Lessons from Leipzig
Abstract
Since German reunification in 1990, the City of Leipzig has built a municipal governing system that provides an interesting infrastructure for civic engagement. With its long history of engagement and activism鈥攑articularly its role as the 鈥淗ero City鈥 during the 1989 Peaceful Revolution鈥擫eipzig鈥檚 experiments with local democracy can provide helpful lessons to American municipalities who also want to support participation.
Based on interviews with 14 residents, city officials, and politicians, Leipzig鈥檚 positive and negative experiences point to the importance of seven democratic elements: building lasting institutions for engagement; sharing power with residents; creating strong civic-city relationships; making engagement accessible and equitable; designing successful engagement; engaging through crisis and conflict; and supporting local, liberal democracy. At a time of ongoing democratic challenges on both sides of the Atlantic, applying these lessons can help support local democratic processes, as well as strengthening democracy as a broader institution.
Acknowledgments
This report was produced with the support of the American Council on Germany through their McCloy Fellowship on Global Trends.
Thank you to Mark Schmitt, Hollie Russon Gilman, Maresa Strano, Rebecca Rosen, Heather Hurlburt, Mervat Hatem, and Chayenne Polim茅dio for their thoughtful feedback and edits. Many thanks to Joe Wilkes, Maria Elkin, and Samantha Webster for their communications work, and to Robin Cammarota for her logistical support of this project.
Finally, this paper would not have been possible without the interview participants, who were generous in sharing their time and experience
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Introduction
In 1990, the Federal Republic of Germany became a united, liberal democracy. After 41 years as separate countries鈥攁nd 28 years divided by the Berlin Wall鈥攖he capitalist West and authoritarian, former German Democratic Republic (GDR) legally rejoined to become today鈥檚 modern Germany.
The period of reunification marked a dramatic shift for East Germans in every aspect of their lives, including the sudden transition to a liberal democracy. Since 1990, the five 鈥渘ew states鈥 (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia) have been conducting a long experiment in building local democracy.
But three decades after reunification, democracy is not a static destination at which Germany has arrived. Populism and democratic skepticism have become part of the political mainstream. Far-right parties have gained increased support and establishment status. Now, Germany also finds itself in a moment of political transition, as Chancellor Angela Merkel steps down from 16 years in office. The United States faces many of these challenges, as well. While our own democratic experiment has always been imperfect, the past five years have indicated that it is concretely under threat. Additionally, from income inequality to bias in the criminal justice system to overt voter suppression,1 American democracy does not yet fully live up to the ideals it promises.
Today, the United States and Germany also share some of the same policy challenges. Recently, they鈥檝e both faced 鈥渟imilar shifts in demographics, fiscal constraints, and increasing pressure to reinvigorate urban cores.鈥2 Over the last two years, they鈥檝e experienced similar crises, including the public health threat of COVID-19 and its economic impacts, anti-mask protests and misinformation, and systemic racism and injustice. In the space of six months, both even saw citizens storm their respective capitol buildings, albeit at different scales.
Ultimately, despite years of progress and experimentation, the practice of practicing and maintaining democracy has become a much larger question on both sides of the Atlantic.
In both countries, these issues are too complex for federal and state governments to solve alone; municipal governments are becoming increasingly important in these efforts.
Based on political science scholarship, local civic engagement is a promising tool to help meet democratic and public policy challenges.3 However, meaningful and sustainable civic engagement doesn鈥檛 happen simply from the grassroots level, and it cannot be effective without strong municipal government buy-in.4 At the same time, successful civic engagement programs can be extremely difficult to design and execute. In addressing these similar challenges, American and German city governments can benefit by sharing lessons learned and municipal models for supporting civic engagement.
Located in the German Free State of Saxony, Leipzig offers a particularly interesting case study for several reasons. First, the City of Leipzig has developed a promising infrastructure for engagement, including efforts to expand representative democracy, or the practice of elected individuals making governing decisions on behalf of their constituents. Second, as a city in the former East Germany, Leipzig also recently passed the 30-year mark in its development of local democracy, and its experiences with establishing new institutions for engagement provide concrete lessons for other cities interested in doing the same. These include insights about the relationship between a city and its constituents, designing successful engagement, working through crisis and conflict, and more. Third, because the city is currently working to address common public policy challenges鈥攕uch as gentrification, urban and economic development, environmental changes, local political polarization, and the mobilization of far-right groups鈥攈ow Leipzig uses civic engagement tools to address those problems can be instructive for other cities. Finally, given its unique history and modern political climate, Leipzig is an important case study for understanding the way that liberal forces can influence local engagement processes, and how to safeguard local liberal democracy.
The City of Leipzig has not created perfect institutions or a utopian city for civic engagement. But, ultimately, what people in Leipzig have learned from the last 31 years of developing and implementing infrastructure for local participatory democracy鈥攁 form of governing that allows constituents to take part in decision-making鈥攁re lessons that can benefit American cities and the broader transatlantic democratic experiment.
Key Findings
The City of Leipzig鈥檚 experience with civic engagement points to seven key lessons for American cities:
- Building Lasting Institutions for Civic Engagement
- Sharing Power with Residents
- Creating Strong Civic-City Relationships
- Making Engagement Accessible and Equitable
- Designing Successful Engagement
- Engaging Through Crisis and Conflict
- Supporting Local, Liberal Democracy
Methodology
Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, this research was conducted through a combination of desk research and one-on-one interviews through Zoom or via email. The 14 interviews focused on three areas of the city鈥檚 political ecosystem: city administrators, city council members, and engaged residents. Initial interviewees were found through desk research, and others were identified through personal reference and snowballing. One result of these limitations is that the interviewee pool over-represents left-leaning representatives and residents in Leipzig. Another limitation is that many of the respondents are involved in the same organizations. However, the research indicates many promising areas for future research, including expanding the study size with a larger sample and greater diversification.
Citations
- Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2021). .
- Geraldine Ide Gardner, Civic Engagement Principles for Transatlantic Cities: Inspiration from the Dialogues for Change Initiative 2013-2015, (Washington, DC: German Marshall Foundation, 2016). .
- Hollie Russon Gilman and K. Sabeel Rahman, Building Civic Capacity in an Era of Democratic Crisis, (Washington, DC: 国产视频, 2017). source.
- Chayenne Polim茅dio, Elena Souris, and Hollie Russon Gilman. Where Residents, Politics, and Government Meet: Philadelphia鈥檚 Experiments with Civic Engagement, (Washington, DC: 国产视频, 2018). source.
From International Values to Local Democracy
Before turning to the details of engagement in Leipzig, this section will review the political, academic, and democratic context for understanding municipal civic engagement. Specifically, the section will address the state of transatlantic democracy, the changing role and growing importance of municipal governments for public policy and democratic practice, and the ways that civic engagement can contribute to broader democratic health.
Transatlantic Democracy
For centuries, the United States and Western European countries built transatlantic alliances upon the foundation of shared democratic values鈥攁s well as the shared process of experimentation and trial-and-error.
Today, both the United States and Germany find themselves in a moment of democratic crisis, with decreasing popular confidence in political institutions, voters who are disenchanted with mainstream political parties, disinformation, and concerns about increasing executive power.1 Specifically in the United States as of 2018, there were high levels of partisan polarization, increasing socioeconomic inequality, and 鈥渄eeply contested electoral process,鈥 while European countries faced increasing political representation won by extremist and antipluralist political forces, a democratic deficit,2 and Euroscepticism that鈥檚 unique to the European Union.3
These developments have also had negative consequences for democracy. In 2019, American trust in the federal government was at 17 percent,4 down three points from its 2017 levels. Between 2017 and 2018, German rates of trust fell 6 points to 24,5 though trust in public institutions was already low in the 1990s and early 2000s.6 Both countries have seen lower rates of support for democracy in recent years too: In 2019, roughly 60 percent of Americans and 53 percent of Germans were satisfied with democracy.7 Additionally, a minority of voters in the two countries have shown degrees of support for strong, authoritarian-leaning leaders. Over a quarter of Americans reported through polling some support for 鈥渁rmy rule鈥 or a 鈥渟trong leader who doesn鈥檛 have to bother with Congress or elections.鈥8 In practice, voters in the United States and Germany have also supported far-right and illiberal parties, too, such as the 70 million ballots cast for Donald Trump in 2020 and 5.8 million counted nationally for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party list in 2017.9
A strong democratic system that can address these existential doubts and dissatisfaction requires institutions that 鈥渃hannel the representative qualities of democracy, whether it be independent courts, or uncensored media that provide information for an informed citizenry, or strong and independent civil society organizations.鈥10 In a democracy, the practice of civic engagement is an institution as much as the individual branches of government, and it requires just as much infrastructural support, informed design, and ongoing maintenance.
As democratic experiments with strengthening this institution continue in the United States, Germany, and around the world, some of the most interesting come from the municipal level, such as in Leipzig.
The Changing Role of Cities
From public policy to democratic experimentation, cities鈥 mandates are shifting to include broader questions than were traditionally thought to be part of municipal governing.11
Soon, 鈥渃ities will be at the center of the global response to climate change, migration, violence and injustice, health security, economic inequality, and security.鈥 They will not simply be 鈥減laces that global challenges affect, but also actors and influencers of the solutions.鈥12 In no issue has this been more clear than during the COVID-19 pandemic, where mayors found themselves making high-stakes decisions that would have real, life and death impacts on their constituencies.
Similarly, cities around the world have also been at the forefront of democratic experimentation: Participatory budgeting, a practice that gives residents decision-making power over part of a municipal budget, originated at the city level in Porto Allegre, Brazil in 1989 and has since spread to cities across the world.13 In Murcia, Spain, the city developed an approach of what they called 鈥渦rban acupuncture,鈥 or a way to use many targeted, civic engagement-based mini-interventions that all contributed towards big-picture solutions.14 In Tulsa, Oklahoma, the mayor designed a data analysis volunteering program through which residents can help make recommendations for public policy.15 There are countless stories like these.
With such experimentation, local government has become an important zone for civic engagement and developing residents鈥 democratic practice, with accessible opportunities to participate outside of elections. When residents do, they are able to engage around issues that are concrete, meaningful, and touch upon some of the greatest policy and institutional challenges of our time.
Civic Engagement for Democratic Health
With all the shapes and models it can take, civic engagement refers to a wide spectrum of activity. Outside of government, this can include activities like joining local groups, volunteering, participating in advocacy, and community organizing. Inside government, engagement can include the basic functions of democracy, such as voting in elections and communicating with representatives, but it can also expand to participation in governing processes.
Opportunities that allow residents to engage in the governing process can be referred to as public participation or collaborative governance (co-governance). Public administration professor Tina Nabatchi defines this participation as having seven characteristics:
- Public participation is based on the belief that those who are affected by a decision have a right to be involved in the decision-making process.
- The participation of those who are potentially affected by or interested in a decision should be sought out and facilitated.
- Public participation should seek input from participants in designing how they participate.
- Public participation includes the promise that the public鈥檚 contribution will influence the decision.
- How public input affected the decision should be communicated to participants.
- Public participation should recognize and focus on the needs and interests of all participants, including decision makers.
- Public participation should provide participants with the information they need to participate in a meaningful way.16
In addition to these foundational characteristics, successful government-led engagement can be evaluated by several measurements. Harvard University Professor Archon Fung argues that justice, legitimacy, and effectiveness are essential democratic values for engagement.17 Other research indicates that elements such as inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgment, transparency, efficiency, and transferability are important criteria.18 Engagement expert Sherry Arnstein鈥檚 classic ladder of participation19 argues that engagement activities typically fall into three categories: nonparticipation (manipulation of residents or what she calls 鈥渢herapy,鈥 essentially means of public relations), tokenism (informing, consulting, or placating residents), and citizen control (partnership, delegation, and citizen control).20 While public participation and co-governance efforts aim to provide opportunities in the citizen control range, many stay within the tokenism and consulting stage.
When civic engagement is executed well, it can help empower constituencies, overcome social divisions, address distrust of government,21 improve resident acceptance of government decisions, and increase trust in democratic institutions and satisfaction with democracy.22 Participation can increase residents鈥 democratic competences, provide new ideas and better information for policymakers, and help avoid bad planning and decisions.23 Perhaps as a reflection of this potential, the German federal government also views civic engagement as an element of national reunification in its annual status reports, especially as a tool to help with integration of immigrants.24
Beyond government-led efforts, civic organizations also play an important role in supporting democracy as an institution. This sector refers to voluntary associations that can be formal and informal, such as 鈥渋nterest groups, cultural and religious organizations, civic and developmental associations,鈥 and more.25 French political philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville saw civic associations as a key part of American democracy,26 and German Vereine, a type of civic associations or organizations similar to nonprofits, have a strong cultural history.27 In the United States, political scientist Robert Putnam argues that decreasing membership in American civic associations leads to lower social capital and more democratic disarray.28
At its best, the 鈥渟uccess of democracy depends on the existence of dense networks of civic engagement.鈥29 Similarly, sociologist and political scientist Theda Skocpol writes that democratic health relies on an improved connection between civic organizations and the federal government.30 From a culturalist perspective, these kinds of voluntary associations 鈥渕ediate between civic society and the state: they inculcate individuals with the rules of compromise and democratic principles; they make individuals more socially active and supportive of democratic norms; and they produce a capacity for trust, reciprocity and cooperation, thereby strengthening democracy.鈥31 Finally, associations also play a 鈥渞ole in making the state responsive and accountable to its citizens.鈥32
A 2014 survey study by the Bertelsmann Foundation33 found that in Germany, 鈥渟atisfaction with the functioning of democracy is higher among democratically active citizens than among democratically inactive citizens and is also higher than the average of all citizens.鈥34 These benefits range based on the type of participation tools used, which underscores the importance of carefully designed procedures: Satisfaction was highest for citizens who participated in successful direct democracy procedures (48 percent), dialogue processes (48 percent), and institutions and committees of representative democracy (55 percent), compared to the average satisfaction for all citizens (46 percent).35 Ultimately, the improvements in democratic satisfaction for direct democracy and dialogue processes are marginal (48 percent vs. 46 percent), but by increasing satisfaction 9 percentage points, participation in forms of representative democracy such as advisory councils can be particularly impactful when people believe their engagement makes a difference.
At the same time, there are also serious potential pitfalls for engagement.
First, negative experiences with participation can damage residents鈥 relationships with government and democracy. In fact, the negative effects of unsuccessful engagement 鈥渁re even more pronounced than the positive effects in the case of successful participation: the proportion of satisfied participants in unsuccessful deliberative procedures decreases by 17 percentage points,鈥 and by 7 percentage points for 鈥渦nsuccessful direct democratic procedures.鈥 Naturally, failures can also increase dissatisfaction: by 14 percentage points for unsuccessful dialogue processes and 13 percentage points for unsuccessful direct democracy. Notably, 鈥渢he effect of engagement in the institutions of representative democracy is strongest when it fails: Unsuccessful representative engagement reduces satisfaction by 21 percentage points,鈥 and 鈥渋ncreases dissatisfaction by 15 percentage points.鈥36 In short, the impact of unsuccessful engagement on democracy can be substantially larger than the impact made by productive engagement.
Additionally, engagement can create increased conflict and opposition between constituents and politicians or involve the appearance of elected officials shirking their responsibilities. For co-governance efforts in particular, Professor of Public Affairs Don Kettl argues that they 鈥減ush greater responsibility for achieving public goals into the for-profit and nonprofit sectors, based on an underlying assumption that the non-governmental sectors can do at least as well as and probably at lower cost than the government.鈥37
It is also important to note that not all civic engagement is good or democratic, simply by the merit of encouraging people to participate. History Professor Sven Reichardt argues that 鈥渆nergies generated by sheer civic activism do not of necessity feed into a politics of toleration and inclusion; they can just as well be utilized for repressive ends.鈥 The practice and frequency of far-right demonstrations in both the United States and Germany reflect this tension. Therefore, he argues that 鈥渋nstead of naively understanding civil society as a highly normative utopia, it should be seen as a sphere or realm of power relations.鈥38
Despite the potential for problems with engagement鈥攊ncluding increased dissatisfaction, conflict, outsourcing, and illiberal participation鈥攖he same 2014 study from the Bertelsmann Foundation found that both German local elected officials and citizens believed the benefits of engagement outweighed the downsides.39 But ultimately, whether civic engagement benefits democratic health depends on the structure and design of the effort, as well as the greater political and structural context within which it takes place.
Citations
- Saskia Brechenmacher, Comparing Democratic Distress in the United States and Europe, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018). .
- Here, democratic deficit refers to the disconnect between Europeans and the democratic institutions of the European Union, which often feel 鈥渙paque and far removed鈥 from citizens.
- Brechenmacher, Comparing Democratic Distress.
- Pew Research Center. Public Trust in Government: 1958-2021. (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2021).
- Rainer Faus, Tom Mannewitz, Simon Storks, Kai Unzicker, and Erik Vollmann. Schwindendes Vertrauen in Politik und Parteien. Berlin, Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019). .
- Sonia Roya, Ana Yetano, Bailio Acerete, 鈥淐itizen Participation in German and Spanish Local Governments: A Comparative Study,鈥 International Journal of Public Administration 34, no. 3 (February 2011): 139-150. DOI:10.1080/01900692.2010.533070.
