debt back.
The article cited U.S. Department of Education College Scorecard data showing that about 47 percent of PLUS loan borrowers with kids who graduated from Baylor in 2018 and 2019 were the parents of Pell Grant recipients.3 They incurred a median of $43,500 in PLUS debt while their children were in college. Meanwhile, the Scorecard data showed that 鈥渙nly about a quarter of Baylor parents paid down any of what they originally borrowed after two years,鈥 the article stated.4
This situation likely started before Starr arrived at Baylor, as university officials were desperate to make payments on the $250 million bonds the university had issued when Sloan was president.5 However, it accelerated under Starr, as the university became more aggressive in recruiting low-income students. From 2009鈥10 through 2014鈥15, recipients of Pell Grants, the federal government鈥檚 primary source of funding for low-income students, made up 20 percent or more of the university鈥檚 students (see Figure 2). In two of those years, 2010鈥11 and 2011鈥12, they made up nearly one-quarter of the student body.6
The Wall Street Journal reporters revealed that some of the university鈥檚 recruiters had serious reservations about the institution鈥檚 aggressive pursuit of low- and lower-middle-income students:
Annabeth Mohon, a former Baylor admissions counselor and 2014 graduate, felt so conflicted about visiting poor neighborhoods in Texas to sell prospective students on a college they couldn鈥檛 afford that she left after a year on the job in 2015. 鈥淚 felt like a real jerk,鈥 said Ms. Mohon.7
Normally college access advocates would applaud a school for enrolling so many low-income students. It is important to remember, however, that Baylor did not make available the resources to adequately support them. During the Starr years, the university regularly met less than 70 percent of the financial need of student aid recipients at the university, far less than many other wealthy private colleges and universities covered at the time.8
It is also important to remember that under the financial aid leveraging programs that private enrollment management firms aggressively market to colleges, institutional aid is not used to meet financial need. With enrollment managers primarily focused on increasing colleges鈥 net revenue and rankings, covering low-income students鈥 financial need is considered inefficient and wasteful. Instead, enrollment managers are concerned with using aid to reel in the students they most desire, without spending a dollar more than necessary.9 By 2016, Baylor awarded about $92 million in non-need-based aid. 国产视频 two-fifths of freshmen received a non-need-based aid award of nearly $18,000 each.10
鈥淎id leveraging is an analytical tool that enables admissions and financial aid administrators to estimate the amount of financial aid (regardless of formal need formulas) that would be necessary to increase the probability that a student with a specified set of characteristics would enroll,鈥 Donald Hossler wrote in 2000, when he was Indiana University at Bloomington鈥檚 vice chancellor of enrollment services. 鈥淭his approach raises tuition and uses large portions of the increase to provide financial aid to prospective colleges students to induce them to matriculate,鈥 he explained. 鈥淎lthough these financial aid inducements might be used to meet student financial need, the intent behind the strategy is to use the award as a merit award that will help individual campuses more effectively 鈥榗ourt鈥 or recruit students with higher grades, with more talent, or with lower levels of financial need.鈥11
Ever since the introduction of the 鈥淏aylor 2012鈥 plan in 2002, the financial aid funding gaps (the yearly cost of attendance minus the amount of grants and scholarships offered) that the lowest-income students faced grew steadily because the university had become so much more expensive. 鈥淭hough Baylor still charges less than many other wealthy [private] colleges, its tuition grew the most among wealthy schools in the Journal鈥檚 analysis of available federal data,鈥 The Wall Street Journal article stated. 鈥淏aylor charges about 2.6 times as much as it did two decades ago, accounting for inflation.鈥12 During Starr鈥檚 presidency, students from families making $30,000 or less paid an average net price of about $32,000, after adjusting for inflation鈥攚hich was more than they earned in a year.13 As a result, these families had little choice but to borrow PLUS loans if they wanted to send their children to Baylor.
In their quest for institutional greatness, Baylor鈥檚 leaders turned a blind eye to the collateral damage their policies caused. Just as they tried to bury the complaints of women who had been sexually assaulted, they did not give a second thought about the possibility of putting families who were already struggling economically into severe financial distress.
But it is hard to see how encouraging low-income parents to take on debt they most likely won鈥檛 be able to repay will end in anything but disaster for these families.
Citations
- Watkins, 鈥淯nder Starr鈥檚 Presidency, Baylor Watched Golden Age Turn Sour,鈥 .
- Hobbs and Fuller, 鈥淗ow Baylor Steered Lower-Income Parents,鈥 .
- The PLUS loan borrowing data are produced for rolling two-year pooled cohorts for the U.S. Department of Education鈥檚 College Scorecard. In this case, the cohort consists of PLUS loan borrowers who are the families of Pell Grant recipients who graduated in 2017鈥18 and 2018鈥19.
- The PLUS loan borrowing data are produced for rolling two-year pooled cohorts for the U.S. Department of Education鈥檚 College Scorecard. In this case, the cohort consists of PLUS loan borrowers who are the families of Pell Grant recipients who graduated in 2017鈥18 and 2018鈥19.
- Luther, 鈥淗ow Baylor Happened,鈥 .
- Colleges and universities report annual data on the share of Pell Grant recipients in their student bodies to the U.S. Department of Education鈥檚 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS).
- Hobbs and Fuller, 鈥淗ow Baylor Steered Lower-Income Parents,鈥 .
- Hobbs and Fuller, 鈥淗ow Baylor Steered Lower-Income Parents,鈥 .
- Burd, 鈥淭he Dangerous Game of Financial Aid Leveraging.鈥
- Peterson鈥檚, 鈥淯ndergraduate Financial Aid and Undergraduate Databases.鈥
- Donald Hossler, 鈥淭he Role of Financial Aid in Enrollment Management鈥 in The Role Student Aid Plays in Enrollment Management, ed. Michael D. Coomes (Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2000), 83.
- Hobbs and Fuller, 鈥淗ow Baylor Steered Lower-Income Parents,鈥 .
- Colleges report the average net-price-by-income data annually the U.S. Department of Education鈥檚 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), which displays the school-by-school data on its College Navigator site. Baylor鈥檚 data can be found at .