- Lee Drutman,Larry Diamond, and Joe Goldman. Follow the Leader: Exploring American Support for Democracy and Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Democracy Fund Voter Study Group, 2019). .
- Drutman, etl al. 2018
- Der Bundeswahlleiter, 鈥淏undestagswahl 2017.鈥
- John Shattuck, 鈥淭hree Decades Later: A Reflection on Transatlantic Democracy Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall,鈥 The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 44, no. 1. (Winter 2020): 143-152.
- In this report, "municipality鈥 and 鈥渃ity鈥 are used interchangeably, as are 鈥渃ity government鈥 and 鈥渕unicipal government鈥 to refer to the local government of a city.
- Berggruen Institute, the City of Los Angeles, and the United Nations Foundation, Reimagining the Role of Cities and City Diplomacy in the Multilateral Order: Workshop Summary (Los Angeles, CA: Berggruen Institute, 2021). .
- Hollie Gilman and Brian Wampler, 鈥淭he Difference in Design: Participatory Budgeting in Brazil and the United States,鈥 Journal of Public Deliberation 15, no. 1 (2019):
- Rebeca P茅rez L贸pez. 鈥淯rban DNA and the birth of Urban Acupuncture Therapy: Story from Murcia, Spain.鈥 URBACT, November 17, 2017.
- Cities of Service, Residents Boost Capacity for Data Analysis in Tulsa, Oklahoma, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2018). .
- Tina Nabatchi, A Manager鈥檚 Guide to Evaluating Citizen Participation, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, 2011).
- Archon Fung, 鈥淰arieties of Participation in Complex Governance,鈥 Articles on Collaborative Public Management 66, no. 1 (December 2006): 66-75. .
- Graham Smith, Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
- 鈥淐limbing the Ladder: A Look at Sherry R. Arnstein,鈥 American Association of Colleges of Osteopathic Medicine. N.d. .
- Sherry R. Arnstein, 鈥淎 Ladder of Citizen Participation,鈥 Journal of the American Planning Association 35, No. 4 (July 1969): 216-224. . 鈥嬧
- K. Sabeel Rahman, Hollie Russon Gilman, and Elena Souris. 鈥淏uilding Democratic Infrastructure.鈥 Stanford Social Innovation Review, March 7, 2018. .
- Robert Vehrkamp and Christina Tillmann, Partizipation im Wandel: Unsere Demokratie zwischen W盲hlen, Mitmachen und Entscheiden (G眉tersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014).
- Vehrkamp and Tillmann, 2014.
- Vehrkamp and Tillmann, 2014.
- Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 鈥業ntroduction: What Makes for Democracy鈥. In Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 1鈥66. As cited in: Christiane Olivo, 鈥淭he quality of civil society in post-communist Eastern Germany: a case-study of voluntary associations in Leipzig,鈥 Democratization 18, no. 3 (2011): 731-750, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2011.563117
- Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
- Elizabeth Grenier, 鈥淕et to know the concept of the German Verein.鈥 Deutsche Welle, May 1, 2019. .
- Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York City: Simon & Schuster, 2000.
- Ross Campbell, 鈥淭he Sources of Institutional Trust in East and West Germany: Civic Culture or Economic Performance?,鈥 German Politics 13, no. 3 (September 2004): 401-418
- Theda Skocpol. Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003.
- Campbell, 2004
- Christiane Olivo, 鈥淭he quality of civil society in post-communist Eastern Germany: a case-study of voluntary associations in Leipzig,鈥 Democratization 18, no. 3 (2011): 731-750, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2011.563117
- The study was conducted in 2013 and involved interviews with mayors, online and telephone surveys of council members and three administrative heads, and telephone surveys of 100 citizens per each municipality studied. The sample size included 27 municipalities.
- Vehrkamp and Tillmann, 2014.
- Vehrkamp and Tillmann, 2014.
- Vehrkamp and Tillmann, 2014.
- Donald F. Kettl, 鈥淭he Job of Government: Interweaving Public Functions and Private Hands.鈥 Public Administration Review, 75, no. 2. (January 19, 2015). 219-229. .
- Reichardt, Sven. 鈥淐ivility, Violence and Civil Society.鈥 In ed. John Keane. Civil Society: Berlin Perspectives. Oxford/New York: Berghahn Books, 2007. As cited by Christiane Olivo, Berlin Program for Advanced German and European Studies SummerWorkshop, "The Meaning of "Wir Sind das Volk" and the Popular Battle overDemocratic Values," Free University of Berlin. (June 19, 2015)
- Vehrkamp and Tillmann, 2014.
Case Study: Leipzig
To understand Leipzig as a case study for civic engagement, this section will first provide an overview of the city鈥檚 historic and political context, including its residents鈥 experience under the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). Second, this review will explain the unique context of local democracy in Leipzig and the outside factors influencing the development of democratic institutions in the city government. Finally, this section will describe the current infrastructure for civic engagement in the City of Leipzig and the outcomes it has produced.
Historical Context
For centuries, Leipzig has been an important geographic nexus, connecting the north and south, and bridging the east and west. Since its founding at the crossroads of two ancient trade routes, connecting Spain to Ukraine and Italy to the Baltic, Leipzig has been a center of international trade and became a hub for German manufacturing and banking. The city also has great cultural importance, as the home to one of the oldest universities in Germany and to historical figures like Johann Sebastian Bach, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Johann Wolfgan von Goethe, and Friedrich Nietzsche.
Approximately one-fourth of the city was destroyed by Allied air raids during World War II, and then later rebuilt by the East German government, the GDR. However, the East German government did not adequately invest in the city鈥檚 infrastructure or historic buildings. By 1989, the city could not 鈥渕eet the needs of municipal organization and communication,鈥 and photos broadcasted of historic structures鈥 鈥渦nbelievably poor conditions鈥 created outrage among the public.鈥1
Despite the state of public infrastructure in the city, Lepizig was an economic hub for the entire Soviet bloc, acting as 鈥渁 meeting point of the two blocks, a gate between East and West.鈥 Though its historic trade fair no longer has national importance, during the GDR era, it meant that Leipzig retained a somewhat more open culture thanks to its many international and western visitors.2
One potential outcome of this openness is the role that Leipzig played in ending the GDR regime. The city was one of hundreds of locations where workers held mass protests in 1953, which ended with military force and martial law by Soviet forces.3 By 1989, many people in East Germany were pushing for democratic reforms and had begun gathering at peace prayer events hosted at the Protestant St. Nicholas Church (Nikolaikirche) in Leipzig every Monday night,4 which ultimately led to a mass protest on October 9.5 Despite the fear of police violence鈥攁nd the presence of armed soldiers鈥攂etween 70,000鈥100,000 people peacefully marched in Leipzig that night,6 calling for reforms to the GDR7 while walking past the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) headquarters.8 Rallies continued in Leipzig and other parts of East Germany,9 and on October 17, the politburo removed GDR President Erich Honecker. The protests continued, including a demonstration of 500,000 in Berlin on November 4. The Berlin Wall fell on November 9.10 After the fall of the GDR, Leipzig became known as the 鈥淗ero City鈥 (Heldenstadt), which it is still referred to today.11
During reunification, however, many people moved west, including young people who left for better jobs. Brain drain and socio-psychological pessimism resulted from these demographic changes, as well as high levels of blight.12 Leipzig became a shrinking city13 until 2002, when the population finally grew again after continuous decline since 1965.14 This trend has continued, and between 1990 and 2020, the population increased by 16 percent.15 As of 2020, the city had a population of 605,407 people.16
While the city now has the nickname 鈥Hypezig鈥17 and is known as a trendy city, some problems from the GDR and reunification era still remain. First, the economy in Eastern Germany still lags somewhat behind the West. Eleven years after reunification in 2001, 17 percent of people in the former East were unemployed, compared to an average of 7 percent in Western states.18 By 2020, the gap was only two points: 8.1 percent versus 6.1 percent.19 Still, Eastern Germans today face lower wages, productivity, and living standards,20 and Leipzig was temporarily named the poverty capital of Germany in 2011. Second, the region still has an aging and declining workforce and general population.21 While more people are moving to the east, the average age in the five states was still 45 or above in 2017.22 In Leipzig, the average age is 42.8 for the overall population, though foreigners and residents with an immigrant background tend to be younger, with average ages of 32.8 and 30.8, respectively.23
As a result of this history and the city鈥檚 development, Leipzig currently experiences many public challenges shared by cities around the world, including increasing housing prices and gentrification, long-term demographic change, a strained education system, insufficient public transportation, shifts due to climate change, and economic stress.
Leipzig鈥檚 History of Local Democracy and Municipally-supported Engagement
Thanks to its role in the 1989 uprisings, a spirit of civic engagement has become one of the Hero City鈥檚 (Heldenstadt) defining traits. However, its civic roots are much older.
Historically, Leipzig was considered a 鈥渃itizen city鈥 (叠眉谤驳别谤蝉迟补诲迟). This differentiated it from its southeast neighbor, Dresden, the capital of Saxony, which was classified as a "residential city" (Residenzstadt). While the royal court was the center of decision-making in a city like Dresden, a 叠眉谤驳别谤蝉迟补诲迟 was ruled by the citizenry.24 The outcome was that people in Leipzig had to be more self-sufficient. As Wolfgang Kurz, a former official in the city planning office, put it in 2003, 鈥淟eipzig has a relatively strong tradition of civic activity and civic commitment鈥 without 鈥渟uch a pronounced mentality or attitude of obedience to authority鈥 as in the Residenzstadt. Instead, those in Leipzig 鈥渁lways had to rely on their own skills and resources and a certain degree of pragmatism can be found in Leipzig鈥25鈥攁n ethos similar to American ruggedness.
However, under the GDR, residents in Leipzig lived with severe restrictions on political and individual freedoms. In this period, a city administration was effectively the lowest hierarchical element in the centralized, one-party system, so decisions would often be handed down from higher up. Additionally, while citizens may have elected city council members, the Social Unity Party (SED) selected the candidates.26
Even so, some degree of political participation was still present during the GDR era. Historian Mary Fulbrook describes the authoritarian regime as a 鈥減articipatory dictatorship鈥 because it 鈥渋nvolved large numbers of its citizens in its political structures and processes.鈥 Among adults, one in five was a member of the SED, and most belonged to the state trade union. Among the youth, the majority belonged to state youth organizations.27 Engagement outside the political infrastructure of the state was minimal鈥攃onfined to the Protestant church and, later, to dissident and pro-democracy groups鈥攁nd participation could result in negative consequences.28 Likewise, refusal to join 鈥渧oluntary organizations,鈥 like the SED, could impact someone鈥檚 ability to get a job, get into college, travel outside the country,29 and more. However, the country did allow citizens to participate in some specific policy areas, such as healthcare, demography, gender, leisure, housing, and work that were not related to human rights abuses.30 These opportunities included controlled public discussions and formal 鈥渓etters of complaint鈥 (Eingaben) that required government response. One motive for the government in creating these channels was to 鈥渉elp improve conditions of life because they saw those issues as impacting worker productivity and satisfaction.鈥31 Another was to monitor public opinion.32 But citizens could use these channels to engage in the political system, express criticism, and to try to 鈥渂uild a better society, or at least to make the best of the present鈥 through activities like 鈥渂eautify[ing] their village, construct[ing] a new swimming pool, or organiz[ing] a youth sports festival.鈥33
When West and East Germany were reunited in 1990, the Western German system replaced all Eastern legal, political, economic, and bureaucratic institutions without retaining many qualities or input from the Eastern structure.34 As part of the reunification process, cities re-established local self-government, a system of federalism, and a bureaucratic structure based on citizen rights with an orientation towards service.35 During this process, many Western Germans moved to the East, drawn by cheap land and property, curiosity, and to help establish a new societal structure. However, this temporary help turned into a permanent elite-transfer,36 which has resulted in many positions of power in Eastern government and business being held by Western Germans instead of Eastern Germans, even today.37
During the 鈥渢urning point鈥 (Wende), or the 鈥減eriod of political change around 1989,鈥38 Eastern Germany experienced a 鈥渢ime of awakening鈥 (Aufbruchszeit), when the sudden democratic freedoms spurred 鈥渞elatively widespread citizen participation.鈥 Under the GDR, there were many groups that already worked on local issues, but they could now do so more openly. In addition to these existing groups and the civil society organizations that were transferred into Eastern German society, other citizens formed new groups. Additionally, the historic nature of the moment also gave citizens the sense that 鈥渢hey could truly change things in society.鈥39 Barbara Baumg盲rtel, who has lived in the Waldstra脽enviertel quarter of Leipzig since 1954, got involved in her neighborhood association after reunification because she wanted to take advantage of the new opportunity to participate in democracy. Around her, she observed that people 鈥渉ad a democratic say for the first time and many wanted to use that.鈥 Like her, 鈥減eople wanted to help make their district more livable, organize something for art and culture, take care of the old people who were overwhelmed with the new situation and much more.鈥 At the time, joining a Verein was 鈥渢he best way to do that.鈥40 However, Christian Bollert, a journalist and the head of media relations for the organization We Are The East (Wir Sind Der Osten), points out that engagement was mostly around responding to the immediate crisis at that time: 鈥淧eople were unemployed and they were fighting for their own lives and not thinking about a nice bike lane in front of their house.鈥41
The reunification period also provided exciting new opportunities to participate with some parts of the city government. Because the City of Leipzig was adapting to the new situation鈥攁nd the people in the administration often did not have much experience鈥擱alf Els盲sser notes that others outside government 鈥渃ould have a little more influence with suggestions and concepts on conceptual processes of the administration itself.鈥 According to Els盲sser, the leader of a Leipzig-based organization that works to support civic engagement and civil society in Saxony, there were 鈥渁 lot more decisions and plans processed in a very short time,鈥 so 鈥渕ore participation was possible鈥 as the city rebuilt.42 Former Deputy Mayor for Urban Development and Construction (1990-1995) Nils Gormsen described a 鈥渨illingness to listen to everyone and to discuss matters openly in order to find the best solution,鈥 as embodied by practices like round tables鈥攁 type of discussion forum that emphasized consensus-based, unified decisions, sometimes focused on specific issues.43 Professor of public administration Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor argues that the round tables 鈥減revented anarchy and violence鈥 while also 鈥渂ecoming one of the most important foundations of a new democratic culture in East Germany.鈥44
But according to Karsten Gerkens, who worked to implement civic engagement efforts as the head of Urban Regeneration during reunification, the city鈥檚 efforts could be inconsistent. Gerkens explains that his department鈥檚 engagement efforts often made him feel like 鈥渢he fire brigade鈥 鈥 there to solve problems when they arise, and then withdraw. To do so in a sustainable way, they tried to collaborate with forms of engagement that already existed in the neighborhood, such as citizen groups. But that model didn鈥檛 translate over the long term into sustained engagement by the city or citizen associations.45
According to Els盲sser, in the mid-1990s, as many residents moved out of Leipzig to pursue other, often professional, opportunities, the number of people who would participate decreased, and so did opportunities for engagement. As a result, the civil society culture suffered in Leipzig.46 This was a common trend in eastern Germany at the time. For example, between 1995-1997, the average citizen 鈥渂elonged to 1.44 organizations, but only 0.78 in 1999.鈥47 Barbara Baumg盲rtel, the former head of the Waldstrassenviertel Neighborhood Verein,48 was in her late thirties when the wall fell. In 2005, she noted that while there was a euphoric spirit during the turning point (Wende) period after 1989 with 鈥減roject groups, exhibitions, public debates, and workshops,鈥 people were 鈥渘ot able to give this spirit a structure鈥 or a 鈥渓asting foundation.鈥49
When the city began to grow again in the 2000s, 鈥渁 new generation of committed people came along, and a different climate had emerged.鈥50 But by this point, the city administration had 鈥渄eveloped into a functioning administration that also does a lot itself.鈥51 As a result, Baumg盲rtel noted in 2004 that without that institutionalization, 鈥減articipation [today] may happen on a formal base but without satisfying results.鈥
Over time, however, the city has shifted back towards a more participatory approach. Els盲sser notes that for many years, the group of people advocating for incorporating engagement was relatively small. But recently, engagement has 鈥渟imply become a matter of course again and something that is also actively supported by the administration.鈥 One reason for this is because the administration has seen a demand for engagement that does not only come from the same group of residents.52 Another factor has been that the administration has seen benefits from the engagement that it has carried out thus far. While the newly professionalized administration was less receptive to engagement overall, Els盲sser found there was still institutional willingness to participate in projects. As various sections of the city government have worked on individual projects over time, those experiments鈥 success 鈥淸have] shown administration employees what is possible in terms of positive effects of citizen participation.鈥 In particular, he believes that these projects have indicated that public participation on complex topics like budget planning is possible, have demonstrated for the administration how to carry out engagement, and have proven that such collaboration with residents 鈥渟upports the administration鈥檚 own work rather than hampers it.鈥 Additionally, the city鈥檚 Democracy Balance working group, which carried out an audit of participation and engagement in the city from 2002 to 2005, helped set the foundation for the city鈥檚 guidelines for engagement and supported individual departments to 鈥減ractice citizen participation more intensely,鈥 including those who would not have done so on their own.53
Though the GDR period ended thirty years ago, many interviewees agreed that the history still impacts politics today. According to Jo虉rg Reichert, a resident who helps run the Leipzig chapter of the national Code for Germany project, the lack of trust that citizens felt in government under the East German regime and as a result of reunification is still present in politics today.54 This is particularly true for older generations who lived through the high hopes and deep disappointments of the Wende period. Their fears are particularly directed at the state and federal levels. But at the local level, Reichert still sees a lack of trust in politics and a belief that city leaders will ultimately follow their preferences over citizens鈥.55 In Bollert鈥檚 experience, some people will say, 鈥淚 don鈥檛 understand what the government does and they possibly have their own agenda.鈥56 To Stefan Heinig, the former Office of City Planning department head (2018-2020), history has impacted different generations in different ways. There is not one single East German experience: Some residents who feel they lost during reunification may be more resistant to government decisions, those who were socialized under the GDR may prefer government to act decisively, and others who felt like winners from reunification, particularly value the freedom and democracy they have in the city today.57 Even its history as a "citizen city" is still present: A city employee who works closely on engagement efforts emphasized that Leipzig has a strong citizenry even today.58
In recent years, Leipzig has been internationally recognized as a strong democratic city. In addition to 鈥渋ts active dissident past under the communist regime, its central role in the peaceful revolution of 1989, [and] the explosion of grassroots citizens鈥 groups beginning in late 1989,鈥 political science professor Christiane Olivo cites 鈥渢he structures put in place by the city government to enhance communication with, and policy input from, the citizenry鈥 as a reason that Leipzig can be called the 鈥渃ity of democracy in Eastern Germany.鈥59 In 1999, Leipzig won second prize in the Bertelsmann Foundation-sponsored competition 鈥淐itizen Oriented Municipalities鈥擜venues to Strengthen Democracy.鈥 And in 2019, the city was a finalist for the international Innovation Politics Award thanks to its 2018 鈥淵ear of Democracy鈥 (Jahr der Demokratie) initiative.60
The City of Leipzig鈥檚 Infrastructure of Engagement
In addition to its history, current public policy challenges, and modern political climate, Leipzig presents an interesting case study in local democracy because of the promising infrastructure for engagement that the city government has developed.
Today, the City of Leipzig has five guidelines for civic participation:
- 鈥Citizen participation benefits all sides: Citizens, city council, and administration are equally involved and benefit from the mutual exchange of knowledge on the respective project.
- Every citizen can get involved: Everyone who is interested has the chance to get involved in the participation process within the scope of his or her own possibilities. You can take part in workshops or use online platforms. Another method is surveys.
- Participation strengthens the city council and administration: Citizen participation has a supportive effect on the decisions of the city council, and enables the administration to plan more reliably in its tasks.
- Citizen participation takes place at an early stage, in parallel with the process, and in several stages: In planning and decision-making processes, public participation accompanies both the administrative and the political process from the start. Citizens are also involved across all project stages鈥攆rom the goal鈥攕etting to implementation.鈥61
- Citizen participation coordination advises and supports all those involved: 鈥The coordinator acts as a contact point for all participation issues and supervises and advises the participation projects throughout the entire process, depending on the city-wide importance of the project to varying degrees.鈥62
The rules for engagement were created through a working group consisting of representatives from the citizenry and administration, as well as the worlds of politics and science. In 2012, the mayor adopted the guidelines and informed the city council.63 When the guidelines were announced in 2012, the city argued that they would improve citizens鈥 ability to 鈥済et up-to-date information on the status of specific projects,鈥 鈥渂ring their own view and competencies into the discussion,鈥 and to help produce 鈥渃ollaborative planning between the administration, the decisions of the city council, and the ideas of the citizens,鈥 while still retaining the decision-making capacity of city government.
In addition to these guidelines, the City of Leipzig approaches engagement through a 鈥淭rialog鈥 model developed in part by participation expert Dr. Helmut Klages, among others. The Trialog considers three categories of engagement partners: the residents, politicians, and city administration.64 According to an official in the administration who works closely on these issues, leaders in the engagement process aim to make sure that participation and representation are balanced between each of the three areas.65 In Leipzig, the official explained that the three sides of the Trialog must all get involved and benefit from the engagement process.66 The tri-sectoral approach to civic engagement is common in other German cities, too, sometimes with a framework that focuses on citizens, the administration, and businesses.67
To put these ideas into practice, the City of Leipzig has a multi-part, formal infrastructure for civic engagement that provides multiple opportunities for resident participation. The following list offers a summary of some of the main elements of municipally-supported engagement. A full description of each entity, as well as related engagement tools and a description of the city鈥檚 current municipal structure, can be found in the appendix.
City Council
In addition to engagement with constituents led by individual city council members, the Leipzig City Council has expanded advisory councils into additional opportunities for representative democracy:
- Youth Parliament (Jugendparlament): The Youth Parliament is a body made up of 20 young Leipzig residents who are between 14鈥21 years old, and are elected by other residents in the same age range. Through the parliament and its youth advisory council, members can submit motions to the full city council. The youth parliament itself has an annual budget of 鈧5,000 EUR (around $5,900 USD).68
- Subject Area Advisory Councils (贵补肠丑产别颈谤盲迟别): In addition to the youth council, the city council has 11 advisory bodies, specializing in drugs, equality, children and families, migrants, psychiatry, seniors, disability, animal welfare, crime prevention, allotment gardens, and conservation. The councils are made up of residents with relevant expertise and members of the city council. Councils also have the right to submit motions to the full city council, but they do not have their own funding or budget.69
- Neighborhood Councils: In addition to representation through the city council, the City of Leipzig also includes neighborhood councils. The 10 district councils (厂迟补诲迟产别锄颈谤办蝉产别颈谤盲迟别) and 14 regional councils (翱谤迟蝉肠丑补蹿迟蝉谤盲迟别) act as advisory councils for the neighborhoods and independent municipalities of Leipzig, respectively.70 Starting with the 2021鈥2022 budget, district councils receive 鈧50,000 EUR (around $59,000 USD) in funding a year,71 and the regional councils receive 鈧6 EUR (about $7 USD) per inhabitant per year.72
City Administration
Within the administration, the City of Leipzig supports several other noteworthy avenues to engagement that can be replicated elsewhere:
- City Office (厂迟补诲迟产眉谤辞): The City Office is a physical location that acts as a 鈥減latform for citizen participation and civic engagement鈥 and as a link between residents and the administration. Residents can visit the office to request help or share feedback. The office often hosts exhibits and events on engagement.
- Leipzig Thinking Ahead (Leipzig weiter denken, LWD): As the coordination office for resident participation, the LWD initiative is tasked with supporting the administration's civic engagement efforts. It is part of the Urban Development department, but works with departments across the city that are interested in incorporating participation into their projects. The LWD office also trains city employees, supports opportunities for engagement, and plays a quality assurance role.73
- Neighborhood Management (Quartiersmanagement): These neighborhood-specific groups are also formed in partnership between nonprofits or associations and city departments. The city and department are responsible for tasks and financing, and the association hires a district moderator who acts as a contact person with whom residents can collaborate. Like the 厂迟补诲迟产别锄颈谤办蝉产别颈谤盲迟别 and 翱谤迟蝉肠丑补蹿迟蝉谤盲迟别, Quartiersmanagement (neighborhood management) groups act as mediators74 between the administration and its constituents, but the Quartiersmanagement groups are more affiliated with city departments instead of the city council. They also receive funding from the city,75 and each cost between 鈧50,00鈥100,000 EUR a year.76
- Time-Specific Initiatives: Occasionally, the city will create specific initiatives on civic engagement, such as the Year of Democracy (Jahr der Demokratie), which come from the city council77 and are sometimes funded in part by the federal government.78
- Participatory Budgeting: The City of Leipzig will carry out a dedicated participatory budgeting program from 2023鈥2024.
- Civic Engagement List: The city publishes a list of current civic engagement projects on its website so that residents or city departments who are interested in participating can find relevant information.
- Individual Initiatives:
- City Funding: In addition to funding for the above participation models, residents and associations may receive city funding for civic engagement and community-related projects.79
- Citizen Recognition: The city also gives out a variety of awards and honors for engaged residents.
In addition to these city-initiated efforts, Leipzig must also follow and recognize some state and federal requirements for formal engagement. For example, the Federal Building Act requires providing the public with plans and including rejected suggestions from the public in a municipal statement. Municipalities must also give public presentations on a plans鈥 goals and purposes.80 Additionally, Saxony does set some direct democracy tools for the state, local, and county levels.81 Compared to other states, however, Saxony was ranked by More Democracy! (Mehr Demokratie!), a direct democracy NGO (non-governmental organization), as mediocre at the state level and sufficient for the local level, largely because the quorums for these tools are high enough to act as a 鈥渄eterrent.鈥82
Engagement Outcomes
As described above, the City of Leipzig has developed a multi-part infrastructure for engagement, which broadly consists of two parts: expanded representative democracy and city-led information-sharing and deliberation opportunities. This infrastructure is very promising and has many benefits, particularly in the ways that it allows for more residents to participate in influential government bodies. However, the general emphasis on information-sharing is a limitation of the engagement approach, and there are areas where the execution could improve. Even so, the municipal government-supported opportunities for engagement have improved over time, and both the positive and negative lessons can be useful to American cities, particularly when considering how a city鈥檚 history can influence present engagement.
Broadly, the city鈥檚 infrastructure indicates that supporting participation is a priority of the administration. Particularly through their LWD office, the city administration seems to recognize the importance of instituting civic engagement as a formal part of the municipal government, though its efforts have required trial and error. Something like the LWD office provides an institutional backbone for the city鈥檚 engagement efforts. In a city audit of engagement from 2016, the LWD office was 鈥減raised for its willingness to experiment with new processes and for the quality of processes carried out there.鈥83
Second, the administration鈥檚 approach to representative democracy expands the traditional city council model to include several councils that Leipzig residents can serve on. The Youth Parliament, neighborhood councils, district councils, and subject area councils provide residents with the ability to make concrete changes in their city and participate in decision-making. It is also notable that in many cases, these councils are designed to improve representation and political power for communities that are traditionally excluded from these processes, including youth, immigrants, and residents with disabilities. Though these opportunities are not available to all constituents, they provide a meaningful platform for bringing new perspectives into governing institutions.
Additionally, the city鈥檚 individual participation projects, which largely take the shape of information-sharing and deliberation opportunities, have often been effective. According to that same 2016 report published by the city, participation helped to 鈥渞educe fears and concerns about upcoming tasks and projects,鈥 strengthen local democracy and neighborhood structures and identities, the collaboration between city employees and constituents, as well as fellow employees in different offices, and increase acceptance and democratic legitimacy, especially for the city council.84 The report also found that the city was able to support engagement on broad topics (such as housing policy), and that administrators were becoming more aware of the benefits of engagement.85
However, some residents, politicians, and contributors to the city administration鈥檚 efforts see room for improvement, including in the areas of consistency and implementation, resources, sharing power with residents, willingness to support engagement, transparency, equity, and timely engagement. In interviews, some residents reflected that they are still not satisfied with the outcomes of engagement, or may feel that the city administration will ultimately make decisions alone rather than in true collaboration with constituents. Some residents feel that city departments won鈥檛 even accept information from citizen associations, even if they have hired experts, and that the majority of the city council typically votes in alignment with the administration.86 According to Baumg盲rtel, 鈥減articipation is made possible in a purely formal manner鈥 today.87
Looking at the administration鈥檚 infrastructure for engagement, Dieter Rink argues that Leipzig currently meets the lowest levels of Arnstein鈥檚 ladder successfully. Rink, who is the head of the Helmholtz Center for Environmental Research鈥檚 Department of Urban and Environmental and an occasional collaborator with the city, believes the administration executes practices of informing and consulting with residents particularly well. However, he says that 鈥渞eal opportunities for co-decision are relatively small.鈥 This focus on consulting over coproduction is common in many American cities, as well, and in Leipzig, the emphasis is deliberate.88 When the city released civic engagement guidelines in 2012, it was clear that the resident participation it envisioned did not 鈥渆xplicitly intervene in the decision-making mechanisms of representative democracy,鈥 with the administration still in charge of planning and the city council responsible for political decisions.89 Similarly, a city report argues that 鈥渃onsistently combining formats of representative democracy and local participation processes鈥 like this is the only way to produce 鈥渁 successful, future-oriented and sustainable governance concept.鈥90
Some of these criticisms鈥攖hat the city provides more information than fully participatory opportunities, that administrators are not always receptive to engagement, and that residents鈥 participation is not clearly reflected in decision-making鈥攈ave been consistent over time. A 2014 report from the Bertelsmann Foundation found in a survey that respondents in Leipzig agreed that 鈥渨e conduct many procedures in which citizens are heard and participate in political discussions, but the final decision is made by the city council.鈥 This was true for all cities included in the survey, but for Leipzig, 50 percentage points more respondents agreed with that statement than the alternative: 鈥渨e have many procedures in which citizens can decide on important political issues.鈥91 In her research on engagement in the city from 2011, Olivo came to the conclusion that Quartiersmanagement forums tended to be 鈥渕ore informational than participatory.鈥
The city鈥檚 two studies on local engagement have come to similar conclusions. Most recently, the administration鈥檚 challenges included limited resources, inconsistent participation from administrative and political leaders, and lack of transparency after participation.92 Participants in the study also reported a lack of clarity around basic participation: how residents or companies could initiate a civic engagement process themselves.93 At that same time, Dr. Raban Fuhrmann, an expert on civic engagement who contributed to the audit of participation in Leipzig, commented that the city is 鈥済ood at downstream citizen participation,鈥 and their efforts 鈥渃oncentrate on projects that have already been planned and reach the committed citizens and those affected,鈥 but could improve by including more residents.94 However, these types of challenges are not unique to Leipzig; many American cities experience them, as well.
Some interviewees believe that even if there are areas where the city could do better, engagement has improved over the last few years. According to Mohammad Okasha, a representative on the Migrant Council, 鈥渁 lot has changed and improved in the last 2-3 years.鈥 He attributes this to increased activism from residents, particularly from the immigrant community. Ralf Els盲sser, who has worked with the City of Leipzig on civic engagement since 1996, has also seen changes in Leipzig residents. Today, he sees more initiatives, and 鈥渕ore young adults who are committed to issues themselves,鈥 in particular to sustainability. As a result, the city has been able to shift away from advancing projects in small groups and instead does more networking, and provides support for others doing related work.95 Finally, while Thorsten Mehnert, a board member of the local Wake Up Corners Foundation (Stiftung Ecken Wecken),96 would like to see the city improve in some ways, he 鈥渂elieve[s] that Leipzig is already on a very good path.鈥97
But while engagement may be improving, damage from earlier failed participation efforts may still influence how residents engage with the city. According to Bollert, if residents had the impression from 2000 to 2010 that they could make a difference, there might be 鈥渁 bigger chance to be really progressive and modern鈥 today, but says that this opportunity has passed. Instead, residents still feel that decisions were made inside the city hall without their input.98 And ultimately, while the city鈥檚 engagement efforts 鈥済et better and better in the long run, the problem is that the missed chances don鈥檛 come back.鈥99
While Leipzig鈥檚 history of engagement and political change gives it a unique civic spirit, this may also contribute to some residents鈥 disappointment, according to Olivo. One group member told her that during the turning point (Wende) period, 鈥渕any people thought that through their work [in associations] they could change something, really influence things. But in the end, many had to realize that it is not like that.鈥 During the Wende, East Germans were promised miracles and 鈥渂looming landscapes.鈥100 Like with many other things, local democracy in practice was not quite what people had hoped for. According to Bollert, people believed from 1989 through 1992 that they 鈥渉ad a voice.鈥 Later, they were disappointed to learn that 鈥渢hey don鈥檛 have a voice, or that they had a voice, but it was not powerful.鈥
Citations
- Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, The Leipzig Model: Myth or Reality? A Study of City Management in the Former East Germany (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2008): 94
- Garcia-Zamor, 92
- Office of the Historian, 鈥淭he East German Uprising, 1953,鈥 United States Department of State, n.d. .
- Laurence Peter, 鈥淓ast Germany 1989 – the march that KO'd communism,鈥 BBC News, October 14, 2019. .
- Peter, 2019.
- Andrew Curry, 鈥溾榃e Are the People鈥: A Peaceful Revolution in Leipzig,鈥 Spiegel, October 9, 2009. .
- Serge Schmemann, 鈥100,000 Protest in Leipzig In Largest Rally in Decades,鈥 New York Times, October 17, 1989. 鈥嬧.
- Peter, 2019.
- Mara Bierbach, 鈥淗ow East Germans peacefully brought the GDR regime down,鈥 Deutsche Welle, October 8, 2019. .
- Bierbach, 2019.
- The Fall of the Wall, 鈥淗eldenstadt,鈥 Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg, n.d. .
- Garcia-Zamor, 79
- Dieter Rink, Annegret Haase, Matthias Bernt, Thomas Arndt, Johanna Ludwig, Urban Shrinkage in Leipzig, Germany (Leipzig, Germany: Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research – UFZ, 2011).
- Garcia-Zamor, 79
- Jens Rometsch, 鈥淟eipzig geh枚rt zu Gewinnern der Deutschen Einheit,鈥 Leipziger Volkszeitung, 10/2/20. .
- Amt f眉r Statistik und Wahlen Leipzig, 鈥淓inwohnerzahl und Bev枚lkerungsentwicklung in Leipzig,鈥 Stadt Leipzig, n.d.
- Monica Raymunt, 鈥淔rom Leipzig to Hypezig – hipsters eye new playground,鈥 Reuters, February 21, 2014.
- Garcia-Zamor, 60
- Institut Arbeit und Qualifikation, Arbeitslosenquoten in West- und Ostdeutschland* 1975 – 2020 (Duisburg,Germany: Universit盲t Duisburg-Essen, n.d.). 鈥嬧
- John Gramlich, 鈥淓ast Germany has narrowed economic gap with West Germany since fall of communism, but still lags,鈥 Pew Research Center, November 6, 2019,
- German Federal Government Commissioner for the New Federal States. Annual Report of the Federal Government on the Status of German Unity 2018 (Berlin: 2018). .
- Bundesinstitut f眉r Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung. 鈥淒eutschland altert unterschiedlich,鈥 press release. May 22, 2017. .
- Leipzig City Treasurer's Office. 鈥淟eipzig's stable growth continues,鈥 City of Leipzig, n.d.
- Garcia-Zamor, 253
- Garcia-Zamor, 163
- Garcia-Zamor, 113
- Mary Fulbrook, The People鈥檚 State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005). 4
- Fulbrook
- Fulbrook, 240
- Fulbrook, 9
- Fulbrook, 281
- Fulbrook
- Fulbrook, 13
- Albrecht Randelzhofer, 鈥淕erman Unification: Constitutional and International Implications,鈥 Michigan Journal of International Law 13, no. 1 (1991).
- Garcia-Zamor, 29
- Garcia-Zamor, 28
- Elena Souris, 鈥淭hirty years after the Berlin Wall fell, a power divide remains in Germany. That鈥檚 dangerous,鈥 Washington Post, November 9, 2019.
- 鈥淕erman Word of the Day: Die Wende,鈥 The Local.de. October 3, 2018.
- Olivo, 2011
- Barbara Baumg盲rtel (former head of the Waldstra脽enviertel Verein), email messages to the author, April – May 2021.
- Christian Bollert (head of media relations, Wir Sind Der Osten), interview with the author, August 2021.
- Ralf El盲sser (civic engagement expert and owner of Civixx), interview with the author, August 2021
- Garcia-Zamor, 263-264
- Garcia-Zamor, 133
- Karsten Gerkens (former leader of the Housing and Urban Development Department, City of Leipzig), interview with the author, August 2021
- El盲sser, 2021
- Marc Morje Howard. The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2003). As cited in Olivo 2011.
- According to Garcia-Zamora, this neighborhood is 鈥渒nown for its particularly beautiful architecture with almost no destruction during [World War II]. It is one of Leipzig鈥檚 most popular residential areas.鈥 GZ, 252.
- Interview with Barbara 256
- El盲sser, 2021
- El盲sser, 2021
- El盲sser, 2021
- El盲sser, 2021
- J枚rg Reichert (volunteer with OK Lab Leipzig), interview with the author, January 2021
- Reichert, 2021
- Bollert, 2021
- Stefan Heinig (former head of the City Development Department, City of Leipzig), interview with the author, August 2021
- City of Leipzig employee, interview with the author, December 2020
- Olivo 2011
- Du Wir Leipzig, 鈥淒emokratie leben – Jahr der Demokratie,鈥 City of Leipzig, n.d.,
- Leipzig weiter denken, 鈥淚nformieren,鈥 City of Leipzig, n.d. Accessed November 9, 2020,
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- Translated, quoted, and paraphrased from: Leipzig weiter denken, 鈥淚nformieren,鈥 City of Leipzig, n.d. Accessed November 9, 2020,
- 鈥嬧婻alf Keppler, 鈥淒as Leipziger Modell zur B眉rgerbeteiligung im Trialog鈥 (PowerPoint presentation), City of Leipzig, May 31, 2011, .
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- Hans-Liudger Dienel, Daphne Reim, Jenny Schmithals, Thomas Olk, Leitfaden: St盲rkung der kommunalen Infrastruktur durch Kooperationen von B眉rgerinnen und B眉rgern, Verwaltung und Unternehmen (Berlin, Germany: Deutscher St盲dte- und Gemeindebund, 2009).
- Jugendparlament, 鈥淭ransparenz,鈥 City of Leipzig, n.d. Accessed September 2021. .
- Toralf Herschel (head of political planning department), email messages with author, September 2021
- Referat f眉r Gleichstellung von Frau und Mann, Kommunalpolitik…Ja, Ich Will (Leipzig, Germany: City of Leipzig, 2018) .
- 鈥嬧婻en茅 Loch, 鈥淒er Stadtrat tagte: B眉rgerhaushalt soll kommen und 50.000 Europ pro Stadtbezirksbeirat + Video,鈥 Leipziger Zeitung, February 19, 2021, .
- Loch 2021
- 鈥淶usammenfassung: Leitlinien der B眉rgerbeteiligung,鈥 City of Leipzig, July 2012; City of Leipzig employees, email messages with the author, September 2021.
- 鈥淨uartiersmanagement Leipziger Osten,鈥 Leipziger Osten, n.d. Accessed September 2021. .
- City of Leipzig employee, 2021; Email messages with City of Leipzig employee, September 2021.
- Herschel, 2021
- Email messages with City of Leipzig employee, September 2021.
- Garcia-Zamor, 77
- Olivio, 2011
- L眉der Busch, B眉rgerbeteiligung in der st盲dtebaulichen Planung: das Beispiel der kreisangeh枚rigen St盲dte Schleswig-Holsteins (Hamburg, Germany: Dissertation for the Department for City Planning, HafenCity Universit盲t Hamburg, 2009).
- These include Volksinitiative, Volksbegehren, Volksentscheid at the state level and B眉rgerbegehren and B眉rgerentscheid at the local and county level.
- Frank Rehmet and Oliver Wiedmann, Ranking der direktdemokratischen Verfahren in Deutschland auf Landes- und Kommunalebene (Berlin, Germany: Mehr Demokratie, e.V., 2021).
- Stadt Leipzig Dezernat Stadtentwicklung und Bau, B眉rgerbeteiligung in Leipzig – wie weiter?, 2016
- Stadt Leipzig, wie weiter?, 2016
- Stadt Leipzig, wie weiter?, 2016
- Ralf Julke, 鈥淒er Verein Neue Ufer verabschiedet sich mit einem letzten Heft und deutlicher Kritik an der Verwaltungspolitik,鈥 Leipziger Zeitung, May 6, 2020.
- Baumg盲rtel, 2021
- Dieter Rink (deputy department head, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research), interview with the author, February 2021.
- Stadt Leipzig, 鈥淶usammenfassung: Leitlinien der B眉rgerbeteiligung,鈥 2012
- Stadt Leipzig, wie weiter?, 2016
- Vehrkamp and Tillmann, 2014
- Stadt Leipzig, wie weiter?, 2016
- Stadt Leipzig, wie weiter?, 2016
- Stadt Leipzig, wie weiter?, 24, 2016
- Els盲sser, 2021
- While the word 鈥淪tiftung鈥 translates as 鈥渇oundation鈥 in English, these organizations are different from American foundations in that they are not necessarily grant-making institutions. The term can encompass organizations with wide-ranging missions, including nonprofits and think tanks. Stiftung Ecken Wecken is more similar to an American community nonprofit organization.
- Thorsten Mehnert (board member of Stiftung Ecken Wecken), interview with the author, July 2021.
- Bollert, 2021
- Bollert, 2021
- Klaus Wiegrefe, 鈥淜ohls L眉ge von den bl眉henden Landschaften,鈥 Spiegel, May 5, 2018, 鈥嬧.
Lessons for Local Democracy
Leipzig is a unique city with a special public spirit for engagement, a difficult but rich political and civic history, and years of investment by the city government into building opportunities for engagement. American cities may not share these exact attributes, but they can still learn much from the last 30 years of democratic experimentation and infrastructure building in Leipzig. The remainder of this report will be organized into seven lessons that city government leaders and local civil society groups can learn from Leipzig鈥檚 experience. Each lesson will be illustrated through the accounts shared by the 14 stakeholders interviewed for this project (a full list of interview participants is available in the appendix).
The first lesson for how municipalities can promote local democracy focuses on the structures necessary to support lasting institutions for civic engagement, including supportive leadership, binding rules, infrastructure built into the administration and civil society, and resources. The second lesson emphasizes the importance of sharing power with residents through engagement, and moving beyond the standard information-sharing models of participation. It explains the benefits that come from such collaboration, and details how Leipzig鈥檚 promising representative democracy model can incorporate more power sharing through direct democracy. The third lesson focuses on building the strong civic-city relationships that are necessary for carrying out engagement, based on open-mindedness from the administration, plus transparency and trust. The fourth lesson points to the necessity of making engagement equitable through many different lenses. Equity in engagement is not just an issue of diverse participation, but also the accessibility of different models and the openness of city government to discussing difficult topics about injustice.
Using these first four lessons as a foundation, the final three lessons also detail characteristics of successful engagement based on interviewees鈥 experiences in Leipzig. As the fifth lesson indicates, this case study emphasizes the importance of bureaucratic flexibility and engaging residents early, as well as connecting concrete opportunities for engagement to big-picture, long-term goals of an administration. The sixth lesson examines how the City of Leipzig has used civic engagement during challenging periods, including times of crisis and conflict, and considers strategies that other cities can adopt for similar situations.
Finally, the seventh lesson identifies another important and unique lesson from Leipzig: the importance of specifically working to support and protect liberal local democracy from extreme and illiberal forces.
Building Lasting Institutions for Civic Engagement
The civic engagement infrastructure that the City of Leipzig has developed over the past three decades is one of the administration鈥檚 strongest assets for supporting local democracy. In particular, their experience points to the importance of supportive city leadership, binding rules for engagement, and infrastructure that institutionalizes engagement within the administration, as well as beyond it.
Supportive City Leadership
As is true in most cities, the City of Leipzig鈥檚 work on engagement has occurred in no small part because government leadership has prioritized participation. According to a city employee who worked with him, Wolfgang Tiefensee, who was mayor from 1998 to 2005, wanted to build a municipality that was open for citizens.1 Similarly, Mayor Burkhard Jung of the center-left Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), who was elected in 2006, wanted to develop the commitment to further engagement and to better understand which tools would function in tandem with the administration鈥檚 tasks.2 It was also Jung who institutionalized the original Leipzig Weiter Denken project from its origins as a federally funded project in 2012 into a permanent office.3
The role of a mayor in driving this democratizing work is crucial in a city like Leipzig, which has a mayor with substantial power as the head of the city administration and the city council. The official, who now works on engagement efforts for the city, feels support for civic engagement from the mayor is the most important element for success.4 But other city leaders can also have an important impact on supporting engagement efforts.5 For example, city council members, often from the Green and Left parties,6 have often pushed the administration to carry out engagement efforts by adding requirements for civic engagement into official motions.7 On a smaller scale, J枚rg Reichert notes that his volunteer coding group has not received institutional support from the city鈥攕uch as hosting individual projects that the group produces using open data, like their website to organize volunteers who water trees in Leipzig.8 However, they have had success working with individual city leaders who understand the value of sharing open data.9
Today, Leipzig is an example of what civic-minded leaders can accomplish. However, this strength can easily turn into a structural weakness with changes in who holds office. Currently, engagement efforts could stagnate if a future mayor does not similarly prioritize participation.
Binding Rules for Engagement
Many other German cities have found that institutionalizing rules mandating civic engagement help produce a more consistent model of engagement that can survive changes in administration and personnel.10
Today, the administration鈥檚 civic engagement guidelines are its main tool for recommending participation standards and expectations.
While the City of Leipzig considered adopting a statute in 2010-2011, the city council and administration ultimately decided against it.11 One argument against passing a statute made by the mayor12 and the city council13 is that it could create a more restrictive bureaucratic infrastructure.14 Similarly, former Department Leader Karsten Gerkens argued that these requirements could create a dynamic where engagement is carried out simply as a 鈥渂ox-checking鈥 exercise.15 But even though the statute鈥檚 opponents expressed concerns about mandated compliance, volunteer Reichert argues that the city already operates from a box鈥攃hecking approach and simply follows the basic federal and state regulations for participation.16
In a recent interview, a city employee who works on engagement efforts said that it would be an advantage for a city to have a civic engagement statute.17 While city guidelines like Leipzig鈥檚 include important information such as the engagement initiation process and how engagement should inform city decision-making, they are still only guidelines. As a result, their effectiveness is based on whether participants and city officials consider them important or not.18 Ultimately, many supporters of a statute, including Leipzig civic engagement expert Ralf Els盲sser believe some city departments simply will not provide public participation opportunities without a clear mandate. He also argues that a statute could help the city council put pressure on the administration to engage residents.19 Finally, for the city employee, a statute is the only way to provide engagement that is truly independent of an individual city administration.20
Binding rules for engagement are also beneficial to Leipzig residents. Codifying engagement would help clarify for residents the power they have, what specific opportunities exist for residents who may want to participate, and the money reserved for those processes. It would also help residents both exercise those rights and pressure an administration to uphold them in the long term.21
Infrastructure for Engagement Built Into the Administration and Beyond
Despite not having binding requirements for engagement, the City of Leipzig鈥檚 multi-part infrastructure for engagement is still a major strength of its local democracy because it addresses three areas of governing: the city administration, the representative governing process, and the hyper-local neighborhood level.
First, within the city administration, the LWD office builds support and expertise on engagement into the city government. While it is based in the Office of Urban Development, the LWD office provides specialization in civic engagement to all parts of the city administration, helps support other offices interested in implementing engagement processes, and acts as a consistent, proactive part of the city institution that builds engagement processes and the city鈥檚 relationship with its residents.
Only a formal city office since 2012, the LWD has previously struggled to become 鈥渟ufficiently well known within the administration and on the part of the citizens of Leipzig.鈥22 Because departments work with the LWD on a voluntary basis, participation varies based on whether, and to what degree, those offices take advantage of resources like the LWD office.23 Today, Els盲sser still sees some areas of the city where administrators 鈥渟hy away from carrying out public participation themselves because they have not yet gained much experience with it.鈥 As a result, when they do, they may make mistakes and have a negative experience with engagement. 鈥淎nd with the baggage of negative experiences,鈥 Els盲sser explains, 鈥測ou don鈥檛 dare to try again.鈥 Residents may feel frustrated. City officials may get discouraged. The delicate nature of building consistent engagement across an entire city administration is a common municipal challenge, including in American cities. 鈥淭hat is not just typical for Leipzig,鈥 he argues, 鈥渋t is typical for participation processes in general.鈥24 When utilized, a specialized office like the LWD can help departments break that cycle and build in-house expertise. As Els盲sser describes the LWD鈥檚 work, they are 鈥渘ot there to make engagement easy for the city departments, but to support them in doing the work themselves.鈥25
Second, Leipzig鈥檚 infrastructure also deliberately creates new opportunities for participation in the representative governing process. In addition to their efforts to institutionalize civic engagement procedures inside the administration, their network of councils offer highly formalized and structured vehicles for expanding representative democracy. Particularly, the Youth Parliament and subject area councils, such as the Senior Council and Migrant Council, do so in a way that brings more residents expertise into the city council鈥檚 decision-making procedures.
Outside of those councils, the City of Leipzig also offers residents a more informal way to approach the administration through the City Office (厂迟补诲迟产眉谤辞). Dr. Gerd Landsberg, the current CEO of the German Association of Towns and Municipalities (DStGB), voiced his support for this kind of institution, recommending in 2009 that German cities should adopt models of institutionalized civic engagement that are supported by the government through measures like citizens鈥 offices.26
Third, the city鈥檚 current infrastructure also helps build engagement opportunities at the neighborhood level, and provides connections between those bodies and the city government. For the city, it鈥檚 helpful to have such institutions to help the city identify resident priorities and interests.27 For residents, the neighborhood and district councils provide hyperlocal institutions for engagement that can have an impact on the administration, but are still officially independent. In the past, some residents have wondered how independent these entities are: Barbara Baumg盲rtel commented that the district councils were still influenced by the administration and that information wasn鈥檛 always shared in a timely manner with citizens in a 2005 interview.28 But today, a city employee argues that such councils are independent from the administration, and that as a result, these institutions help strengthen the process between representative civic engagement and democracy.29
Supporting Infrastructure with Resources
The City of Leipzig鈥檚 current infrastructure is promising because of its combination of components, types of engagement, and the number of involved areas of the city government. However, many interviewees noted that this infrastructure can only live up to its full potential with adequate resources鈥攁 challenge familiar to many American cities as well.
For example, the Youth Parliament is successful in part because it has the necessary institutional support to be effective. Every year, the parliament receives an annual budget of 鈧5,000 EUR ($5,868 USD) for project implementation and administrative costs. Additionally, two city employees work with the parliament to provide administrative and bureaucratic support, helping young members learn how to work within city government, navigate procedure and political processes, and understand technical language.
Similarly, the district councils have gained more power in the city over time as they have received more funding. Quentin K眉gler, a current member of the district council for the Southwest neighborhood (Stadtbezirksbeirat S眉dwest), explained that the councils were once 鈥渋nsignificant,鈥 but now receive 鈧50,000 EUR ($58,685 USD) a year in funding from the city to implement projects.30 Simply put, 鈥渨hoever has money has power.鈥31
Not all of the city infrastructure receives adequate resources and support, however. Okasha wishes that the Migrant Council had more administrative support. As a subject area advisory council, the Migrant Council is dedicated to providing the city council with resident expertise on topic areas. The city currently provides a few hours a week of assistance, but he feels that the Migrant Council could benefit from a full-time staff person.32 City Councilmember Kristina Weyh agrees that the topic councils need more support. For that reason, she says that the city council is currently working to help strengthen those groups, such as providing additional skills and training for members.
Additionally, Weyh argues that the broader city infrastructure for engagement is currently in need of more resources. She believes that part of the reason that the city and city council do not currently do more to implement civic engagement on more topics is that 鈥渋t simply requires a lot of staff鈥 and time to hear what residents think. To her, that gap between the resources necessary for engagement and the city鈥檚 capacity to deliver those resources is a 鈥渧ery, very big problem.鈥 Similarly, Councilmember Franziska Riekewald believes that the LWD office needs more funding. Like everything, she says the office 鈥渟tands and falls鈥 based on financial support and that currently, it is 鈥渘ot yet well-financed.鈥
Ultimately, supporting civic infrastructure also means supporting those who will implement it. DStGB suggests that city employees can benefit from receiving training on engagement skills, including how to work best with residents. Similarly, cities may also find it beneficial to offer supervision for volunteers, though these kinds of efforts should be tailored to the needs of engaged residents. Finally, to support bureaucrats who work on civic engagement issues, the DStGB encourages cities to give city employees flexibility in their working location and hours so that they can 鈥渁ttend and participate regularly鈥 in civic engagement events that occur when bureaucrats are off the clock.33
Limited resources are a constant challenge for municipal governments around the world. One potential solution that a report by the City of Leipzig suggested in 2016 was for administrators to submit 鈥減articipation concepts鈥 outlining resources and target groups during the preparation phase for projects to improve coordination. This reflects the city鈥檚 finding that producing high-quality engagement opportunities鈥攚ith transparency, targeted outreach, and regular communication鈥攊s based on ensuring the necessary resources are in place before a project begins.34
When making decisions about how to spend limited resources, however, Christian Bollert of We Are the East recommends that cities try to look beyond the immediate financial trade-offs. After reunification in the 2000s, the city sold real estate off to private owners as a way to raise money in an economically devastating time. But now that gentrification and rising rents are a problem throughout Leipzig, Bollert argues that the city missed an important opportunity to preserve and provide the public meeting spaces that clubs need to do their work. As a result, clubs that can鈥檛 afford meeting spaces must now move 15 kilometers north or south of the city center. He explains that the city was 鈥渟o keen to sell everything and to be profitable that they maybe missed the chance to secure one thing that really is outstanding for Leipzig: this vibrant, always fresh, new subculture.鈥35
Sharing Power with Residents
Despite the challenge of limited resources, and the city government鈥檚 continued policy of voluntary participation efforts, the City of Leipzig鈥檚 engagement infrastructure points to the impact that sharing power with residents can have.
The Benefits of Collaboration
For Quentin K眉gler, his participation in elected and appointed institutions gives him the feeling that he could actually make a difference in his city. In the Youth Parliament, which he joined at 15 and recently left after turning 22, he found that he and his fellow members could be creative about ideas they brought to the city council. In 2020, the Youth Parliament, along with the Fridays for Future movement, was part of pushing the City of Leipzig to declare a climate emergency. In 2017, he helped introduce a motion to the city council for improving the holiday and birthday stipend that foster children receive from the city鈥攊ncreasing it from 鈧30 EUR ($35 USD) to 鈧50 ($58 USD). When he went to a school visit with the Youth Parliament later, a student came up to him and thanked him. For him, that moment is what made the participation feel worthwhile.
Though the Youth Parliament is also working to increase residents鈥 awareness of their work鈥攙oter turnout for parliament elections was 6.9 percent in 202136鈥擪眉gler also felt that his role as a representative empowered other young people to share their ideas and concerns. This is especially true in the Youth Parliament because anyone can come and submit a formal request, even if they are not an elected representative.
To K眉gler, this kind of opportunity for youth participation has benefits beyond policy change. He believes that involving young people early through such measures encourages them to stay politically involved in the long run鈥斺渂ecause the people who are now in office will not be able to do it forever.鈥37
Similarly, Councilmember Weyh observes that Leipzig residents are very grateful to have a public contact point with the district councils, where they can bring up small issues like changing street signs or adding a bench to the public transportation stop by the retirement home.38 K眉gler has had a similar experience on the district council: it gives him the opportunity to 鈥渃hange something right outside [his] own doorstep,鈥 from the speed limit to street lights.39 As one outcome, Hinze observed that through the neighborhood management system in Leipzig, 鈥減rojects that are implemented by and with the residents are recognized, accepted, and have a lasting effect.鈥40
Like K眉gler, Okasha feels that that 鈥渁 lot鈥 is possible through the Migrant Council, specifically because of that right to submit motions to the city council.41 No other migrant council in Saxony has that ability. However, he is frustrated that his board cannot do more to influence the slow decision-making process once a motion has reached the full city council. Instead, he would like the council to have the right to make their own decisions.42
Combining Representative, Direct, and Deliberative Democracy
Mohammad Okasha is not alone in wanting more opportunities to participate in decision-making directly. Direct democracy鈥攖he unmediated engagement of citizens in government or in governing themselves43鈥攊s popular with many German residents. Based on a study of the broader German population, researchers found a particularly 鈥渉igh demand鈥 for direct democracy opportunities, which include referendums and citizen initiatives. As of 2014, almost three-fourths of citizens 鈥渁re either already participating [in direct democracy efforts] today or can imagine themselves doing so for the future.鈥44 Similarly, when asked what forms of engagement they would like to use to have an impact on their community, 41 percent chose direct democracy (such as referendums), 36 percent selected deliberative democracy (including public meetings or suggestions for participatory budgeting), and 22 percent said representative democracy (such as serving on a city council committee).45
City officials tend to be more hesitant, particularly about direct democracy. According to that same study, 80 percent of politicians, 85 percent of mayors, and 79 percent of administration heads view their 鈥渞epresentative mandate more freely and independently of specific citizen preferences.鈥 Those respondents 鈥渁dvocate[d] decisions based on the conscience of the elected officials, even against the majority opinion.鈥 Only 43 percent of citizens agreed. When asked about direct democracy specifically, 69 percent of citizens said they wanted more direct decision-making power. In contrast, only 52 percent of mayors, 45 percent of elected city officials, and 38 percent of administration heads agreed that citizens should have that ability.46
Direct democracy is not appropriate or possible in many instances for local government. Stefan Heinig, the former Office of City Planning leader, finds direct democracy approaches to engagement too prescriptive and, ultimately, restrictive. With tools like referendums, he believes that the 鈥渕ajority that says yes to a topic alienates the minority who have special needs.鈥 Instead, he believes that 鈥渢he aim of participation should actually be to try to bring together different interests in a new solution鈥 and that direct democracy can make it especially difficult to incorporate a minority鈥檚 needs who may not be able to win a majority in a referendum.47
However, different forms of engagement can be mutually supportive. As the DStGB put it, cities could do more to better establish the 鈥渇undamental connections between representative, direct, and cooperative democracy鈥 that make a democratic system work.48 According to Thorsten Mehnert, of the Wake Up Corners Foundation, deliberative democracy can also be a complementary model. He argues that 鈥減eople no longer feel adequately represented by their representatives,鈥 and that representative democracy 鈥渋s no longer enough.鈥 While he believes that 鈥渞epresentative democracy is right,鈥 he would like it to be complemented by supportive tools that 鈥渆nsure that the representative democracy is really experienced closer to the citizens again, that they not only talk in the city council but also exchange ideas with people from the neighborhood.鈥
This principle of complementary democratic approaches could be applied in many different ways. Representative bodies can do more to bring participation into earlier stages of their work ahead of decision-making. For example, participation can be part of budget planning, so that the city council鈥檚 later work can be informed by the priorities reflected in that engagement.49 With municipal decision-making, 鈥渙ffers of dialogue and intensive deliberation are鈥 not only proving to be a prerequisite for the success and acceptance of representative and direct democracy, but they also combine representative and direct democracy into a multifaceted democracy,鈥 according to the Bertelsmann Foundation.50
Bringing residents into the decision-making process doesn鈥檛 mean residents have to get everything they want to be happy with participation, however. Barbara Baumg盲rtel, who criticized the City of Leipzig鈥檚 engagement models in 2005, indicated that what she wanted was for the administration to consult with residents鈥攏ot necessarily to defer all decisions to them.51 To her, failure to provide residents with more of a chance to meaningfully participate鈥攚hether because of budget cuts or a lack of support鈥攃reates a 鈥渧icious cycle where there are no opportunities to participate for the citizens, where there is frustration for those who try anyway, and where there is a shrinking number of people willing to do political work.鈥 The outcome is that 鈥渋t becomes even easier to call this small group an insignificant minority.鈥52
For Okasha, incorporating more elements of democracy is a matter of principle. He was part of the movement to elect members of the Migrant Council by the immigrant population in Leipzig, who are otherwise not permitted to vote in elections. And while today there are still six members of the council who are appointed, Okasha would like to change that, too. The problem is not that those members are too close with the administration. In conversation, he referred to them as friends of his but he would like to see the council become a fully elected body because 鈥渢hat is basic democracy.鈥 To him, the city council appointments are patronizing, and he believes that 鈥渃ommunities should have the complete right to vote to elect their representatives.鈥53 Councilmember Riekewald shares the same belief in democracy as a principle. She, as well as the broader LEFT party, would like to see the district councils be elected, not appointed. If that were to happen, she says the district councils would be 鈥渁 completely different body.鈥54
In Okasha鈥檚 experience, it鈥檚 also democratic principles that ensure the council can conduct its work. Each topic council includes seats for representatives of the broader city council, each coming from a different party. For the Migrant Council, this means that one of their members is a representative of the Alternative for Germany (AfD)鈥攁 far-right, anti-immigration party. However, because the council makes decisions through votes, and the other members still have a majority, Okasha says it is not an obstacle to their work.55
These same democratic functions are also useful for the Youth Parliament and their work. In addition to the main parliamentary body, eight members join six city council members to form the youth advisory council. In this body, the youth parliament members still have the majority, but can receive feedback on motions from council members before submitting it to the entire city council. According to K眉gler, this process has helped the youth council develop a strong working relationship where members feel that they can negotiate with the city council over disagreements in submitted motions and to find solutions together when obstacles arise鈥攂ut while still maintaining a healthy antagonism, with the recognition that the Youth Parliament is there to fight for issues they believe in.56
In contrast to K眉gler, who feels that the Youth Parliament is respected by the members of city council, Okasha sometimes feels that the Migrant Council is not 鈥渢aken seriously as elected representatives.鈥 His concern is that the council isn鈥檛 seen as a legitimate representative body by the city administration and city council, but as a 鈥渃onsolation prize鈥 for their limited ability to otherwise participate in politics. He says they 鈥渟ee that in practice sometimes.鈥 Their different experiences suggest that concrete institutional power can translate into procedural power for residents, but that not all forms of combined democracy models are equally effective. Apart from the question of institutional power, a model鈥檚 impact is also affected by less tangible factors, such as the relationships between participants and city officials.
Creating Strong Civic-City Relationships
As demonstrated by the different experiences that K眉gler and Okasha have had in their respective councils, the relationship between the city government and its constituents provides a foundation for collaboration and participation. All parties play an important role, but as the more powerful entity, cities ultimately build the basis for developing these partnerships and their tenor. In particular, examining Leipzig as an example points to the importance of two components: a city鈥檚 attitude towards residents and their engagement, and building trust through transparency and communication.
Open-Mindedness and a Willingness to Cooperate
Combativeness may feel inherent to local politics in many cities, with a distinctive government versus constituents dynamic. For example, in Leipzig, despite the city鈥檚 infrastructure for engagement, some interviewees described still feeling resistance from parts of the administration.
In her more than 30 years of local participation in Leipzig, Barbara Baumg盲rtel does not feel a fully collaborative relationship exists with the city yet鈥攁nd that it is not a problem unique to Leipzig. Through her experience in her neighborhood and from participating in engagement programs through organizations like adult education centers, the Goethe Institute, and the Herder Institute that bring international participants together, she鈥檚 noticed a similar trend: 鈥淐itizen participation and achieving an understanding of democracy is a real problem everywhere.鈥 She explains that politicians and administrators are resistant to sharing power with constituents, though they may pretend otherwise. Often, she believes they instead see citizens as a 鈥渘ecessary evil,鈥 and prioritize their own expertise. Exceptions, she finds, are rare.57
During his role as the deputy mayor for urban development and construction, Nils Gormsen observed something similar. After retiring and becoming involved as a private citizen, he believed it was a 鈥渕isunderstanding to see citizens and administrators as enemies, per se,鈥 or to view participation as 鈥渁 confrontational match someone wants to win.鈥 58
Residents in Leipzig also experience this dynamic with the city council, and may feel that the city council and administration typically side with each other over resident input. Riekewald argues that the relationship between the council and administration has changed over time, and that with the increase in representation from the Left and Green parties, the council now acts against the SPD mayor more often.59 However, Weyh鈥檚 perception is that often for administration, 鈥渢he objections of citizens are worth less than those of us city council members,鈥 or 鈥渆ven colleagues from our own administration.鈥 To her, 鈥渋t has something to do with a culture that can be changed. People just have to get used to the fact that they don鈥檛 invent everything on their own, so to speak, but in cooperation with the citizens.鈥
Shifting this dynamic between city governments and their residents requires time and continued effort.
One helpful adjustment is for a city government to shift its role to be less hierarchical and more resident-oriented,60 so that the administration and politicians are more open to input, engagement, and collaboration. In 2005, Baumg盲rtel explained that she wanted to be heard, for engagement to not feel performative or like an "alibi," and for there to be less disconnect between an administration that said engagement mattered, but seemed to prioritized technical experts over resident feedback.鈥 According to Thorsten Mehnert, what the Wake Up Corners Foundation needs from the city to support collaboration always changes. In some cases, it might be a permit; in others, it may be funding. Consequently, for him, a basic willingness and attitude in favor of participation from the city is key to a productive relationship鈥攁 feeling that 鈥渋f we work together in a citizen group, we achieve more for the city than if we do it alone.鈥61
Additionally, it can help to have intermediaries to help facilitate a constructive relationship between the city and its constituents. Though the relationship between council members and residents can be contentious, pro-engagement members like Riekewald feel that they can help facilitate collaboration. Riekewald sees her responsibility as a council member to mediate and continually ask what citizens across the city want鈥攕tanding 鈥渋n the middle and bring[ing] [both sides] together.鈥62
Through his organization, Mehnert works to provide channels for residents to collaborate better with the government, and to do so with the benefit of the foundation鈥檚 experience with the city and procedural knowledge of how to implement projects and ideas. Weyh notes that even as a city council member, she often struggles to contact the right person in the city鈥檚 huge administration and employee base, and then to get clear answers from that communication. 鈥淚 can imagine the people who aren鈥檛 even doing [this professionally] despair and don鈥檛 know how to [get answers],鈥 she said.63 Mehnert, along with other staff and volunteers, try to ease this challenge.64
Transparency and Trust
In addition to openness towards engagement and collaboration with intermediaries, transparency and trust are important components for building productive relationships between residents and cities.
Evaluating their performance overall, one city employee reflected that the city does well with informing residents through a variety of methods, including a newsletter, project list, and city office. The project list, in particular, was originally instituted to improve transparency.65 Some interviewees argued that the city could still do more, particularly around informing residents early in the governing process, and communicating implementation and decision-making more clearly. Additionally, Weyh believes that the city website could be better. Currently, she says people attribute the difficulty of finding information to secrecy, when the real reason is an old website that the city is currently working to update.66
To Weyh, communication and information accessibility is about transparency. And transparency helps to 鈥淸lower] the threshold which I believe prevents many from participating because they just don't know how.鈥 Beyond facilitating engagement, transparency also helps build trust between residents and their city.
In particular, interviewees pointed to the importance of transparency from city governments in three main areas: limitations, decisions, and implementation.
First, it is important for a city to be clear about which policy areas residents can participate in, as well as transparent about the limitations for that engagement.67 Being honest about the restrictions and complications that are unavoidable for local government, including financial limitations, can help avoid misunderstandings or frustration from residents,68 the Mayor for Urban Development and Construction Dorothee Dubrau noted.69 Stefan Heinig also found that it was important to communicate the legal and procedural limits of participation, reiterating that, though residents may participate in different processes, the final decision-making power still belongs to the city council.70 Based on a recent failed engagement process, Riekewald believes that this type of transparency is an area where the city government can still improve.71
Second, transparency around how decisions are made by the city council and administration can help avoid frustration from residents who feel like their participation or preferences were not included. For Weyh, it鈥檚 鈥減erfectly fine if a citizen鈥檚 objection is rejected by the administration because it doesn鈥檛 work鈥.But then it is important to me to take the second step, and we have to get better at actually conveying these reasons to people.鈥 She believes this is the case even for sensitive issues like city finances. To her, 鈥測ou can鈥檛 always fully discuss everything in public,鈥 but you still 鈥渘eed feedback鈥 and to be honest with constituents, even when it鈥檚 uncomfortable. Karsten Gerkens had a similar experience in his 27 years as the leader of the Urban Regeneration department. Even on challenging topics like budget restrictions, he found that he was able to have productive discussions with residents when they wanted programs that the city couldn鈥檛 afford, or when the city needed to decide how to allocate limited resources. He also found that, sometimes, residents actually favored simpler solutions that cost less money than those proposed by the city planners.72 However, Weyh thinks that kind of culture of transparency still 鈥渉as to grow鈥 in the Leipzig city government.73
鈥嬧淚n the end, democracy lives from trust.鈥
Third, interviewees pointed to the importance of transparency around implementation. Baumg盲rtel argues for more transparency around project timelines to avoid residents becoming frustrated after participating, but seeing no corresponding changes. A study on engagement in Leipzig came to the same conclusion, recommending the city to follow individual engagement projects and report their results and implementation back to residents.74
Without this transparency, Heinig argues that a city can easily develop a fractured relationship with its constituents. 鈥淲ith one or two badly made investments where you do something completely different afterwards than you announced beforehand,鈥 he explains, 鈥測ou can destroy a lot of trust that has been built up over the years.鈥 The trust that engagement depends upon 鈥渋s not something that can be achieved through one single participation process, but rather is something that a city can create over years and can also be destroyed again.鈥75 And as Weyh puts it, 鈥嬧渋n the end, democracy lives from trust.鈥76
Making Engagement Accessible and Equitable
The relationship between the city and constituents鈥攆rom openness towards participation to trust鈥攊s not the same for all residents. Residents鈥 experiences with government are also shaped by modern and historic issues around accessibility and equity, all of which are particular to the individual city鈥檚 context. Many residents, such as immigrants, are legally excluded from fully participating in the democratic process and cannot vote until they become citizens.77 Even as citizens, Germans of color have often been excluded from institutions of power and face systemic racism in their country.78
Because engagement is the practice of bringing constituent voices into government, who participates is just as important as how they do. In Leipzig, as in American cities, fully achieving equity in government-supported engagement faces several obstacles.
At the grassroots level, Migrant Councilmember Mohammad Okasha describes the engaged community in Leipzig as very diverse. This is not surprising: Almost 10 percent of residents in Leipzig are not originally from Germany, with 14.5 percent of that population made up of immigrants from Syria alone.79 To Antar Keith, an American living in Leipzig, the city government 鈥渋s very, very motivated to create a certain semblance of cultural variety and to live up to the hype of being a vibrant, young city that has this edginess but also has an important self-image because of what鈥檚 happened in the past.鈥 For him, though, the government is not racially diverse in practice. For example, though there are 70 members of the city council, almost all are white or white-passing.80
Similarly, the City of Leipzig鈥檚 infrastructure for engagement is also not yet equitable. As noted above, the most powerful forms of resident participation happen through the city鈥檚 many different forms of representative democracy, from the neighborhood councils to the Youth Parliament. Like the city council, by definition, these programs benefit a small number of residents, and primarily those privileged with community or party connections, the free time to participate, and the financial resources to allow for volunteer work.
This is especially true for appointed bodies, such as the neighborhood councils; a resident must have a relationship with a party to be nominated and appointed.81 While this doesn鈥檛 require that a resident is a formal party member, the nomination path towards participation is not equally accessible to all residents. Instead, it requires that residents participate in engagement for extended periods of time, develop familiarity with the bureaucratic system, and build relationships with residents who have more institutional power. According to Riekewald, the district councils can then also act as a pipeline to the city council, allowing members to network, 鈥渕ake a name for [themselves],鈥 and learn about the city administration's governing processes.
Though participation is not expected to be a full time job, Riekewald also noted that joining a district council is also not financially accessible for everyone given the amount of work that is involved: Members only receive approximately 鈧25 EUR (around $29.32 USD) per month for their work, according to her. In the Youth Parliament, members receive 鈧26.20 EUR (around $30.73 USD) per month, with members of the youth council receiving an additional 鈧26.20 EUR per month and an additional 鈧31.44 EUR (around $36.88 USD) per council meeting.82
In the Migrant Council, members do not receive any compensation, though Okasha says he spends approximately 20 to 30 hours a week on related work.83 As a result, he says that 鈥渢he working class is not properly represented.鈥84 To achieve better representation for the broad migrant population in particular, Okasha is frustrated by what he views as a 鈥減arallel society in politics.鈥85 Keith agrees that the council is an imperfect form of representation that flattens immigrants into a homogenous group.86 Ideally, Okasha says he would like to abolish the council, and see migrants represented in Leipzig鈥檚 political structures more broadly.87
Challenges with equity also continue outside of the city鈥檚 representative democracy models.
While the strong culture of Vereins and citizen groups may be beneficial to local democratic health, many engaged residents agree that it is difficult to be heard as an individual who is not aligned with a civic group, or in a group that is not as institutionalized as a Verein. In contrast to citizen initiatives, Vereins typically have more members, more financial resources, and often have some paid staff, which allows them to work more and on more topics.88 For example, J枚rg Reichert often feels like his smaller group of computer science volunteers and their concerns are not taken as seriously, though they may occasionally participate with the city or a local party.89 Some individuals can make themselves heard, but according to K眉gler, 鈥渋f you want to have a say in the decision-making process…you should run for an elected position.鈥90
In its engagement projects, the City of Leipzig does try to address issues of accessibility and equity. A city employee involved in those processes noted that by listening only to the strongest resident voices and not hearing the weaker ones, civic engagement cannot work.91
Today鈥攖o make decisions about the construction of a new playground, for example鈥攖he city鈥檚 engagement model favors discussion groups and meetings to gather residents input. However, a small, engaged group of privileged, self-selected citizens who participate in discussion groups and meetings cannot represent the city as a whole. As Riekewald explains, 鈥渢hose who have less income simply have other problems than dealing with city administration projects,鈥 which then means that 鈥渁 whole clientele is ignored.鈥92
In an attempt to make discussion events more equitable, the city ensures that residents who are randomly selected93 as working group members are still representative of the neighborhood, considering factors like gender, citizenship status, income, and other demographics. Citizenship status is also considered, as engagement opportunities are open to all Leipzig residents, not just those who are legally German citizens.94Another factor is whether the residents participating are already involved in other groups or organizing, as their goal is to include people who will both be impacted by the city鈥檚 decision-making and whose voices typically aren鈥檛 heard. During the events themselves, the moderator is tasked with getting everyone to participate, rather than having the conversation dominated by single individuals.95
Weyh agrees that 鈥渢he most important thing is that you have the courage, that you create opportunities and spaces for people you have not previously selected or cast, so to speak, to meet and exchange ideas.鈥 To her, bad engagement means having participants who are 鈥渙nly men over fifty,鈥 who cannot 鈥渃over all perspectives.鈥 She believes this is avoidable. 鈥淭here are always ways I can get in touch with people, I just have to do it actively,鈥 she explains. But in the city council, she does not see that happening often yet. Keith has experienced this problem first hand. Though he is politically engaged in the community, he hasn鈥檛 participated in any opportunities provided by the city because they don鈥檛 currently feel accessible to him. He feels that the city鈥檚 promotion for engagement efforts could be better, especially to target immigrants like him.96
Within engagement opportunities themselves, the city also can use tools to facilitate equal participation. In the Office for Urban Renewal, one of Stefan Heinig鈥檚 priorities was also that even when they had large events with 200 participants, the design of their engagement events could facilitate participation and contribution from every single attendee. As one example, for events where people were broken up into groups sitting at different tables, the office developed tablecloths that participants could write their ideas on. The office would then process those comments and make them available online. This approach helped with transparency, and with their efforts to make sure all attendees could participate.97 Similarly, participants of the city鈥檚 2016 study on local engagement emphasized the importance of using 鈥渟imple language,鈥 or writing text in such a way that is accessible to residents who are not fluent in German.98
Still, making engagement equitable requires more than including diverse participants, good facilitation tools, and translation. It also requires openness to discussing issues around accessibility and equity. Keith, who was a keynote speaker at a Leipzig Black Lives Matter protest in June 2020,99 finds that around issues of racism in particular, there is 鈥渢remendous pressure to not really rock the boat,鈥 and that pointing out such problems receives pushback. During his involvement in the Leipzig Black Lives Matter movement in the summer of 2020, and throughout his time living in Germany, he found that many Germans were comfortable discussing racism as a problem that exists in the United States, but have been much less comfortable reflecting on racism at home, or tend to focus on racism solely in its neo-Nazi form. To Keith, 鈥渞acism is not locked into the past, it鈥檚 an ever-changing, mutable creature that changes with the times.鈥
According to Okasha, there are many engaged residents in Leipzig who got involved for the same reasons that he did: because he was affected by problems in the city and he wanted to help others who faced similar challenges. Okasha describes that when he arrived in Germany, he had 鈥渧ery little money,鈥 didn鈥檛 receive government support, and 鈥渉ad no contact with any city councilors or politicians.鈥 He explains that these challenges motivated him to make a difference. Weyh agrees that it is important for marginalized groups, such as immigrants, the unemployed, or differently abled residents, to be able to 鈥渆xplicitly say where the problems are.鈥 Because without being in their position, 鈥測ou sometimes don鈥檛 get it.鈥100 Okasha believes that because they are often so closely affected by problems in the city, if more people of color were involved, they could make substantial, 鈥渞apid change鈥.101
鈥淩acism is not locked into the past, it鈥檚 an ever-changing, mutable creature that changes with the times.鈥
Designing Successful Engagement
Building on a strong relationship with residents and equitable engagement efforts, the City of Leipzig鈥檚 experience also points to the importance of two principles of participation design that American cities can learn from: Planning for early civic participation and adopting bureaucratic flexibility, as well as bringing together concrete engagement and long-term goals.
Bureaucratic Flexibility and Early Participation
In 2004, former Deputy Mayor for Urban Development and Construction Nils Gormsen reflected that bureaucracies like the City of Leipzig administration 鈥渢end to be inflexible, fixed, and self-contained.鈥 As a result, 鈥渙nce a bureaucratic institution internally decides in favor of a certain strategy, it becomes extremely difficult for citizens to convince it of alternative solutions.鈥102
In contrast to the rigidity of bureaucracy, a city employee explained that, in his experience, engagement is not a static state, but one that requires consistent reflection and self-examination, especially during challenging times like the current COVID-19 pandemic.103 This is also true during more non-crisis periods. For example, in a document about the Quartiersmanagement system, a former city employee in the Social Welfare Office, Klaus Hinze, recommended that the Quartiersmanagement system cannot be a 鈥渟tatic process,鈥 and instead 鈥渞equires constant adjustment.鈥
Needless to say, 鈥渃onstant adjustment鈥 is challenging for inflexible governing systems. Based on his experience in Leipzig, Hinze recommended an evaluation process that identifies deficits, offers recommendations, and checks 鈥渢he objectives of the administration and the agency and compares them to the respective status of work.鈥104
Another important strategy for creating flexibility in engagement processes is to allow residents to participate early in the governing process. To Gormsen, the rigidity he observed in the Leipzig government in the early 2000s was due to a decision-making approach where the city would use technical expertise to 鈥減lan internally first, and then [go] public to inform the citizens.鈥 For Gormsen鈥攁nd other city employees who participated in recent interviews鈥攖his approach is a 鈥渕istake.鈥105 Instead, the officials argued for incorporating engagement early in the process, before 鈥渂ureaucratic opinion is fixed,鈥 as Gormsen put it.
Engagement is not a static state, but one that requires consistent reflection and self-examination, especially during challenging times…
Indeed, when the city has engaged residents early on, leaders have seen clear benefits. First, Stefan Heinig found that participation was actually less expensive when residents were brought in during the early stages of planning. With early participation, it was easier to prevent additional, expensive investments that surpass the original project budget. Second, he noted that earlier participation made incorporating resident feedback much more feasible.106 Riekewald agrees that when engagement is included after city plans are in place, the criticism becomes much larger and it can delay the project timeline. Finally, Riekewald also points out that including residents earlier also helped improve acceptance of city decisions, especially because they can hear from other Leipzig residents. She explains that through participation, someone who may not agree with the final decision could 鈥渟it at the table鈥 with someone from the majority who supported that outcome. In retrospect, that allows residents to say, 鈥渨ell, okay, the majority wanted it that way. My neighbors think that鈥檚 great. I have to accept that I鈥檓 not in the majority.鈥107
Bridging Concrete Engagement with Long-term Goals
One major challenge of including residents early is to avoid frustration with the slow nature of the bureaucratic process. In Riekewald鈥檚 experience working on transport and mobility as a city council member, it can be 鈥渧ery, very difficult鈥 to tell people that the contributions of their engagement will only be incorporated several years later. To her, this means that 鈥渘ot all projects are suitable for increasing public participation.鈥 Rink agrees that 鈥渋t is not particularly interesting for citizens to be involved in something for years, to invest a lot of time,鈥 and then not feel like they have seen any benefits apart from participation for its own sake.108
To navigate these challenges, Heinig believes that communication is particularly important, so that it鈥檚 clear to everyone involved what individual engagement efforts are building to, and how the final result is a product of that participation.109 Gerkens also found that engagement was most successful when individual participation efforts around highly specific topics were connected back to long-term goals. For example, during reunification, the city experienced a large problem: a broken housing system. By breaking a large problem into smaller, concrete participation projects and incorporating feedback and reflection, he felt that his office was able to reach a solution of 鈥渉igher quality.鈥110
Despite the difficulty of long-term engagement, Gerkens saw that when residents were involved鈥攅ven in large projects like creating the city鈥檚 master plan for development鈥攖he process was faster than when they engaged residents around one-off, individual development projects. In part, this is because he found that the same questions that came up during engagement, particularly those about funding and timelines, would also come up again later in city council meetings. In the end, he found that participation saved him time and produced better projects. Today, he believes that engagement should be factored in from the beginning as a standard project cost.111
Engaging Through Crisis and Conflict
Over the last 31 years, the City of Leipzig has faced many tumultuous challenges, beginning with the chaotic, difficult reunification process of the early 1990s. From the Peaceful Revolution and reunification round tables to the COVID-19 crisis today, civic engagement during crisis and conflict has consistently been part of the city鈥檚 local democracy.
For many municipal governments in the United States, it is exactly these kinds of conditions that can make city leaders resistant to engagement. After all, including residents can be difficult in the best of times. While the City of Leipzig is still learning how to best facilitate engagement during such challenges, their experiences can also be instructive.
Crisis-era Engagement
During the Wende period, Gerkens found engagement to be helpful for making the important decisions that the city administration faced. At that point, the administration had to renovate a majority of apartment buildings in the city, but with very little funding and resources. Gerkens described it as a difficult period because of the number鈥攁nd range鈥攐f people impacted by those decisions, including tenants, renters, developers, and investors. And the consequences had serious impacts on peoples鈥 lives: where they lived, who their neighbors were, whether their apartment building was torn down or not, and so on. While the decisions were difficult, the city also wanted to make sure residents accepted those outcomes and that their plans had buy-in from the constituents.
To do so, the city held public workshops where planners would explain their plans for urban development and residents could participate in discussions. These events would include lectures, round tables, the opportunity for residents to submit written feedback, and collaboration with citizen moderators for more difficult conversations. His office also collaborated with advisory boards and Quartiermanagement groups. At this point, Gerkens describes the exchange of information鈥攚ith residents learning from the city and the city learning from residents鈥攁s being very useful for the city planning office. Though the decisions were ultimately decided by the city council, politicians at that time also prioritized participation from residents, in part because financial resources were so limited. Participation events provided the city with 鈥渞eassurance鈥 that they were making the correct decisions that would align with citizens鈥 goals. However, at that time, their work did not come with resources or from explicit directions from the city administration.
Now, in 2021, many of the city鈥檚 problems and the administration鈥檚 approach to civic engagement have changed. Today, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the city has tried to maintain engagement by adapting to pandemic restrictions, such as in-person engagement with social distancing and masks when it was safe, but ultimately found that online tools like Zoom were useful. Interestingly, in Els盲sser鈥檚 experience, when facilitating conversations through digital tools like Zoom, the discussion tends to be more objective and less emotional. However, he argues that Zoom should only be supplemental in the long term, and should not replace in person engagement.112 Historically, when the city attempted online participation, a high majority of the participants were already involved in associations, and it was harder to ensure equal engagement.113 Additionally, a city employee involved in these processes pointed out that an important part of relationship-building was missing: those small moments interacting in line for food, or the specific dynamic created by meeting another person face-to-face.114
Though engaging during crisis periods is more difficult, it may also be more mobilizing. Particularly during reunification, Mehnert believes that in situations with such upheaval and where there is an opportunity to 鈥渂uild something new,鈥 people want to be involved. In his work with the foundation, he has also seen a dramatic increase in the number of volunteers during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, he observes that 鈥渢he more normality takes hold…the less [people] feel the need to get involved.鈥 Particularly when things go well, people may not feel the same urgency to prioritize engagement ahead of other demands in their life. To continue engagement in the long term, Mehnert believes it needs to be fun, too: 鈥淐ompared to a visit to the zoo or to the [local] Cospudener Lake to lie on the beach, what is the motivation?鈥115
Navigating Conflict and Engagement
Of course, compared to a trip to the beach, engagement can also be difficult because conflict is unavoidable in local politics. From tensions between constituents and the city government to conflict among bureaucrats to disagreements between different groups of residents, conflict can make engagement feel less productive and more unpleasant.
Over three decades, the City of Leipzig has implemented several strategies to manage engagement and conflict.
According to a city employee who is involved in participation efforts, working through contentious engagement requires sharing information, receiving feedback and protests from residents through meetings and workshops, and then changing plans in response. To resolve some conflicts, the city may even bring in a mediator.116 Another strategy that the city uses for hosting difficult conversations is to personally invite randomly selected residents to 鈥渞each a broader social spectrum鈥 than would typically volunteer through a public invitation. During these conversations, Els盲sser notes that it鈥檚 also important to find easy common ground, with 鈥渁s low a threshold as possible to win people.鈥117He also emphasizes the importance of facilitating personal conversations through models like round tables where people talk to each other directly. In these settings, he explains that 鈥渢here is no big stage where individuals can present themselves,鈥 and that extreme opinions become 鈥渓ess effective because those residents get feedback from their peers.鈥 Crucially, that critique 鈥渄oes not come from the administration, but from the other citizens.鈥 In this way, he finds that another important benefit of engagement is not just supporting dialogue between the administration and its constituents, but also between residents themselves to help keep people in discussion with each other and to help counteract residents鈥 drifting into separate, polarized social spheres. For him, 鈥渋t is important that residents not only talk about each other, but also with each other.鈥
To work through conflict, the city administration also turns to the subject-area committees, 厂迟补诲迟产别锄颈谤办蝉产别颈谤盲迟别 and Quartiersmanagement councils to help work with residents to find solutions. The independence of those institutions helps them act as facilitators, separate from potential baggage or distrust of the administration.118
However, from his time as a department head, Heinig also believed that conflict was an important part of the engagement process. He found that consensus did not only develop from the additions that residents contributed, but also from the points of conflict. As a result, he thought it was important to record everything that arose in participation processes, both positive and negative.119
To consider one example of these efforts in practice, the Connewitz neighborhood in Leipzig is an infamous site for protests and political conflict. That area has a strong history in activism that鈥檚 rooted in an antifascist movement, and today, the neighborhood is home to a communist, antifacist ideology that鈥檚 often skeptical of the police and the federal government.120 Activists there often hold protests against gentrification and rising rents, including squatting in buildings under development, and hold demonstrations against the far-right.121 To engage with residents there, the mayor holds conversations with citizen initiatives and associations, and hosts round table discussions for particularly difficult conversations to identify areas for collaboration.122 For these discussions, they find that it鈥檚 important to host a time-restricted series: more than one conversation, but not so many discussions that nothing else happens. In these conversations, the city may also ask a community leader, such as an artist or a musician, to moderate.123
Of course, there are limits to the kinds of conflicts that these strategies can mediate. A city employee commented that in his opinion, the social climate has become more aggressive and protests more violent since the peaceful revolution in 1989.124 And many interviewees agreed that some political ideologies should not be accommodated in participation鈥攕uch as the far-right LEGIDA movement, or the anti-mask, anti-lockdown 鈥淐ontrarian Thinkers鈥 (Querdenker) movement that has often held protests in Leipzig during the pandemic.
Supporting Local, Liberal Democracy
The recognition that not all conflicts or ideologies can be mediated through participation points to a final lesson from Leipzig: Not all engagement is pro-democratic.
To reinforce a healthy local democracy, the city鈥檚 experience suggests two important takeaways for American cities. First, building local democracy is a slow process and requires consistent investment and support. But, second, a strong democracy is not enough to deter destructive and illiberal efforts. Thus, supporting local democracy cannot happen without dedicated efforts to protect liberal democracy.
Christian Bollert, the Head of Media Relations with We are the East, notes that 鈥渄emocracy building takes time.鈥 K眉gler, a member of the Southwest District Council and a former speaker for the Youth Parliament, agrees that the process can be hard, but that 鈥渄emocracy means always staying in conversation.鈥 Though he was born after reunification, the city鈥檚 history under the GDR鈥攂oth the lack of a liberal democracy and the way that the regime fell鈥攊s instructive to him.125 At 22, he is still inspired by the way that the 1989 movement took place without violence, and emphasized discussions as a way for residents and the city to find solutions together. To him, that doesn鈥檛 mean that engagement is only successful if every participation process results in a solution.126 Through We Are the East, Bollert has also seen the benefits of continued engagement, despite its challenges. While their work may go unrecognized, he sees that eastern Germans鈥 local participation does give them the sense that democracy is working, and that they can eventually create change.127 Bollert also argues that he has seen it help overcome divisions in German society鈥攆rom the Eastern German man who became less skeptical of Western Germans, or the Germans in Leipzig whose attitude towards Syrian refugees became more welcoming over time.128
A city like Leipzig can help encourage these efforts. Bollert suggests supporting grassroots initiatives, finding people already doing the work, and 鈥済iving them a voice, giving them power, giving them money, and trying to build bottom-up.鈥129 This kind of work may take time, but the benefit is that people feel like their work is appreciated.130
However, a city employee with over 20 years of experience in the Leipzig government reflected that while he believes engagement is good, it is not enough to maintain a democracy, and not enough to solve violence.131
Influenced by the city鈥檚 history, K眉gler believes it鈥檚 important to protect the democracy that exists in Leipzig today, and to not give right-wing extremists a chance to destroy that model. To him, it鈥檚 important to be clear 鈥渨here the limit is鈥 for what kind of ideas receive time, attention, and a platform.132
Some specific models of engagement may lend themselves more to co-option than others. For example, political science professor Christiane Olivo noted that the anonymous, virtual participation by the Leipzig Stands Up and Gohlis Says No groups鈥攚hich may have concealed astroturfing efforts by the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party of Germany鈥攔aised questions about the authenticity and legitimacy of such engagement models. In these cases, it wasn鈥檛 clear who in Leipzig supported these groups, how many people these efforts represented, and how many of them actually were Leipzig residents. However, these groups still purported to speak for the population as a whole, misappropriating the historic 1989 chant of 鈥淲e are the people.鈥 Therefore, it is important for anonymous and virtual engagement to include measures of authentication.133
Ultimately, Olivo argues that, 鈥渕odern democracy combines constitutional guarantees with popular sovereignty鈥 It tempers pure democracy with liberal elements.鈥 Such a model recognizes that the people are not a sovereign monolith, and prioritizes a balance between engagement and respect for liberal democratic protections.134
In Weyh鈥檚 opinion, efforts to strengthen liberal democracy are especially important today. Observing politics today, she sees 鈥渄issatisfaction鈥 and disinterest, and that because people 鈥渘o longer feel represented鈥 or heard, they distance themselves from politics and the state. She believes one consequence is that people become 鈥渧ery receptive to populists with very simple answers,鈥 like the far-right AfD. That scares her. And that has also been her motivation to 鈥渋mplement democracy well鈥 through civic engagement.
Citations
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- Baumg盲rtel, 2021
- Rink, 2021; Franziska Riekewald (City of Leipzig council member, LINKE), interview with the author, August 2021; Mehnert, 2021
- Quentin K眉gler (former speaker of the Jugendparlament, current member of the Southwest Stadtbezirksbeirat with the Green Party, and a volunteer with Stiftung Ecken Wecken), interview with the author, February 2021.
- 鈥淟eipzig Giesst,鈥 OK Lab Leipzig, n.d. Accessed September 2021. .
- Reichert, 2021
- 鈥淎lternativmodelle: Analyse von Kommunalen Beteiligungsmodellen,鈥 Arbeitspaket III des Bilzansprozesses und der Erarbeitung von Handlungsempfehlungen zur B眉rgerbeteiligung als Entscheidungsgrundlage f眉r ein Leipziger Beteiligungsmodell, 2016.
- Keppler interview
- Stadt Leipzig, wie weiter?, 25, 2016
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- Stadt Leipzig, wie weiter?, 2016
- Karsten Gerkens (former leader of the Housing and Urban Development Department), interview with the author, August 2021.
- Reichert, 2021
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- Stadt Leipzig, wie weiter?, 2016
- Elsaesser, 2021
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- Stadt Leipzig, wie wieter?, 2016
- Elsaesser, 2021
- Elsaesser, 2021
- Elsaesser, 2021
- Dienel, et. al., 2009
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- Garcia-Zamor, 255
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- 鈥湷С俨够宄俨鸪卑觳醪鹁卑こ俦 in Leipzig,鈥 Stadt Leipzig, n.d. Accessed September 2021.
- K眉gler, 2021
- Mohammad Okasha (member of the Migrant Council), interview with the author, August 2021.
- Dienel, et. al., 2009
- Stadt Leipzig, wie weiter?, 2016
- Bollert, 2021
- 鈥淲ahl zum Jugendparlament 2021,鈥 Stadt Leipzig, n.d. Accessed September 2021.
- K眉gler, 2021
- Kristina Weyh (City of Leipzig city council member, Gr眉ne), interview with the author, August 2021
- K眉gler, 2021
- Klaus Hinze, 鈥淨uartiersmanagement – Leipzig,鈥 Sozialamt Stadt Leipzig, n.d. Accessed September 2021, .
- Sophie Goldau and Eva Morlang, 鈥淒ie Perspektiven kann die Mehrheit nicht nachvollziehen芦Mohammad Okasha 眉ber seine Ziele f眉r den Migrantenbeirat,鈥 Kreuzer Online, June 17, 2021, .
- Okasha, 2021
- 鈥淒irect Democracy,鈥 Participedia, n.d. Accessed September 2021, .
- Participedia
- Vehrkamp and Tillmann, 2014.
- Vehrkamp and Tillmann, 2014.
- Heinig, 2021
- Dienel, et. al., 2009
- Dienel, et. al., 2009
- Vehrkamp and Tillmann, 2014.
- Garcia-Zamor, 253
- Garcia-Zamor, 256
- Okasha, 2021
- Riekewald, 2021
- Okasha, 2021
- K眉gler, 2021
- Baumg盲rtel, 2021
- Garcia-Zamor
- Riekewald, 2021
- Busch, 2009
- Mehnert, 2021
- Riekewald, 2021
- Weyh, 2021
- Mehnert, 2021
- Stadt Leipzig, wie weiter?, 2016
- Weyh, 2021
- Busch, 2009
- Dienel, et. al., 2009
- Stadt Leipzig, wie weiter?, 24, 2016
- Heinig, 2021
- Riekewald, 2021
- Gerkens, 2021
- Weyh, 2021
- Stadt Leipzig, wie weiter?, 2016
- Heinig, 2021
- Weyh, 2021
- Jill Petzinger, 鈥淣early 8 million long-term residents of Germany can鈥檛 vote in the election,鈥 Quartz, September 11, 2017.
- Tiffany N. Florvil, Mobilizing Black Germany: Afro-German Women and the Making of a Transnational Movement.
- 鈥淧辞辫耻濒补迟颈辞苍,鈥 Stadt Leipzig, n.d. Accessed September 2021.
- 鈥淒as sind Leipzigs neue Stadtr盲te – mit Fotos aller Abgeordneten,鈥 Leipziger Volkszeitung, June 6, 2019, 鈥嬧.
- K眉gler, 2021
- Stadt Leipzig, 鈥淭ransparenz,鈥 Jugendparlament, n.d. Accessed September 2021.
- Okasha, 2021
- Okasha, 2021
- Goldau and Morlang, 2021
- Antar Keith (involved in political groups supporting human rights in Leipzig), interview with the author, August 2021
- Goldau and Morlang, 2021
- Rink, 2021
- Reichert, 2021
- K眉gler, 2021
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- Riekenwald, 2021
- Els盲sser, 2021
- Leipziger Stadtrat, 鈥淚nformation zur Ratsversammlung am 18.07.2012: B眉rgerbeteiligung – weiteres Vorgehen,鈥 Stadt Leipzig.
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- Keith, 2021
- Heinig, 2021
- Stadt Leipzig, wie weiter?, 2016
- Antar Keith, 鈥淏lack Lives Matter protesters ponder a Leipzig branch,鈥 Leipzig Glocal, June 17, 2021.
- Weyh, 2021
- Okasha, 2021
- Garcia-Zamor
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- Hinze, n.d.
- Garcia-Zamor, 258
- Heinig, 2021
- Reiewald, 2021
- Rink, 2021
- Heinig, 2021
- Gerkens, 2021
- Gerkens, 2021
- Els盲sser, 2021
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- Mehnert, 2021
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- Els盲sser, 2021
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- Heinig, 2021
- Keith, 2021; Josa Mania-Schlegel and Valerie Sch枚nian, 鈥淓in Reizendes Viertel,鈥 Zeit, September 2, 2017, .
- Elizabeth Braw, 鈥淎s Germany's far right rises, so does its radical left,鈥 Christian Science Monitor, May 19, 2016, .
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020; K眉gler, 2021
- K眉gler, 2021
- City of Leipzig employee, 2021
- K眉gler, 2021
- K眉gler, 2021鈥嬧
- Bollert, 2021
- Bollert, 2021
- Bollert, 2021
- Bollert, 2021
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- K眉gler, 2021
- Christine Olivo, Berlin Program for Advanced German and European Studies SummerWorkshop, "The Meaning of "Wir Sind das Volk" and the Popular Battle overDemocratic Values," Free University of Berlin. (June 19, 2015)
- Olivo, 2015
Conclusion
For modern cities around the world, government-supported civic engagement has become the new normal. According to a city employee in Leipzig, this is in part because people have more choice now to decide where they live; his grandfather could only travel by horse. Regardless of the time period鈥攐r whether the government in question is a dictatorship or a democracy鈥攈e believes that people are interested in where they live. In today鈥檚 globalized world where there is so much more choice than ever before, people can really 鈥渢ake root where they live,鈥 and become actively involved in their city in a way that鈥檚 different from civic engagement of the past.1
At first glance, Leipzig may appear to be special in its emphasis on engagement, particularly by its residents. Its experience with establishing local democracy over the last 30 years seems too fresh. Its reputation as the Hero City and a "citizen city" can create the impression that there is an inherent climate of participation鈥攕omething that other cities simply couldn鈥檛 replicate. Leipzig civic engagement expert Ralf Els盲sser disagrees. He argues that this climate did not happen simply because of historical events, but that it was created by a culture of freedom and possibility. In particular, he points to the way that residents could be creative about how to use abandoned buildings and public space during the time of a shrinking city. To him, that example points to the broader importance of building a culture of possibility and freedom鈥攚hat he calls 鈥渇ree space,鈥 whether it is physical or metaphorical. 鈥淚f a city has the chance to have free space, whatever that is,鈥 he argues, 鈥渋t is money well invested to support this free space and the use of such free space.鈥
Put another way, Wake Up Corners Foundation board member Thorsten Mehnert explains that, 鈥淚 think you are only a hero city if [you] always give birth to new heroes. You will not remain a hero city if you only adore heroes from the past. You also have to create new ones.鈥
Residents in Leipzig like Barbara Baumg盲rtel certainly are committed to maintaining that civic spirit. After 20 years in the neighborhood association, she still finds that formal errors and bureaucratic hurdles in the participation process, such as the procedure for petitions, can be discouraging. She says that to make change, one needs persistence. Without 鈥渁 lot of time and energy, at some point you will give up.鈥 For her, she credits her persistence to the fact that she is an 鈥渋ncorrigible optimist.鈥
That optimism and persistence is not unique to Leipzig. Countless residents in Germany, the United States, and countries around the world are dedicated to making their cities better. The questions then become whether city governments subscribe to the belief that the governing process is 鈥渂etter with the citizens than without them,鈥 as the city employee described it, and whether they implement that belief well in practice. By sharing lessons from Leipzig, and continuing transatlantic collaboration on issues large and small, hopefully more cities and their residents can work together to support a robust local democracy.
Citations
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
Appendix
Interviewees
Many thanks to the 14 individuals who participated in interviews for this research. Those who have chosen to participate publicly are included in this list. Affiliation is given only for identification. Views of the interviewees reflect their own opinions, not those of their employers or organizations:
Residents
Quentin K眉gler, former speaker of the Jugendparlament, current member of the Southwest Stadtbezirksbeirat with the Green Party, and a volunteer with Stiftung Ecken Wecken
Barbara Baumg盲rtel, former member of the B眉rgerverein Waldstra脽enviertel, e.V.
Mohammad Okasha, current member of the Migrantenbeirat and organizer
J枚rg Reichert, volunteer with OK Lab Leipzig
Christian Bollert, head of media relations with Wir Sind Der Osten
Antar Keith, affiliated with various political groups supporting human rights
Dieter Rink, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research, Deputy Head of the Department of Urban and Environmental Sociology
Thorsten Mehnert, board member of Stiftung Ecken Wecken (Wake Up Corners Foundation)
Ralf El盲sser, civic engagement expert and owner of Civixx
City Officials
Karsten Gerkens, former leader of the Housing and Urban Development Department
Stefan Heinig, former leader of the City Development Department
Politicians
Franziska Riekewald, city councilmember, LINKE
Kristina Weyh, city councilmember, Gr眉ne
Current Municipal Structure
The German constitution establishes a model of government with three levels: local (cities and counties), state, and federal. Article 28 specifically gives municipalities 鈥渢he right to regulate all local affairs,鈥 including granting 鈥渇inancial autonomy鈥 and the right to set and collect local taxes.1 Some tasks are delegated to the municipal government with strict rules about their execution (such as social benefits, public safety, ID laws), and others are mandated tasks without instructions, which gives city governments the ability to implement them as they see fit (such as fire brigades or schools). Finally, voluntary tasks give city governments the ability to regulate local community issues, such as sports facilities.2
As in the United States, city administration, and city council are the most important authorities at the municipal level. Their distribution of power varies by state. In Saxony, and in Leipzig, the mayor leads both the city administration and the city council. Citizens elect city council members and the mayor. Council members are elected by citizens every five years through a proportional representation system that awards parties seats based on the number of votes they receive. After the most recent elections in May 2019, the council includes the CDU (13 seats), The Left (15 seats), the SPD (nine seats), the Greens (15 seats), the AfD (11 seats), the FDP (three seats), the Pirate Party (one seat), WVL (one seat), and The Party (two seats), for 70 total council members.3 The city council then appoints supporting committees, who work on specific issue areas.4 While the mayor leads the city council, the council does have some control over the administration, such as managing 鈥渢he execution, implementation, and compliance with its decisions.鈥5
The current mayor, Burkhard Jung, is a member of the center-left SPD and has been in his position since 2006. Saxony has particularly strong mayors, in part because of their seven year terms and also because they have the highest quorum for impeachment of all 16 German states (requiring 50 percent of the electorate to support a referendum).6 In leading the city administration, the mayor oversees 10 departments, ranging from City Planning Office to the Department of Migration and Integration.7
Referenced City Infrastructure
Full descriptions of the City of Leipzig's programs and infrastructure for civic engagement discussed in this report are included below.
City Council
Citizens can engage in this traditional form of representative democracy by electing council members and bringing issues to their attention once they are in office. However, the Leipzig city council is unique in its use of more direct forms of engagement within this governing institution:
- Youth Parliament (JuPa): Since 2015, the Youth Parliament has existed to represent the interests of the city鈥檚 young population. This body is made up of 20 young Leipzig residents, who must be between 14鈥21 years old and are elected through an online election by other residents in the same age range who have lived in Leipzig for at least three months. Young residents can communicate directly with the youth parliament, attend meetings, and participate in JuPa working groups,8 which discuss culture, free time, and urban development, as well as organization public relations.9 Members from the youth parliament then join the City Council鈥檚 Youth Advisory Council, which is also attended by city council members. JuPa members, as well as young residents, can submit motions to the youth parliament. From there, motions are considered by the youth council, and then passed to the full city council, where it goes through other committees, receives a financial and legal review from the administration, and then can be voted on by the city council. The youth parliament receives support from two city employees, one who helps with 鈥渃ontent-related questions鈥 and collaboration, and another who manages organizational tasks. JuPa representatives serve two-year terms. The first JuPa electoral term began in 2015.10 Members of the youth parliament receive a monthly allowance (as of 2018, 26.20 euros/month for members of the youth parliament, 26.20 euros/month for members of the youth council, and an additional 31.44 euros per youth council meeting). The youth parliament itself has an annual budget of 5,000 euros.11 This body is the only one of its kind in Saxony. There are other youth parliaments in other Saxon and German cities, but they operate as a more limited committee. For example, these parliaments cannot submit motions to the full city council.12
- Subject Area Advisory Councils: In addition to the youth council, the city council has 11 total advisory bodies, specializing on drugs, equality, children and families, migrants, psychiatry, seniors, disability, animal welfare, crime prevention, allotment gardens, and conservation. These boards advise the council on decisions pertaining to their subject area and are made up of residents with expertise on this topic,13 as well as members of the city council.14 Regulations for the advisory councils may vary. For example, 16 members of the Migrant Council are residents of Leipzig with migration backgrounds. Some are appointed by the city and others are directly elected by other residents with similar backgrounds who are at least 18 years old and have lived in Leipzig for at least three months. These councils also have the right to submit motions to the city council.15 However, they do not have their own funding or dedicated budget.16
- Neighborhood Councils: In addition to representation through the city council, the City of Leipzig also includes neighborhood councils. The 10 厂迟补诲迟产别锄颈谤办蝉产别颈谤盲迟别 and 14 翱谤迟蝉肠丑补蹿迟蝉谤盲迟别 act as advisory councils for the neighborhoods and incorporated municipalities of Leipzig, respectively.17
- 厂迟补诲迟产别锄颈谤办蝉产别颈谤盲迟别: The neighborhood councils include 11 members who are appointed by the city council after each election. This process means that many members belong to specific parties, but residents who are not official party members may still be appointed by party representatives in the city council. City residents must be at least 18 years old, an EU citizen, and live in the district to qualify for membership of a council. The city council must consult the neighborhood councils before making a final decision on issues that would impact that district. Additionally, city council committees must review any information submitted by neighborhood councils about their district (鈥淲ichtige Angelegenheiten鈥).18 Finally, the councils receive 50,000 euros in funding from the city each year to carry out projects.19
- 翱谤迟蝉肠丑补蹿迟蝉谤盲迟别: During state municipal reforms, 14 municipalities officially became part of the City of Leipzig. Today, their corresponding municipality councils grant these areas extra political power so that they can 鈥渞etain their public weight鈥 and 鈥減reserve their public identity.鈥 The members of these councils are elected and advise on issues from the Leipzig city council that will impact their municipality. They can also make legal decisions about some local issues, and specially elected representatives can speak at city council assemblies, among other powers.20 Each year, the councils receive funding from the City of Leipzig of six euros per inhabitant.21
City Administration
Within the administration, the City of Leipzig supports several other avenues to engagement:
- 厂迟补诲迟产眉谤辞: The 鈥渃ity office鈥 was originally established in 1998 to 鈥渄evelop new forms of civic involvement and stimulate the dialogue between the city council, the administration, the citizens, and their associations.鈥 A founding principle of the office is to use this position as intermediary and moderator to understand residents鈥 perspectives on public issues in early phases of projects.22 Today, the 厂迟补诲迟产眉谤辞 still provides a 鈥渃ity platform for citizen participation and civic engagement,鈥 and acts as 鈥渁 link to the city administration.鈥 This is a physical office in the city, which often displays, 鈥渁mong other things, exhibitions on urban planning and urban development projects for local democracy, organizes events such as informal participation opportunities, cooperates closely with the volunteer agency, and also publishes information on formal participation procedures for urban planning.鈥23 The office is open for residents to visit five days a week to share feedback or request help.24
- City Initiatives:
- Leipzig weiter denken: This effort began in 2012 with support from the federal government25 to discuss 鈥渜uestions about the future of urban development with the general public鈥26 using tools like future series, online dialogues, and workshops. In 2014, Mayor Jung decided to institutionalize it as an 鈥渦mbrella brand for a new culture of participation.鈥27 Now, the coordination office 鈥淟eipzig Thinking Further鈥 initiative is an ongoing effort to build civic engagement into the traditional administrative process of the city. Officially, LWD falls under the urban development department and often works on issues related to that topic. Additionally, 鈥渢he office also advises other participation procedures from other departments.鈥28 For example, a city department may come to the LWD team for help hosting a representative neighborhood focus group to discuss the details of building a new school.29 They also provide training to other city employees on topics such as moderating,30 and give 鈥渁dvice on promoting volunteering.鈥31 In addition to their work with the 厂迟补诲迟产眉谤辞, the LWD office also monitors the city newspaper to make suggestions to the administration about potential areas for engagement based on residents鈥 priorities.32 As described in the announcement of civic engagement guidelines in 2012, the 鈥減ublic participation coordinator鈥 (B眉rgerbeteiligungskoordination) plays a 鈥渜uality assurance鈥 role, and 鈥渁cts as an interface between the administration, politics, and citizens by mediating, advising, controlling, and moderating.鈥33
- Time-Specific Initiatives: Occasionally, the city 鈥渟upports the promotion of local democracy with specific initiatives,鈥34 such as the Jahr der Demokratie. The Jahr der Demokratie (Year of Democracy) was an effort to 鈥減romote mutual dialogue and strengthen local democracy.鈥
- Quartiersmanagement: Quartiersmanagements are only located in neighborhoods with 鈥渁 strong demand for social stabilization.鈥35 These neighborhood-specific groups are also formed in partnership between nonprofits or associations and city departments. The city and department are responsible for tasks and financing, and the association hires a district moderator who acts as a 鈥渃ontact person鈥 for residents to collaborate with. Like the 厂迟补诲迟产别锄颈谤办蝉产别颈谤盲迟别 and 翱谤迟蝉肠丑补蹿迟蝉谤盲迟别, Quartiersmanagement (neighborhood management) groups act as 鈥渕ediators鈥36 between the administration and its constituents, but the Quartiersmanagement groups are more affiliated with city departments instead of the city council. For some groups, this includes a council (Quartiersrat). In one neighborhood, these are elected positions open to any citizens who live or work in the district and are over 18 years old.37 Unique to the Quartieresmanagement groups is a focus on developing residents鈥 ability to identify problems and become part of the solution. With this aim, they work on issues ranging from urban development to local economic policy, all closely tailored to the specific neighborhood.38 Like the 厂迟补诲迟产别锄颈谤办蝉产别颈谤盲迟别, the Quartiersmanagement groups receive financial support from the city, but are independent.39
- Participatory Budgeting: In February 2021, the Leipzig city council voted to approve a participatory budgeting program starting with the budget for 2023/2024. Residents as young as 14 may propose projects for funding from the 厂迟补诲迟产别锄颈谤办蝉产别颈谤盲迟别.40 Outside of this new process, citizens also have the ability to give input on the annual budget for the city, based on Section 76(1) of the Saxon municipal code. Citizen objections are then recorded on the City website.41
- Civic Engagement List: Since the end of 2017, based on a city council resolution,鈥42 the city has regularly published a list of current civic engagement projects on its website so that residents who are interested in participating can find that information [details from the Wie Weiter PDF].
- Individual Initiatives:
- City Funding: In addition to funding given to the 厂迟补诲迟产别锄颈谤办蝉产别颈谤盲迟别 and 翱谤迟蝉肠丑补蹿迟蝉谤盲迟别, residents and associations may receive city funding for civic engagement and community-related projects43 through specialist funding guidelines.44 To name a few, projects may be related to efforts like promoting engagement in the city and neighborhood (efforts like citizen forums) and collaboration with city projects, as well as individual efforts like the publication of local newspapers, nature conservation, and preserving neighborhood history.45
- Citizen Recognition: The city also has a variety of awards and honors for engaged residents, such as the Golden Badge of Honor and the Certificate of Honor; events recognizing volunteers; and area-specific awards, such as the Sports Club of the Year.46
To implement these different engagement efforts, the city often uses combinations of the following tools: 叠眉谤驳别谤蹿辞谤耻尘, 叠眉谤驳别谤辫濒补迟迟蹿辞谤尘, 叠眉谤驳别谤惫别谤蝉补尘尘濒耻苍驳, Zukunftswerkstatt, Repr盲sentative Befragung/B眉rgerpanel, Online-Kommunikation, etc.47
Based on city documents from 2012, when considering specific goals, conducting needs analyses, and considering potential solutions, the city uses a range of potential engagement tools, including but not limited to the following:
1. To develop project contents, the city may use:
- Information sessions
- "Future workshops"
- General workshops
2. To create a reliable picture of citizen opinions, the city may use:
- Information sessions
- Representative surveys or citizens' panels
- Citizens' assemblies or forums
- Online communication
3. To address conflicts or diverging citizen interests, the city may use:
- Information sessions
- Round table discussions
- Meditation
Another tool used in this phase are commissions, which may be used to address specific issues, such as renaming city streets to replace racist historical figures or names. Commissions with 鈥渒nowledgeable citizens鈥 may give input to the city council.48
Later, during the decision-making phase, the city consults with the district councils (Stadtbezirksbeirat and Ortschaftsrates) and city council to consider different arguments and communicate feedback to the public. At this stage, civic engagement may be used for different purposes:
1. To incorporate public participation in the decision-making: The administration provides information and results from civic engagement 鈥渁s a basis and orientation for further action and decision-making.鈥
2. To communicate feedback to the public, the city may use:
- Information sessions, potentially with the local media
- Citizens' forums
- Citizens' platforms
- Citizens' assemblies
Finally, to provide citizen participation for the project implementation phase, the city may also use project groups.49
Outside of the city government, Leipzig also includes formal and informal infrastructures for engagement, such as citizen initiatives (B眉rgerinitiativen), political parties, and citizen-organized demonstrations.
Of the citizen groups, Vereine (associations) are the most formal and the most powerful. Compared to organizations in the United States, Vereine is most like nonprofits, which may have some staff,50 but are largely run by volunteers. In Leipzig, these groups focus on the quality of life and urban development issues such as green spaces, parking and traffic, and historic buildings. They may also mobilize around local priorities, such as keeping a neighborhood library open. Some have been around for decades, and most of the older ones were established in 1989 during the peaceful revolution (called 鈥Wendekinder,鈥 or 鈥渃hildren of the time of political change鈥).51 They鈥檙e typically run by volunteers, who engage with other associations, organize neighborhood projects, publish district newspapers, hold festivals, and aim to influence city government. To accomplish their goals, Vereine may use tools including petitions, informational meetings, on-site inspections, and letters to administrators, city council members, or advisory group representatives. Between each other, the Vereine also compete for 鈥渃ommitted members, sponsorship money, and financial and other forms of support from the city.鈥52
Citations
- Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 28: Land constitutions鈥擜utonomy of municipalities. Bundesministerium der Justiz und f眉r Verbraucherschutz.
- Stadt Leipzig B眉ro f眉r Ratsangelegenheiten, Blickpunkt Ratsversammlung: Leipzig, September 5, 2019.
- Stadt Leipzig, Blickpunkt Ratsversammlung, 2019
- Stadt Leipzig, Blickpunkt Ratsversammlung, 2019
- Stadt Leipzig, Blickpunkt Ratsversammlung, 2019
- Lokale Demokratie in Sachsen Report (2014)
- Economic Development Office; Youth Welfare Office; Cultural Affairs Office; Municipal Real Estate Office; Office of Legal Affairs; Department of Employment Policy; Department of Migration and Integration; Departments of Communication, Protocol, and International Cooperation; City Treasury; and the City Planning Department: 鈥淟eipzig鈥檚 New Town Hall and Town House,鈥 City of Leipzig, n.d. Accessed September 2021. .
- Jugendparlament der Stadt Leipzig, Das Jugendparlament der Stadt Leipzig: Eine Kurzanleitung, November 2018.
- Stadt Leipzig, 鈥淎rbeitsgruppen,鈥 Jugendparlament, n.d. Accessed September 2021.
- Jugendparlament der Stadt Leipzig, 2018
- Stadt Leipzig, 鈥淭ransparenz,鈥 n.d.
- K眉gler, 2021; Herschel, 2021
- Stadt Leipzig, 鈥湽蟛钩Τ蟛鹁卑こ俦,鈥 Stadtrat, n.d. Accessed September 2021.
- Stadt Leipzig, 鈥淩atsinformation,鈥 n.d. Accessed September 2021.
- Alexandra Athanasopoulou K枚pping, 鈥淰oting in Leipzig MIgrants鈥 Council selection process,鈥 Leipzig Glocal, February 28, 2021,
- Herschel, 2021
- Referat f眉r Gleichstellung von Frau und Mann, Kommunalpolitik…Ja, Ich Will (Leipzig, Germany: City of Leipzig, 2018) .
- Stadt Leipzig, Blickpunkt Ratsversammlung, 2019
- Loch, 2021
- Stadt Leipzig, Blickpunkt Ratsversammlung, 2019
- Loch, 2021
- Edwards and Job van der Meer, 鈥淕ermany: Administration Meets Community,鈥 In: H. Daemen & L. Schaap (eds). Citizen and city; developments in fifteen local democracies. Delft: Eburon, 2000, pp.95-109.
- City of Leipzig employee interviews, 2021
- Stadt Leipzig, 鈥淒as 厂迟补诲迟产眉谤辞 – Anlaufstelle f眉r Fragen zu B眉rgerbeteiligung, Engagement und Stadtplanung,鈥 n.d. Accessed September 2021, .
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- City of Leipzig employee, 2021
- Stadt Leipzig, wie weiter?, 2016
- City of Leipzig employee, 2021
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- Els盲sser, 2021
- City of Leipzig employee, 2021
- City of Leipzig employee, 2020
- Stadt Leipzig, 鈥淶usammenfassung: Leitlinien der B眉rgerbeteiligung,鈥 2012
- City of Leipzig employee, 2021
- Herschel, 2021
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